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Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities
About the Journal
Overview
Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities (JSSH) is the official journal of Universiti Putra Malaysia 
published by UPM Press. It is an open-access online scientific journal which is free of charge. It publishes 
the scientific outputs. It neither accepts nor commissions third party content.
Recognized internationally as the leading peer-reviewed interdisciplinary journal devoted to the 
publication of original papers, it serves as a forum for practical approaches to improving quality in issues 
pertaining to social and behavioural sciences as well as the humanities.  
JSSH is a quarterly (March, June, September and December) periodical that considers for publication 
original articles as per its scope. The journal publishes in English and it is open to authors around the 
world regardless of the nationality.  
The Journal is available world-wide.
Aims and scope
Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities aims to develop as a pioneer journal for the social 
sciences with a focus on emerging issues pertaining to the social and behavioural sciences as well as 
the humanities. 
Areas relevant to the scope of the journal include Social Sciences—Accounting, anthropology, 
Archaeology and history, Architecture and habitat, Consumer and family economics, Economics, 
Education, Finance, Geography, Law, Management studies, Media and communication studies, Political 
sciences and public policy, Population studies, Psychology, Sociology, Technology management, Tourism; 
Humanities—Arts and culture, Dance, Historical and civilisation studies, Language and Linguistics, 
Literature, Music, Philosophy, Religious studies, Sports.
History
Pertanika was founded in 1978. A decision was made in 1992 to streamline Pertanika into three journals 
as Journal of Tropical Agricultural Science, Journal of Science & Technology, and Journal of Social 
Sciences & Humanities to meet the need for specialised journals in areas of study aligned with the 
interdisciplinary strengths of the university. 
After almost 25 years, as an interdisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities, the revamped 
journal focuses on research in social and behavioural sciences as well as the humanities, particularly in 
the Asia Pacific region.
Goal of Pertanika
Our goal is to bring the highest quality research to the widest possible audience.
Quality 
We aim for excellence, sustained by a responsible and professional approach to journal publishing.  
Submissions are guaranteed to receive a decision within 14 weeks. The elapsed time from submission 
to publication for the articles averages 5-6 months. 
Abstracting and indexing of Pertanika
Pertanika is almost 40 years old; this accumulated knowledge has resulted in Pertanika JSSH being 
abstracted and indexed in SCOPUS (Elsevier), Thomson (ISI) Web of Knowledge [BIOSIS & CAB Abstracts], 
EBSCO & EBSCOhost, DOAJ, Cabell’s Directories, Google Scholar, MyAIS, ISC & Rubriq (Journal Guide).
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Future vision
We are continuously improving access to our journal archives, content, and research services.  We have 
the drive to realise exciting new horizons that will benefit not only the academic community, but society 
itself. 
Citing journal articles
The abbreviation for Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities is Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. Hum.
Publication policy
Pertanika policy prohibits an author from submitting the same manuscript for concurrent consideration 
by two or more publications.  It prohibits as well publication of any manuscript that has already been 
published either in whole or substantial part elsewhere. It also does not permit publication of manuscript 
that has been published in full in Proceedings. 
Code of Ethics
The Pertanika Journals and Universiti Putra Malaysia takes seriously the responsibility of all of its 
journal publications to reflect the highest in publication ethics. Thus all journals and journal editors are 
expected to abide by the Journal’s codes of ethics. Refer to Pertanika’s Code of Ethics for full details, or 
visit the Journal’s web link at http://www.pertanika.upm.edu.my/code_of_ethics.php
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
An ISSN is an 8-digit code used to identify periodicals such as journals of all kinds and on all media–print 
and electronic. All Pertanika journals have ISSN as well as an e-ISSN. 
Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities: ISSN 0128-7702 (Print);  ISSN 2231-8534 (Online).
Lag time 
A decision on acceptance or rejection of a manuscript is reached in 3 to 4 months (average 14 weeks). 
The elapsed time from submission to publication for the articles averages 5-6 months. 
Authorship
Authors are not permitted to add or remove any names from the authorship provided at the time of 
initial submission without the consent of the Journal’s Chief Executive Editor.
Manuscript preparation
Refer to Pertanika’s Instructions to Authors at the back of this journal.
Most scientific papers are prepared according to a format called IMRAD. The term represents the first 
letters of the words Introduction, Materials and Methods, Results, And, Discussion. IMRAD is simply 
a more ‘defined’ version of the “IBC” [Introduction, Body, Conclusion] format used for all academic 
writing. IMRAD indicates a pattern or format rather than a complete list of headings or components of 
research papers; the missing parts of a paper are: Title, Authors, Keywords, Abstract, Conclusions, and 
References. Additionally, some papers include Acknowledgments and Appendices. 
The Introduction explains the scope and objective of the study in the light of current knowledge on the 
subject; the Materials and Methods describes how the study was conducted; the Results section reports 
what was found in the study; and the Discussion section explains meaning and significance of the results 
and provides suggestions for future directions of research. The manuscript must be prepared according 
to the Journal’s Instructions to Authors.
Editorial process
Authors are notified with an acknowledgement containing a Manuscript ID on receipt of a manuscript, 
and upon the editorial decision regarding publication. 
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s Pertanika follows a double-blind peer-review process. Manuscripts deemed suitable for publication 
are usually sent to reviewers.  Authors are encouraged to suggest names of at least three potential 
reviewers at the time of submission of their manuscript to Pertanika, but the editors will make the final 
choice. The editors are not, however, bound by these suggestions. 
Notification of the editorial decision is usually provided within ten to fourteen weeks from the receipt 
of manuscript.  Publication of solicited manuscripts is not guaranteed.  In most cases, manuscripts are 
accepted conditionally, pending an author’s revision of the material.
As articles are double-blind reviewed, material that might identify authorship of the paper should be 
placed only on page 2 as described in the first-4 page format in Pertanika’s Instructions to Authors 
given at the back of this journal. 
The Journal’s peer-review
In the peer-review process, three referees independently evaluate the scientific quality of the submitted 
manuscripts. 
Peer reviewers are experts chosen by journal editors to provide written assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of written research, with the aim of improving the reporting of research and identifying the 
most appropriate and highest quality material for the journal.
Operating and review process
What happens to a manuscript once it is submitted to Pertanika?  Typically, there are seven steps to the 
editorial review process:
1. The Journal’s chief executive editor and the editorial board examine the paper to determine 
whether it is appropriate for the journal and should be reviewed.  If not appropriate, the 
manuscript is rejected outright and the author is informed. 
2. The chief executive editor sends the article-identifying information having been removed, to 
three reviewers.  Typically, one of these is from the Journal’s editorial board.  Others are 
specialists in the subject matter represented by the article.  The chief executive editor asks 
them to complete the review in three weeks.  
Comments to authors are about the appropriateness and adequacy of the theoretical or 
conceptual framework, literature review, method, results and discussion, and conclusions. 
Reviewers often include suggestions for strengthening of the manuscript.  Comments to the 
editor are in the nature of the significance of the work and its potential contribution to the 
literature.
3. The chief executive editor, in consultation with the editor-in-chief, examines the reviews and 
decides whether to reject the manuscript, invite the author(s) to revise and resubmit the 
manuscript, or seek additional reviews.  Final acceptance or rejection rests with the Edito-
in-Chief, who reserves the right to refuse any material for publication.  In rare instances, 
the manuscript is accepted with almost no revision.  Almost without exception, reviewers’ 
comments (to the author) are forwarded to the author.  If a revision is indicated, the editor 
provides guidelines for attending to the reviewers’ suggestions and perhaps additional advice 
about revising the manuscript. 
4. The authors decide whether and how to address the reviewers’ comments and criticisms and 
the editor’s concerns.  The authors return a revised version of the paper to the chief executive 
editor along with specific information describing how they have answered’ the concerns 
of the reviewers and the editor, usually in a tabular form. The author(s) may also submit 
a rebuttal if there is a need especially when the author disagrees with certain comments 
provided by reviewer(s).
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5. The chief executive editor sends the revised paper out for re-review.  Typically, at least one of 
the original reviewers will be asked to examine the article. 
6. When the reviewers have completed their work, the chief executive editor in consultation 
with the editorial board and the editor-in-chief examine their comments and decide whether 
the paper is ready to be published, needs another round of revisions, or should be rejected. 
7. If the decision is to accept, an acceptance letter is sent to all the author(s), the paper is sent to 
the Press. The article should appear in print in approximately three months. 
The Publisher ensures that the paper adheres to the correct style (in-text citations, the 
reference list, and tables are typical areas of concern, clarity, and grammar).  The authors are 
asked to respond to any minor queries by the Publisher.  Following these corrections, page 
proofs are mailed to the corresponding authors for their final approval.  At this point, only 
essential changes are accepted.  Finally, the article appears in the pages of the Journal and is 
posted on-line. 
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Preface
Alhamdulillah, with the grace of Allah s.w.t., this Special Edition of the Pertanika Journal of 
Social Sciences and Humanities is finally complete. This Issue comprises of selected papers 
from the International Conference on Law, Order and Criminal Justice, which took place on 19th 
and 20th November 2014, at the beautiful ISTAC Campus. The Conference was hosted by the 
Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, IIUM, in collaboration with the Malaysian Judiciary, the Royal 
Malaysian Police, the Institute of Public Security Malaysia (IPSOM) and the National Council of 
Professors. The Conference focused on the modern criminal justice system with the aim of looking 
at the effectiveness of this existing system as a comprehensive system of controlling crimes and 
ensuring the safety of the public through various institutions, which are directed at maintaining 
social order and minimising crimes. In lieu of the challenges of the current criminal justice system, 
this Conference adopted the term “Law, Order and Criminal Justice” to cover all the different 
agencies and organisations involved in enforcing law and order, preventing crimes and meting out 
punishments, as well as how they work together in establishing the principles of equity, fairness 
and justice.
In this fast-changing world, these practices and institutions cannot remain static. They must 
change and evolve as criminals and syndicates also adopt sophisticated tactics to commit various 
types of crimes. On top of that, new technologies such as ICT and biotechnology further challenge 
the traditional notions and “forms” of crimes. As such, these have an impact to the collection 
of evidence as well as the need to revisit the appropriateness of the existing punishments. The 
forces of globalisation and international trade have also given rise to new commercial crimes 
across borders that require rethinking of traditional concepts such as criminality, evidence 
gathering and punishment.
 The theme of the Conference, “Criminal Justice Systems in the 21st Century: Spirit, Forms and 
Challenges”, reflects all the various tensions faced by the modern criminal justice system in all 
its five pillars, namely, the community, the law enforcement agencies and mechanisms, the 
prosecution, the court and the correctional system. Should we strive to achieve the main spirit 
behind criminal punishments alone? Do the forms of punishments matter? If so, what are the 
main challenges in meting out punishments?
 In order to unearth the various issues surrounding criminal justice, the Conference organisers 
accepted papers based on eight broad themes, namely; crimes against the state; commerce 
and new forms of crimes; new technologies and the criminal justice system; punishment and 
reform; law enforcement; judiciary and administration of justice; criminal evidence and other 
related issues on criminal justice. The Conference also encouraged papers which offered Islamic 
perspectives on issues surrounding these themes.
During the Conference, a total of 51 papers were presented by participating speakers from Brunei, 
Maldives, Nigeria, Iran, Palestine, Singapore and Indonesia. On the local front, Malaysian law 
schools also participated with the presenters from the University of Malaya, National University 
of Malaysia, MARA University of Technology, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia, Universiti Utara 
Malaysia, as well as the host institution, the International Islamic University Malaysia. A total 
of 18 papers were carefully chosen for this Special edition. In these papers, the authors have 
rigorously examined and discussed recent developments on criminal justice in their national legal 
system. It is hoped that their academic endeavour will serve to initiate broader discussions on 
the effectiveness of the criminal justice system not only at the domestic front but also regionally 
and internationally.
The publication of these papers would not have been possible without the support of the Kulliyyah, 
and the Dean, Prof. Dr. Hunud Abia Kadouf, as well as the team of reviewers who carried out the 
review within such a short time frame. Without their tireless and selfless assistance, this edition 
would not have been a reality. For them and the Kulliyyah, we wish to express our sincerest 
gratitude and heartfelt appreciation. 
Last but not least, this issue is a concerted effort made possible with the help of Dr. Nayan Kanwal, 
the Chief Executive Editor, and his dedicated Pertanika team at the Journal Division, UPM, who 
rendered us their generous guidance and commitment in bringing this edition to print.
It is our deepest hope and prayers that all these efforts will be rewarded with the choicest 
blessings from Allah s.w.t.
Jazakamullahu khairan kathira.
Guest Editors, 
Ida Madieha bt. Abdul Ghani Azmi (Prof. Dr.) 
Majdah Zawawi (Assoc. Prof. Dr.) 
Sonny Zulhuda (Assoc. Prof. Dr)
Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, IIUM 
October 2015
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ABSTRACT
The formal dispensation of criminal justice in pluralistic legal systems has continued to 
generate academic interest in the last few decades. This has always been influenced by the 
colonial and post-colonial historical legal reforms in the African continent. Islamic law 
has played a very significant role in the evolution of the modern nomenclature of legal 
systems of some of African countries, particularly the common law-based jurisdictions. 
The application of Islamic law, particularly its criminal justice component, was relegated 
to mere personal matters as part of the colonial baggage, and it has been a struggling to 
re-assert itself in some North, East and West African countries. This article therefore 
examines the dynamics of the application of the Islamic criminal justice system in Africa 
and the role of mufti based on a case study of a recent apostasy case in Sudan. While 
the case, as well as the decision of the court, cheated a maelstrom of controversy and 
rekindled the narratives of human rights activists globally on the sacrosanct nature of 
freedom of religion, Muslim jurists have argued that Islamic law provides punishments for 
specific offences such as hudud, qisas and diyyah; the rationale behind such punishments 
is not only to punish the offenders, but also to deter other people from committing 
the same offence. For apostasy issues, there is a kind of link established between this 
offence and treasonable felony in Islamic 
legal discourse, which might warrant 
capital punishment. Having reviewed 
these diverse positions, the article finds 
that Islamic legal principles and maxims 
contain numerous principles that should 
guide the judge in arriving at a decision, 
particularly when it relates to such a serious 
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offence. This is where the mufti plays his 
role in advising the judge on core issues in 
a case while taking into consideration the 
context of each case. In the Sudanese case 
of Mariam Yahia Ibrahim, the trial judge 
should have looked beyond the content of 
the statute by seeking further clarifications 
from a learned mufti in order to ascertain 
the social and religious background of the 
parties involved.
Keywords: Islamic criminal justice system, role of a 
Muftī, apostasy, Mariam Yahia Ibrahim
INTRODUCTION
Since colonialism established its footprints 
on African soil with its attendant legal 
reforms to the existing legal orders, which 
were subjected to the English rules, there 
has been series of controversy on the nature 
of the Islamic criminal justice system. 
Even before the advent of the colonial 
overlords, the primitive African legal 
orders have been largely pluralised; hence, 
the plethora of legal orders introduced 
was a by-product of legal pluralism in 
most parts of the continent. This in turn 
has affected the form and practice of the 
Islamic legal system. The restrictions 
and limitations introduced during the 
colonial era, which assumed further legal 
acculturation in the post-colonial era, have 
re-shaped the nature of the Islamic criminal 
justice system (Olayanju et al., 2013). 
Even the Sharī‘ah Peal Codes introduced 
in some Northern states in Nigeria based 
on the earlier Sudanese experiment are also 
by-products of the modern legal system 
which is based on the colonial legacy. For 
instance, codification of   the Sharī‘ah penal 
laws was never known to classical Islamic 
legal philosophy (Suberu, 2009).
While one may argue that codifying 
certain laws might foreclose the opportunity 
for hermeneutical interpretation based on 
the views of learned jurists, it is necessary 
to revisit the role of a mufti, a qualified 
learned jurist who can give a non-binding 
ruling on an issue referred to him, in the 
dispensation of criminal justice system. 
Specifically, this article examines the role 
of a mufti in the criminal justice system 
in Africa, with an important case study of 
the Sudan apostasy case of Mariam Yahia 
Ibrahim [2014], which recently sparked 
international concern among human 
rights activists and conservative religious 
scholars.
Apostasy is one of the capital offences 
under Islamic criminal law, which attracts 
a death penalty after the accused person 
has been convicted, and after all the 
requirements of the law are satisfied. 
Nevertheless, a golden principle under 
Islamic criminal law provides that doubt 
of any kind should be avoided in deciding 
criminal cases, for it is not the pride or sole 
aim of the law to execute a sentence against 
the accused. However, the law is out to see 
that justice has been done to the accused 
persons. That is why Islamic law sets out 
some requirements and conditions, general 
principles and exceptions, as well as rules 
of procedure for dealing with each and 
every case. This is to ensure that justice has 
been done to all, and also to maintain the 
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position and objective of Islam towards the 
protection of innocent persons. The recent 
Sudanese case of Mariam Ibrahim on 
apostasy has again brought to the limelight 
some contentious legal issues within the 
Islamic criminal justice system.1
 In line with the dynamism of Islamic 
law, qualified Muslim jurists might need 
to clarify jurisprudential issues in their 
advisory capacity to judges in the Sharī‘ah 
court in order to enhance and improve the 
Islamic criminal justice system (Oseni, 
2015). In view of these issues, the article 
examines the Mariam’s case with a view to 
explore the role of muftīs (jurist-consults) 
in the administration of the criminal justice 
system. In doing so, the article first provides 
a background analysis on the Islamic 
concepts of judiciary and the criminal 
justice system, followed by a brief overview 
of the Mariam Yahia Ibrahim’s case. 
Furthermore, the article discusses the legal 
position of apostasy in Islamic law, its rules 
and limitations, with a view to understand 
the actual position of the Sharī‘ah on the 
matter based on the most popular opinion 
of Muslim jurists. Similarly, in laying a 
proper foundation for the analysis, a brief 
background on the administration of fatwā 
and the role of muftī in some African states 
has been equally highlighted to provide the 
backbone of the study.
1 The apostasy case of Mariam Ibrahim is not 
the first of its kind in Sudan to be determined by 
a court of law. A similar case of a Nuba Muslim 
school teacher named Al Faki Kuku Hassan 
who converted to Christianity in 1998 was also 
another example of an apostasy case (Kadouf, 
2001, pp. 56-57).
JUDICIARY AND THE ISLAMIC 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In Islam, judiciary is an important sector in 
the administration of the criminal justice 
system, which plays a very significant role 
in the dispensation of justice. It adjudicates 
disputes between parties in accordance 
with the law, which is usually based on 
legal texts (nusus) and further extrapolated 
and expounded by Muslim jurists (Zaidan, 
2006). Despite the role of the judiciary in 
adjudicating matters between disputing 
parties, one of the fundamental things to 
understand about the judiciary in relation 
to the criminal justice system is its role 
in ensuring that laws are applied properly 
in order to protect people’s lives, honour 
and property. Hence, not an iota of doubt 
will be allowed to overshadow justice; 
parties are to be given equal treatment in 
accordance with the law; and Maqāsid al-
Sharī‘ah or the higher objectives of the law 
are expected to be upheld in criminal cases 
with a view to attaining justice (Mamman 
et al., 2011). It is not the primary objective 
of the Sharī‘ah to enforce punishments or 
execute sentences against offenders, but to 
ensure that justice, peace and tranquillity 
prevail in the society.
The judiciary from the Islamic 
perspective is defined as an official 
authoritative organ of the state, where 
disputing parties have their matters 
resolved and their rights and duties 
enforced in accordance with the clear-cut 
legal principles, which are basically based 
on the Qur’an and Sunnah. Historically, 
the concept of adjudication between 
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disputant parties is an old phenomenon. 
It has been known even before the advent 
of the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.). The 
Qur’an has confirmed that the system 
of adjudication has existed even during 
the reigns of the earlier Prophets and 
Messengers of Allah.2 The legal basis of 
the Islamic judicial system or adjudication 
has been equally provided for in the 
Prophetic precedents. For instance, the 
Prophet once said,  “If a judge gives a 
judgment using his best judgment and is 
correct, then he receives a double reward 
(from God). If he uses his best judgment 
but makes a mistake, then he receives a 
single reward.” (Sahih Bukhari, Hadith No. 
6919 and Sahih Muslim, Hadith No.1716).
The Prophet was the first person to act 
in the capacity of a judge in Islam while he 
was in Medina. He equally used to appoint 
people to serve as judges in other cities. 
Among his appointees were `Utab Ibn 
Asyad who was sent to Mecca, and Ali Ibn 
Abu Talib and Muadh Ibn Jabal, both of 
whom were sent to Yemen (Azad, 1994). 
2 For instance, Qur’an 21: 78-79 provides: 
“And remember David and Solomon, when 
they gave judgment concerning the field when 
people’s sheep had browsed therein at night, 
and We were witnesses to their judgment. And 
We made Solomon to understand the case. 
And to each of them, We gave good judgment 
and knowledge.” Also, Qur’an 38: 26 gives a 
similar insight into the adjudication process 
as practiced by previous prophets: “O David, 
verily we have placed you as a successor on 
Earth, so judge between people in truth, and do 
not follow your desires for it will mislead you 
from the path of God. Verily, those who stray 
from the path of God have a severe punishment 
because they forgot the day of reckoning.”
Similarly, during the era of the Khulafā’ (the 
Rightly Guided Caliphs: Abubakar Siddiq 
(r.a), Umar Ibn Alkhattab (r.a), Uthman Ibn 
Affan (r.a) and Ali Ibn Abi Talib (r.a)), the 
head of state continued to play such role 
of appointing judges to ensure effective 
dispensation of justice (Alqasimi, 2001). 
As a result, the judicial system continued 
to evolve in this manner throughout the 
early Islamic era, during the Umayyad 
and Abbasid eras. Later in the subsequent 
period (period of Tabi‘un – the followers of 
the companions), the office of Chief Justice 
(qādi al-qudāt) came into being. The Chief 
Justice was responsible for supervising 
the judicial conduct and performance. The 
first person to be appointed to this position 
was a leading associate of Abu Hanifah, 
Imam Abu Yusuf, who took up the position 
upon the refusal of the former. Thereafter, 
the office of the Chief Justice became 
widespread throughout the Muslim world 
and it existed up to the eventual fall of the 
Ottoman Empire in the early decades of the 
20th century (Alqasimi, 2001).
The judiciary is one of the vehicles 
to be used in attaining the proper and 
effective administration of criminal 
justice through the law. Thus, the Islamic 
criminal justice system is regulated by 
the principles of Islamic injunctions that 
are found in the Qur’an, Hadith, ijma 
(consensus of opinions of the Muslim 
jurists), qiyas (analogical deduction from 
the Qur’an, Hadith and ijma) and ijtihad 
(independent legal reasoning of a Muslim 
jurist) (Mammam et al., 2001). This system 
of criminal justice has many features in 
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abundance that distinguish it from other 
systems. It provides for a criminal process, 
whereby all cases are justly examined and 
ascertained so that justice is meted to all 
the parties in a case (Zubair, 1994).  In 
light of this, there is a popular principle 
under the Sharī‘ah which provides that 
everybody shall be criminally responsible 
for his action or omission.3 The lesson to 
be learned from this principle is that textual 
provisions of Sharī‘ah have recognised the 
concept of criminal responsibility under the 
Islamic corpus juris; hence, it is not simply 
based on analogy. In fact, the concept of 
criminal responsibility under the Sharī‘ah 
depends on the commission of an offence, 
and the age of the accused person; whether 
or not the accused person has attained the 
age of majority. That is, a person can only 
be criminally responsible for an offence 
only if he attains the age of majority. Thus, 
in a Hadith, the Prophet says:
“Do you know that no actions whether 
good or evil are recorded for the following: 
an insane person till he becomes sane; a 
child till he attains the age of puberty; and 
a sleeping person till he awakes. All are 
3 To this end, Qur’an 53: 38 provides: “That no 
burden person (with sin) shall bear the burden 
(sin) of another.” In a similar verse, Qur’an 
35: 18 reads, “And no bearer of burdens shall 
bear another’s burden, and if one heavily laden 
calls another to bear his load, nothing of it will 
be lifted even though he be near of kin…” In 
yet another verse, Qur’an 17:15 provides: 
“Whoever goes right, then he goes right only 
for the benefit of his own self. And whoever 
goes astray, then he goes astray to his own loss. 
No one laden with burdens can bear another’s 
burden. And we never punish until we have sent 
a messenger (to give warning)”.
not responsible for what they do.” (Sunan 
al–Tirmidhi 4/32 and Sunan Abu Dawūd 
4/558)
Furthermore, another aspect that is very 
important to note under the Islamic criminal 
justice system is the concept of proof. 
Crimes under the Sharī‘ah can be proven in 
any of the following methods: bayyinah (by 
adducing evidence), shahādah (witness) 
and/or iqrar (confession) (Zubair, 1994). 
The standard of proof is to prove the case 
beyond any shadow of a doubt, failure of 
which, it should be resolved in favour of 
the accused person. If the matter has been 
proven beyond any shadow of a doubt, 
the accused person, therefore, should be 
subjected to the punishment as prescribed 
by the law. In the Islamic criminal justice 
system, three categories of punishments 
are provided: qisas (retaliatory penalty), 
hudud (prescribed punishments) and ta’zir 
(discretionary punishments) (Zubair, 
1994). In addition to the proof of guilty, 
the Islamic criminal justice system has 
put in place some rules upon which the 
administration of criminal justice should 
be based, namely: principle of legality (i.e., 
no law should be applied retrospectively) 
and every person should be treated equally 
before the law (Zubair, 1994).
THE MARIAM YAHIA IBRAHIM’S 
CASE
The accused person, Mariam Ibrahim, was 
born in 1987 to a Muslim Sudanese father 
and a Christian Ethiopian mother. She was 
brought up by her Christian mother after 
her parents were divorced. In December 
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2011, Mariam married a Christian man 
in Khartoum, and ten months after, she 
gave birth to a son named Martin on 25th 
October 2012. Later, she was convicted 
by the Sudanese Sharī‘ah Court, and 
subsequently imprisoned on the allegation 
that she committed riddah (conversion) 
and zina (fornication). While in the prison 
custody, she gave birth to a baby girl called 
Maya on 27th May 2014.
A brief background of the facts 
surrounding the conviction will shed 
more light on the issue. The underlying 
philosophy upon which the court’s 
judgment was premised is summarised 
thus: by virtue of being a Muslim-born 
daughter whose father equally died as 
a Muslim, Mariam is presumed to be a 
Muslim under the Sharī‘ah, since a child’s 
religion depends on the religion of his/
her paternal parent. On this basis, Mr. 
Alsmni Alhadi, one of her relatives, lodged 
a complaint against the accused person, 
alleging that she had abandoned her father’s 
religion. This subsequently led to her arrest 
by the public order police on 15 September 
2013. The complaint contained allegations, 
among other things, that the accused person 
by virtue of being born a Muslim should 
not have married a non-Muslim, therefore 
her purported marriage to a Christian man 
amounted to fornication; that the accused 
person who was born as a Muslim and of 
course, by a Muslim father, has committed 
riddah by denouncing her father’s religion, 
thus, she should be punished according to 
the Sharī‘ah (African Justice and Peace 
Studies, 2014). In the end, the court on 15th 
May 2014 found the accused person guilty 
of fornication and apostasy and accordingly 
convicted her.
Mariam was sentenced to 100 lashes 
and death penalty, respectively. Before 
the execution of the sentence, the court 
ordered the accused person to recant her 
faith within three days or face a possible 
death sentence by hanging. Dissatisfied 
with the judgement, on the 22nd day of May 
2014, an appeal was filed before the Appeal 
Court. While waiting for the appeal, the 
news reached the public that the accused 
person had given birth to a baby in the 
Prison yard. As a result of that, the accused 
was transferred to the Prison clinic in order 
to have access to good medical care for 
medical facilities in Omdurman Women’s 
Prison were insufficient to provide adequate 
post-natal care to the accused. In reaction 
to the current condition of the accused, 
many international non-governmental 
organisations began to condemn the entire 
incident and demanded the unconditional 
release of the accused person. They equally 
maintained that the arraignment, trial 
and conviction were clear violations of 
human rights provisions contained in the 
United Nations Charter, African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights, as well as 
the Sudan Constitution and Criminal laws 
(African Justice and Peace Studies, 2014). 
According to the Sudanese law:
“Every person shall have the right to 
the freedom of religious creed and worship, 
and to declare his/her religion or creed and 
manifest the same, by way of worship, 
education, practice or performance of rites 
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or ceremonies, subject to requirements 
of law and public order; no person shall 
be coerced to adopt such faith that he/
she does not believe in, nor to practice 
rites or services to which he/she does not 
voluntarily consent.” (Article 38 on the 
Freedom of Creed and Worship of Sudan’s 
Bill of Rights)
Despite the issue of human rights 
raised by the international community in 
relation to the above matter, there are also 
certain legal and jurisprudential issues 
that are involved, which are pertinent to 
the criminal proceedings. The Sharī‘ah 
judges themselves, or with the support of 
muftīs, are required to resolve them before 
determining the guilt or otherwise of the 
accused person. The issues include among 
other things the determination of who is 
an apostate? Does apostasy really have a 
nexus with one’s parental background? 
What is the status of a Muslim born child 
who was brought up under the custody of 
a non-Muslim parent? Can it be considered 
as a riddah (apostasy) if his/her non-
Muslim parent converted him/her during 
childhood? Can a child be responsible for 
criminal offence under the Sharī‘ah? Can 
a female apostate be subjected to a death 
penalty? What is the maqsad (purpose) of 
punishing the offenders in Islamic law? In 
fact, all these issues are very important to 
the case in question. Hence, they would be 
considered in the relevant sections of this 
article. Meanwhile, it is argued that some 
modern Sharī‘ah court judges may not have 
the requisite knowledge and expertise to 
address all the jurisprudential issues before 
arriving at a well-reasoned judgment; 
hence, the need to consider the views of 
learned muftis who might be able to advise 
such judges. The proto-jurists played this 
great role in advising judges on the best 
legal position on issues, particularly when 
one considers the specific context of a case 
and the prevailing social realities (Hallaq, 
2005).
APOSTASY IN ISLAM: RULES AND 
LIMITATIONS
In Arabic language, the term riddah is often 
used to describe apostasy, which is defined 
as the conversion of a Muslim faithful to 
a religion other than Islam (Alalwani, 
2012). The term ‘apostasy’, therefore, 
conveys the sense of turning away from 
Islam after one has previously professed 
the faith in accordance with what God has 
commanded (Alalwani, 2012). The word 
riddah is captured in the Qur’anic word 
“yartaddah”, i.e., the act of turning away or 
apostatising from Islam. In the Qur’an, the 
Almighty Allah says: “…And whosoever 
of you turns from his own religion (Islam) 
and dies as a believer, then his deeds will 
be lost in this life and the Hereafter, and 
they will be dwellers of Fire. They will 
abide therein forever” (Qur’an 2:217). The 
term irtaddah in the verse seems to have 
been used for conversion from Islam into 
disbelief (kufr). Therefore, as irtaddah 
represents the process or conversion to 
another religion, the person (apostate) 
who has converted from Islam to another 
religion is referred to as “murtadd”. This, 
according to some opinions, includes any 
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person born of Muslim parents who later 
rejects Islam. To this end, there are two 
types of apostate: murtadd fitri (inborn 
or natural, or instinctive apostate) and 
murtadd milli (one who converts to Islam 
and subsequently leaves it) (Council of Ex-
Muslims of Britain 2013).
However, even though the Qur’an 
condemns the act of riddah, some Muslim 
jurists have argued that there is no divinely 
revealed punishment provided for such 
act in the divine book to the effect that 
everyone who reverts to kufr after having 
believed is to be put to death. Similarly, 
some scholars have criticised some of the 
ahādith (prophetic traditions), which other 
scholars have been relying on to decree the 
death penalty for apostasy. This is based 
on the reasons identified by the jurists, 
such as lack of clear indication from the 
action of the Prophet that an apostate who 
merely converts to another religion should 
be put to death. Had it been the actual 
intent of his traditions to decree a death 
penalty to apostasy simpliciter (without 
any connection with a treasonable act), 
he would not have hesitated to classify it 
under the specific crimes (hudūd). One of 
the most popular traditions widely cited 
among Muslim jurists regarding the death 
penalty against apostates is a hadith that 
says, “If anyone changes his religion, put 
him to death.” Some jurists are of the view 
that the hadith was not about killing an 
apostate who converts to another religion, 
but it is connected with the case of Jewish 
leaders who were working to undermine the 
Prophet, his revelation and his mission in 
every way possible by spreading falsehood 
about Muslims in Madinah, plotting 
divisions and undermining the Muslim 
Ummah (community). Hence, it has been 
explained that the Prophet never executed 
any apostate on the ground that he/she 
converts to another religion (Alalwani, 
2012). An additional instance that calls 
for some modicum of caution pertaining 
to death penalty against an apostate is the 
event that culminated into the “Treaty of 
Hudaybiyyah”; this involved a peace treaty 
between the Muslims and the Quraysh tribe 
in Makkah in 627 CE, in which the parties 
agreed to cease warfare for ten years. The 
Truce of Hudaybiyyah was to remain in 
effect for ten years but held only for two 
years as it was violated by the Quraysh. 
The Truce was a good indication of the 
Prophet never prescribed punishment for 
the act of committing apostasy because the 
key condition of the agreement would have 
forced him to ignore this principle, if it 
ever existed, and of course, he would never 
violate any directive of Allah whether 
for the sake of political expediency or 
any other reason. According to the treaty, 
anyone choosing to leave the Muslim camp 
would be allowed to return to the Quraysh, 
freely without reprisal. The treaty offered 
an important prospect for peace without 
violating any command of Allah. This 
fact cannot be ignored (Alalwani, 2012). 
Another important reason for debunking 
the death penalty against apostates by some 
Muslim jurists is the established fact that 
never in the entire life of the Prophet did he 
put an apostate to death. If he had known 
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that he had been commanded to do so by 
the Almighty Allah, he would not have 
hesitated to carry out Allah’s command 
(Alalwani, 2012).
Even some of the Prophet’s 
companions, as well as jurists of later 
centuries, had equally held the opinions 
that the apostate should not be killed as a 
result of his mere conversion. Among such 
Companions were Umar Ibn al-Khattab 
(d.644), Ibrahim al-Nakha’i (d.715) and 
Sufyan al-Thawri (d.778). Umar Ibn al-
Kattab had even suggested that an apostate 
should better be casted into the prison 
and asked him to repent than terminating 
his life. Perhaps, he may repent and obey 
the commands of Allah. Meanwhile, later 
jurists such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Rashid Rida, 
Maududi and Faruqi were among those 
who disagreed on meting out punishment 
for a mere apostasy. However, they allowed 
the punishment to be executed only by the 
state in cases where conversion from Islam 
is associated with a threat to public order 
(treason) (El Fegiery, 2012).
Other modern scholars such as 
Mahmud Shaltut (former Grand Sheikh of 
Al-Azhar University, d.1963), Gamal al-
Banna, Muhammad Abu Zahra (d.1974), 
Fathi Osman (d.2010), Mohammed Hashim 
Kamali and Muhammad Shahrur are of the 
opinion that if the punishment is upheld, 
there will certainly be a clear contravention 
of many verses of the Qur’an that promote 
freedom of belief and religion. Though 
modern human rights movement might 
have largely influenced the views of these 
modern scholars, their argument cannot be 
totally discountenanced. More so, no reports 
can be found in the corpus of authentic 
hadith where the Prophet had supposedly 
killed apostates. To this effect, Imam al-
Shafi’i says, “During his [Muhammad’s] 
time, there were some among the believers 
who became apostates, and then returned 
to Islam; the Prophet did not kill them.” (El 
Fegiery, 2012).
Lack of explicit provision in the Qur’an 
regarding the punishment of apostasy does 
not stop some modern Muslim countries 
from criminalising the act. They have 
prescribed various punishments for the 
offence such as fines, imprisonment, 
flogging and exclusion from civil and 
family rights. Countries that adopted this 
system include Malaysia, Morocco, Jordan, 
Oman, etc. However, some countries like 
Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, former 
Islamic state of Afghanistan, Qatar, Yemen 
and Mauritania upheld the punishment of 
death penalty for apostasy (El Fegiery, 
2012). In Sudan, for instance, the Criminal 
Code provides that, “Whoever propagates 
the renunciation of Islam or publicly 
renounces it by explicit words or an act of 
definitive indication is said to commit the 
offence of Riddah (apostasy).” (Article 126 
of the Sudan’s Criminal Code 1991)
Furthermore, Imam Al-Ghazali was 
also of the view that the death penalty 
should not be the appropriate punishment 
for the apostate for it is not the maqsad 
(purpose) of the Sharī‘ah. He reiterates 
that Islam is a dynamic religion, thus, 
the Islamic law could not remain on the 
same level as it was in the early period 
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of Islam. However, this position of Al-
Gazali has contravened the position of 
some Muslim jurists of his School of 
thought (Shafi’i School), which confirmed 
the death penalty against an apostate. All 
the Sunni Schools of thought, except the 
Hanafis, agreed that apostates of whatever 
gender should be put to death. According 
to Hanafi jurists, a female apostate should 
not be sentenced to death, but she should 
rather be imprisoned (Afshar, 2006). These 
diverse juristic views re-emphasise the 
role of Muslim jurists in understanding the 
reason behind every ruling in the Islamic 
law and contextualising such rulings within 
the society within which they live in line 
with the realities of time. Hence, in issuing 
rulings applicable to the issues that relate 
to one’s life, modern jurists might need to 
go an extra mile to understand the earlier 
rulings of the previous jurists and apply 
them to modern events in accordance with 
the higher objectives of the law (maqasid 
al-Sharī‘ah).
ADMINISTRATION OF FATWA AND 
THE ROLE OF MUFTĪ IN SOME 
AFRICAN STATES
A significant number of Muslims have 
lived in Africa since the early days of Islam. 
Most of this population largely resides in 
the Northern, Western and Eastern parts of 
the continent. The advent of Islam in the 
different parts of the continent also brought 
about many issues such as the application 
of the Sharī‘ah and institutionalisation 
of some religious agencies like fatwa 
and the Sharī‘ah Courts. For the purpose 
of this article, this study highlights the 
administration of fatwa and the role of 
mufti in the following selected countries: 
Egypt, Sudan and Nigeria.
In Egypt, matters related to fatwa 
and the roles of muftis are as old as the 
application of Islamic law in the country. 
However, the formal institutionalisation of 
fatwa began towards the twilight of the 19th 
century. In the year 1895, a fatwa institution 
called Dar al Ifta al-Misriyyah (The Fatwa 
Institution of Egypt) was established by the 
high command of Khedive Abbas Hilmi. 
This institution was later affiliated to the 
Ministry of Justice on 21st November 1895 
by Decree No. 10 of the then Egyptian 
laws (Dar Al-Ifta Al-Misriyyah). One of 
its civil roles is to keep the contemporary 
Muslim ummah (community) in touch with 
religious principles, clarify the right way, 
remove doubts relating to religious and 
worldly life, and apply religious laws to 
new issues of contemporary life (Dar Al-
Ifta Al-Misriyyah). More importantly, the 
institution plays a significant role in giving 
rulings to issues referred to it by people and 
serves as a counsellor and consultant to the 
Egyptian Judiciary. In fact, it is considered 
as one of the divisions of the Egyptian 
Ministry of Justice. To this effect, all capital 
punishments, especially those involving 
death penalties among others, are referred 
to it in order to seek for the opinion of the 
Grand Mufti concerning these punishments 
(Article (2/381) of criminal procedural 
law of Egypt). The recent example is the 
referral of the case of the former Egyptian 
President, Mohammad Morsi, to the Grand 
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Mufti of Egypt, Shawky Allam; in order 
to examine the death sentence pronounced 
by the court against him on 16th May 2015, 
and 100 others in relation to the allegation 
of a mass prison break in 2011 (BBC News, 
2015). It is the responsibility of the Grand 
Mufti to review any case referred to him 
by the criminal court and examine all the 
evidence administered in the case before 
issuing his legal opinion. This practice 
minimises, if not prevents, the erroneous 
sentencing and execution of the accused 
persons. This also implies that it is not the 
aim of the Sharī‘ah to hurriedly execute 
offenders just to suffer the consequence of 
their acts or omissions, but to make sure 
that things are done in accordance with the 
Sharī‘ah.
In Sudan, fatwa and the role of mufti 
is not a new thing, especially in relation to 
the judiciary. Previously, during the pre-
colonial era, the provisions of Qur’an and 
Sunnah were applied in the Sudan Sharī‘ah 
courts. These provisions were further 
interpreted and complemented by the legal 
opinion of the supreme Islamic Ruler called 
the Mahdi, and later, the Khalifa (Medani, 
2010). This role of interpretation is likened 
to the role played by the present day muftis. 
In the pre-colonial era, supervision and 
control of judiciary were solely in the hands 
of the Islamic Ruler. Cases were heard and 
determined by the Sharī‘ah judges (qudāt) 
who were learned in Islamic law and trained 
under any of the Sunni schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence. However, any legal action 
instituted against the government was to 
be determined and decided by the Ruler, 
with the advice of the grand mufti who 
served as his legal adviser. This implies 
that the role of mufti in the pre-colonial 
Sudan, as the leading expert in Islamic law, 
was duly recognised. However, when the 
colonial administrators came, some of the 
Islamic values and institutions, including 
the institution of fatwa, were tempered 
with to the extent of abolishing some of 
them. The position of the Grand Mufti of 
Sudan, however, still exists up till today, 
although it appears the nomenclature is 
rather different from the pre-colonial era. 
In the case of Nigeria, muftīs, prior to the 
advent of colonial administration, were 
used as assessors (court officials) who 
are responsible for assisting the courts in 
the dispensation of Sharī‘ah justice (Oba, 
2007). When the colonial administrators 
came, however, they introduced the 
English-styled legal system, which indeed 
led to a gradual decline of some aspects 
of the Islamic legal system (including the 
muftīship) in the country (Oba, 2007). 
Currently, fatwa committees in countries 
like Sudan and Nigeria have not been fully 
institutionalised as it is in Egypt.
THE ROLE OF A MUFTĪ: MAKING 
RECOURSE TO MAQĀSID  
AL-SHARĪ‘AH IN THE 
DISPENSATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
A muftī is an Islamic law expert who issues 
Islamic legal verdicts on matters relating to 
Islam and Muslim’s affairs (Gelani, 2011). 
The role of a muftī has become manifestly 
important in the contemporary society as 
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solutions to new issues and developments 
could be provided. The role of a mufti is 
to issue verdicts and make clarifications 
based on the points of law and principles 
of Islamic jurisprudence, with a view to 
reiterating the dynamism of Islamic law. 
This role played by muftīs is significant in 
enhancing the application of the Sharī‘ah, 
especially in the modern Muslim societies 
that had suffered series of traumatic 
colonial subjugation. Most of the Muslim-
majority countries were once subjected to 
colonial incursions, which resulted in legal 
pluralism (Taib, 2011).
Based on the pre-colonial practice, 
which mirrored the age-long relationship 
between the mufti and the judge as 
practiced during the early centuries of 
Islam, it is thus clear that muftīs have a role 
to play in the dispensation of the Sharī‘ah 
criminal justice. Considering the recent 
apostasy case of Mariam Ibrahim from that 
perspective, one will again acknowledge 
the role of muftīs in guiding the court 
to establish who is an apostate under 
Islamic law, with a view to ascertaining 
the status of the accused person.  By so 
doing, the court will be well informed 
on how to apply the relevant laws to the 
facts in issue. In Islamic legal parlance, it 
seems that “who is an apostate” may take 
different meanings and legal implications 
(Alalwani, 2012). It is not simply limited to 
a mere “conversion of a Muslim faithful to 
another religion” but it also involves other 
considerations such as avoidance of doubt 
as to the legal status of the accused person 
before his/her conversion. That is, the court 
should be convinced that the convert was 
truly a Muslim before his/her conversion; 
otherwise his/her act will not amount to 
riddah (conversion). Like in Mariam’s 
case, the accused person testified that never 
a time did she practice Islam (which is the 
religion of her late father). This is based 
on the fact that she was brought up by 
her Christian mother since her childhood. 
Of course, this equally raises a doubt as 
to whether the accused ever acted as a 
Muslim. Hence, in this regard, it is the duty 
of muftīs to guide and advise the court on 
which type of apostasy attracts the capital 
punishment and which one does not.
Another important issue which a muftī 
can assist the court with in determining 
the guilt of the accused, especially with 
reference to the case in question, is to 
examine whether or not a Muslim-born 
child, who was brought up under his/
her non-Muslim mother, can be declared 
to have committed a riddah if he/she 
abandoned his/her father’s religion. It 
is a general principle of the Islamic law 
that children’s religion must follow the 
religion of their Muslim father. However, 
if a child happens to be under the custody 
his/her non-Muslim mother and is brought 
up in accordance with the latter’s belief or 
conviction, it is difficult to safeguard and 
retain the status quo ante. This also raises 
a doubt as to whether Mariam Ibrahim 
can be considered a “convert” (murtadd) 
despite her confession of non-participation 
in all Islamic activities since childhood; 
coupled also with the fact that she became 
accustomed with Christianity right from 
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her childhood. More so, it is a rule under 
the Islamic law that Islam is not a religion 
that one can access through name or 
lineage. It should be by the concurrence 
of the statement and action (qawl wa 
al-ˊamal) altogether (Badi, 2002). Thus, 
one may conclude that the legal position 
of Mariam’s conversion is indeed doubtful. 
Hence, judges are therefore warned not to 
apply punishments in cases of doubt. This 
is because, according to Islamic principles, 
doubts are always to be resolved in favour 
of the accused persons (Zayd, 2005). To this 
end, the Prophet was reported to have said, 
“Ward off the hudūd punishments from the 
Muslims as much as you can. If there is any 
possible way for the accused, let him go. 
For a judge to err in pardon is better than 
his erring in punishment” (Sunan Tirmidhi, 
Hadith, No. 1344). In a related Hadith, the 
Prophet says, “Ward off the hudūd with the 
doubts (shubuhāt).” (Sunan al Tirmidhi, 
Hadith, No. 1344).
Going by the above traditions, it is 
confirmed that infliction of punishments 
under Islamic law of crime requires 
absolute certainty of the accused guilt; 
otherwise, the matter is said to have been 
resolved in favour of the accused person. A 
muftī also clarifies the position of the law at 
the request of the court regarding the issue 
whether or not a child can be responsible 
for a criminal offence under the Sharī‘ah. 
It is a general principle of the Sharī‘ah that 
a minor or a child is not responsible for any 
offence committed by him during the period 
of childhood (Sunan al –Tirmidhi 4/32 and 
Sunan Abu Dawūd 4/558). In relation to 
Mariam’s case, the relevant facts showed 
that she was under the custody of her 
Christian mother throughout her childhood, 
and thus, she became acculturated with 
Christianity. Therefore, this also implies 
that her conversion to Christianity was 
made during the childhood period, 
which exonerates her from the criminal 
responsibility for the offence of riddah, as 
contained in the Sharī‘ah.
Another important issue that needs 
the opinion of a muftī in the dispensation 
of criminal justice, especially regarding 
the apostasy case of Mariam Ibrahim, is 
to determine whether or not an apostasy 
per se is a capital offence, which 
absolutely attracts death penalty under 
the Sharī‘ah. Some scholars have argued 
that although apostasy is an offence under 
the   Sharī‘ah, its punishment has not been 
explicitly provided for in the Qur’an, 
and therefore, it becomes subjective and 
controversial (Alaalwani 2013). Unlike 
other hudūd cases whose punishments are 
prescribed in the Qur’an and Hadith, the 
apostasy punishment was reported only 
in the ahādith (traditions) of the Prophet. 
Notwithstanding, some jurists have still 
maintained that such punishments as 
contained in the authentic traditions of the 
Prophet should not be interpreted strictly 
as death penalty. More so, Islam does not 
encourage execution of death penalty, for it 
is a capital punishment prescribed only for 
murderers and those who spread mischief 
on earth. In fact, Islam wishes people to 
act with mercy and does not allow people 
to be exposed by their evils; instead, they 
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should ask for forgiveness from Allah at 
all times, and Allah is the Most Merciful 
(Zayd, 2005). This is a remarkable attribute 
of Allah as well as a fundamental feature 
of Islam. The Almighty Allah deliberately 
ignores His servants, for it is a mercy 
from him, and at the same time, He 
promotes and encourages His servants to 
seek forgiveness and compassion. To this 
end, the Almighty Allah says, “Hold on 
to forgiveness” (Qur’an 7: 199). In yet 
another verse, “Those who love to see 
scandal broadcast among the believers will 
have a grievous penalty in this life and in 
the Hereafter. Certainly Allah knows and 
you do not.” (Qur’an 24:19). Similarly, 
the Prophet was reported to have said, 
“Whoever conceals [the faults, offenses] 
of a Muslim, Allah will conceal his in this 
world and the Hereafter” (Sahih Muslim 
Hadith No. 4867).
Furthermore, in respect of whether or 
not a female apostate can be subjected to 
a death penalty by the court is a question 
of law and jurisprudence. This could be 
resolved by the intervention of experts 
who are learned in Sharī‘ah. Muslim 
jurists have not unanimously agreed on 
this issue. While the Shafi’i, Maliki and 
Hanbali jurists maintained that apostates 
should be killed regardless of their sex, the 
Hanafi jurists are of the view that a female 
apostate should not be sentenced to death 
(Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain 2013). 
This implies that even if the punishment of 
an apostate is settled as death sentence, it 
should not be executed against the female 
apostates according to the Hanafi jurists. 
After all, it is not the maqsad (purpose) of 
the Sharī‘ah to merely punish the offenders. 
This can be understood from the various 
traditions of the Prophet, in which, it was 
reported that he used to ignore the offences 
committed by some offenders; sometimes 
even to the extent of ignoring their 
confessions, provided they do not reach 
him. Thus, the Prophet says, “Forgive the 
hudūd among you. But should a hadd case 
reaches me, punishment is certain” (Sunan 
Abu Dawūd, Hadith No. 3804). In yet 
another hadith, the Prophet was reiterating 
the importance and preference of seeking 
forgiveness over and above execution of 
punishment, in which he lamented over the 
attitude of one of his companion (Hazzal 
al-Aslamy) for encouraging his friend 
(Māiz Ibn Malik) to expose his guilt over 
adultery. He then said, “Woe to you, O 
Hazzal. If you had veiled him with your 
mantle, it would have been better for you.” 
(Sunan Ahmad, Hadith No. 20890). All of 
the above prophetic precedents imply that it 
is not the aim and objective of the Sharī‘ah 
to punish offenders, but to minimise if not 
to prevent the commission of the offence. 
Therefore, the Sharī‘ah does not encourage 
unnecessary executions in the name of 
penalty, let alone execution of the penalties 
in doubtful cases such as apostasy. The 
basis upon which the apostasy penalty 
was premised in pre-modern Islamic time 
by the classical jurists was surrounded 
by controversies, and it does not suit 
the contemporary situation, taking into 
cognisance the dynamism of the Islamic 
law and the need to exhibit such dynamism 
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as contained in the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
This is of course, what prompted some 
modern jurists to emphasise on the need 
to rethink about the apostasy laws in this 
contemporary society thereby resorting 
to maqasid al- Sharī‘ah (objectives of 
Sharī‘ah) (Abdullah & Hassan, 2004).
Recourse to maqasid al-Sharī‘ah 
(objectives of Sharī‘ah) is a fundamental 
concept to be recognised by the courts in 
the dispensation of criminal justice. The 
concept preserves public interest masālih 
or al-daruriyyāt (essential necessities) 
such as preservations of religion (hifz 
al-din) and that of life (hifz al-nafs), as 
well as blocking the means to evil (sadd 
al-dhari‘ah) (Baharuddin et al., 2015). 
Evidence (al-bayyinah) is one of the means 
of proof in deciding any criminal matter 
before the court. This can assist the court 
to discharge its role effectively. Thus, it is 
also in line with the maqāsid al-Sharī‘ah 
to apply in some cases the corroboration of 
qarinah (circumstantial evidence) to direct 
evidences. No one shall be punished unless 
he/she is proven guilty beyond any shadow 
of doubt, which of course, in most cases, 
is very difficult to prove. Hence, it is not 
just the aim (maqsad) of Sharī‘ah to punish 
but to deter other people from committing 
offences (Baharuddin et al., 2015). In light 
of the said objective, it is therefore a duty 
incumbent on the court to always emphasise 
and focus on the intent of the law rather than 
its form. To this end, the courts are advised 
to use the qawā‘id (Islamic legal maxims) 
in determining or interpreting any evidence 
or matter that can be presented, as it depicts 
maqāsid al- Sharī‘ah (Baharuddin et al., 
2015). For instance, the maxim al-umūru 
bi maqāsidiha (matters are determined by 
intention) (Tyser et al., 1980) focuses on the 
significance and implications of intention 
to all actions. This maxim originated from 
the Hadith of the Prophet that says, innama 
al-‘āmālu bi al-niyyāt: “action must be 
judged according to the intention” (Badi, 
2002). Thus, in criminal cases, the mental 
element (mens rea) of an accused person 
is a determinant factor for his conviction 
or refusal of mitigation. In addition, for 
an accused person to be convicted for any 
offence, the mens rea must concur with the 
actus reus (wrongful act), otherwise he/
she will be given the benefit of a doubt. 
Another maxim to be reckoned with in 
the dispensation of criminal justice is al-
yaqīn lā yazūl bi al-shakk (certainty is not 
dispelled by doubt) (Tyser et al., 1980). 
The maxim has gotten the basis from the 
provisions of Quran and Sunnah of the 
Prophet. In the Qur’an the Almighty Allah 
says, “O you who believe! Avoid much 
suspicion; indeed some suspicions are 
sins…” (Qur’an 49: 12). Similarly in a 
Hadith, the Prophet was reported to have 
said, “da‘ ma yurībuk ilā mā lā yurībuk - 
Leave that about which you are in doubt for” 
(Badi, 2002). The application of this maxim 
therefore provides an avenue to the courts 
to desist from passing erroneous decisions 
or executing punishments based on 
doubts. This has also brought about a similar 
maxim that says, al-hudūd tudra’u bi al-
shubuhāt - punishments shall be averted by 
doubtful matters. The genesis of this maxim 
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is the Hadith of the Prophet related in the 
Sunan of Al-Tirmidhī on the authority of 
‘Aisha who said, the Messenger of Allah 
said “Avert punishments from Muslims 
as far as you can, and if you find a way 
out release the Muslim” (Sunan Tirmidhi, 
Hadith, No. 1344).
There is a need to utilise or explore 
the legal maxims so as to ensure that the 
purposes of Islamic criminal law are 
comprehended by establishing justice in 
Islamic legal procedure. There are also 
some issues in criminal proceedings that 
need to be considered by the courts, namely 
criminal intention of the accused person 
and certainty of the matter, because should 
there any shubha (doubt) involved, the 
accused persons will be given the benefit of 
the doubt, as required by law. In fact, most 
of these issues will be answered through 
some relevant basic legal maxims of the 
Islamic law (Zakariyah, 2014).
CONCLUSION
Though apostasy remains one of the most 
heinous and abominable acts in Islam, it 
does not trump the fundamental right to 
the freedom of religion recognised in the 
Islamic law. The criminality of apostasy 
stems from the concept of treason and 
rebellion against the state and the potential 
impact such act will have on the Islamic 
State. Thus, apostasy in Islam has not 
been strictly defined as a mere conversion 
of Muslim to a religion other than Islam. 
It can therefore be understood in two 
perspectives, namely: apostasy as a mere 
conversion of a Muslim to religion other 
than Islam; and apostasy (conversion) of 
a Muslim with a view to causing public 
disorder (rebellion) within the Islamic state 
such as treason and treasonable felony. The 
Glorious Qur’an does not explicitly provide 
for the punishment of apostasy of whatever 
kind. However, death penalty against 
apostates has been provided for in the 
traditions of the Prophet (s.a.w.), which has 
been attributed only to the latter category of 
apostasy, according to the modern Muslim 
jurists. In view of the apostasy case of 
Mariam Ibrahim, this study has raised some 
fundamental questions to be examined by 
the court while determining the guilt of an 
accused person. These questions include: 
who is an apostate? Can a Muslim-born 
child who was brought up by a non-
Muslim mother be said to have committed 
a riddah (apostasy) if such an individual 
abandons the father’s religion? Can a child 
be responsible for criminal offence under 
the Sharī‘ah? Is apostasy really a capital 
offence that can absolutely attract death 
penalty under the Sharī‘ah? Can a female 
apostate be subjected to death penalty? 
What is the maqsad (purpose) of punishing 
the offenders in the Islamic law? All these 
are jurisprudential issues which require the 
intervention of Muslim jurists. Thus, the 
study concludes that muftīs have a role to 
play in the dispensation of criminal justice. 
Finally, one may conclude that in criminal 
cases, generally, recourse should always be 
made to maqāsid al-Sharī‘ah (the higher 
objectives of Sharī‘ah), thereby resorting 
to the principles of qawā‘id, masālih al-
mursalah and sadd al-dharai’. Meanwhile, 
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in apostasy cases, the court might need to 
distinguish between who is an apostate and 
who is an infidel; the court should always 
be cautious about erroneous execution of 
those who are not criminally responsible for 
an offence, or who are sometimes exempted 
from the capital punishment such as children 
and women; the court should therefore 
avoid anything doubtful and treat any case 
based on its merit (Rabb, 2010). After all, a 
fundamental legal maxim which derives its 
source from a prophetic precedent is, “Avoid 
(imposing) fixed criminal sentences in cases 
of doubt” (idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt)
(Al-Shantarini 1979).
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Al-Qāsimī, M. (2001). al-Nizām al-Qada al-Islāmī, 
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ABSTRACT
This article discusses issues related to custodial sentences. It addresses jurists’ arguments 
against these sentences on the ground of their inconsistency with the aim of criminal 
justice. The article is more concerned with the Muslim jurists’ position; hence, it 
focuses on examining the consistency of custodial sentences with maqasid al-Shariah to 
determine their appropriateness to the enforcement of criminal justice and the safeguard 
of public interest. It also assesses the consistency of this concept with the philosophy of 
Islamic criminal law and the viability of its application in light of the concept of crime 
and punishment. For this purpose, the article defines custodial sentences in contemporary 
legislations. It then analyses the concept of imprisonment in the Quran and the Sunnah, 
and the practices of the Companions. It also assesses the impacts of custodial sentences 
in modern practices with the aim to identify the conditions and parameters for alternatives 
to these custodial sentences within the framework of maqasid al-Shariah in general, and 
the maqasid of punishments in particular. The article found that although considered as 
necessary to establish justice and protect society, custodial sentences are not in line with the 
Shariah principals and objectives. It also proposes a number of Maqasidi-driven parameters 
that serve as building blocks for the implementation of alternative custodial sentences.
Keywords: Islamic law, criminal justice, custodial sentences, Maqasid al-Shariah and freedom
INTRODUCTION
One of the ultimate aims of the criminal 
justice, as propagated in criminal justice 
legislation and legal literatures, is to deter 
criminals from causing harm to public. 
The sentences available to the courts are 
considered necessary measures that ensure 
public protection. These sentences range 
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from low to severe sentences. Among the 
severe sentences are custodial sentences, 
which are defined as, “Sentences 
imposed by a court in a criminal case. 
They require mandatory custody of the 
convict, either in prison (incarceration) 
or in some other closed therapeutic and/
or (re)educational institution such as 
a reformatory, psychiatric counselling 
or drug treatment programmes. This is 
opposed to a deterrent sentence, which 
does not impose confinement, but serves 
as a warning through alternate punishment 
such as community service or a fine” 
(definitions, US Legal). The justification 
for these reserved offences is that they 
are “so serious that neither a fine alone 
nor a community sentence can be justified 
for the offence” (UK Legislation, n.d.). 
Despite all the justifications presented for 
these custodial sentences, they have been 
challenged by many contemporary legal 
experts, criminologists and sociologists 
in the conventional arena, indicating the 
overwhelming negative end results of these 
sentences. They have also been criticised 
by many Muslim Jurists on the ground 
that such sentences are inconsistent with 
the concept of imprisonment in Islam 
and do not serve the higher objectives of 
the Islamic law (maqasid al-Shariah). 
This paper is more concerned with the 
Muslim jurists’ position; hence, it focuses 
on examining the consistency of custodial 
sentences with maqasid al-Shariah to 
determine their appropriateness to the 
enforcement of criminal justice and the 
safeguard of public interest.
In the first part, the article examines 
the higher objectives of the Shariah with 
special focus on freedom – as opposed 
to custody – as one of the fundamentals 
related to the maqasid al-Shariah. The 
second part highlights the concept of 
custody in the Islamic law as compared 
to that applied at present. It presents the 
contextual implementation of custodial 
sentences in the traditional Islamic law. 
The third part examines major impacts of 
the presently applied custodial sentences on 
the convicted, his family, the government 
and the general public. This part paves the 
way for the proposition of alternatives to 
the currently practiced custodial sentences. 
The final part proposes some maqasidi-
driven parameters for these alternatives. It 
sets a framework for future exploration of 
the detailed alternatives.
Custodial Sentences in Light of the Higher 
Objectives of the Shariah (Maqasid al-
Shariah)
Definition of Maqasid al-Shariah
Maqasid al-Shariah is an independent 
discipline that addresses aspects of Islamic 
law from a macro perspective. The maqasid 
approach to law is a combination of an 
epistemological and legal framework that 
sets the philosophy of the Islamic law to 
ensure a holistic approach to its aspects.
The ultimate objective of maqasid al-
shari’ah as established in the Quran and 
the Sunnah is to serve the interests (jalb al-
masalih) of all human beings and to save 
them from harm (daf‘ al-mafasid), they 
choose to define maqasid al-shari’ah from 
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a different perspective (Chapra, 1992). Abu 
Hamid al-Ghazali (d.111) defined maqasid 
by stressing the Shariah concerned with 
safeguarding five objectives by stating that:
“The very objective of the Shari’ah is 
to promote the well-being of the people, 
which lies in safeguarding their faith (diin), 
their lives (nafs), their intellect (‘aql), their 
posterity (nasl), and their wealth (maal). 
Whatever ensures the safeguarding of these 
five serves public interest and is desirable, 
and whatever hurts them is against public 
interest and its removal is desirable.” (Al-
Ghazali, 1973)
The same has been highlighted by al-Iz 
Ibn Abdessalam and al-Shatibi with regards 
to serving the interests of all human beings 
and to save them from harm by preserving 
five essentials (‘Izz al-Din ‘Abd al-Salam, 
1999; al-Shatibi, 1975).
Ibn ‘Ashur (1973), on the other hand, 
defines Maqasid from a broader dimension. 
He stated that:
“The all-purpose principle (maqsad 
‘amm) of Islamic legislation is to preserve 
the social order or the community and 
insure its healthy progress by promoting 
the well-being and righteousness (salah) of 
the human being. The well-being and virtue 
of human beings consist of the soundness 
of their intellects and the righteousness of 
their deeds, as well as the goodness of the 
things of the world where they live that are 
put at their disposal” (Muhammad El-Tahir 
Al-Misawi, 2006).
The same approach has been adopted 
by ‘Allal al-Fassi (d.1974) as he stressed 
that the uppermost objectives of Shari’ah 
rest within the concept of compassion and 
guidance that seeks to establish justice, 
eliminate prejudice and alleviate hardship. 
He stated that:
“The overall objective of Islamic Law 
is to populate and civilize the earth and 
preserve the order of peaceful coexistence 
therein; to ensure the earth’s ongoing well-
being and usefulness through the piety of 
those who have been placed there as God’s 
vicegerents; to ensure that people conduct 
themselves justly, with moral probity and 
with integrity in thought and action, and 
that they reform that which needs reform 
on earth, tap its resources, and plan for the 
good of all” (Alaal Al-Fasi, 1993).
Freedom and Maqasid Al-Shariah
Freedom is a core fundamental of the 
maqasid al-Shariah and among its essential 
aspects. It is strongly related to custodial 
sentences, which is the issue of concern in this 
paper, therefore, necessitates to be elucidated 
in order to acquire a better understanding of 
the issue in relation to the concept of maqasid 
al-Shariah to mean many things.
The word “Freedom” is used in the 
Arabic literature such as “original or 
authentic; Arabs say a free horse (farasun 
hurrun) to mean a thoroughbred horse. They 
say a free clay (Teenun Hurun) to mean a 
clay pure and without sand in it. They also 
say a “free boy” (waladun muhararun) – as 
mentioned by the wife of Imraan – to mean 
a boy consecrated for the service of Allah” 
(Ibn Manthour, 1993). However, the usage 
of the concept as an attribute of a person 
has two meanings:
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The first meaning: Freedom is used as 
the opposite of the word “slavery”. It 
refers to the original ability of all rational 
and mature people to handle their affairs 
themselves without depending on the 
consent of someone else.
The second meaning: It is derived from 
the first by metaphorical usage. It denotes 
one’s ability to act freely and handle one’s 
affairs as one likes, without opposition 
from anyone (Ibn Ashour, 2006).
The Protection of Freedom as a 
Fundamental Part of the Maqasid al-Shariah
Though the vast majority of Muslim jurists 
did not consider freedom as a stand-alone 
objective of Shari’ah, as opposed to the five 
necessities (ad-daruriyyat al-khamsah), 
yet, freedom is considered as part and parcel 
of these five necessities and a prerequisite 
for their establishment and existence. This 
is because the objective of the Shari’ah, as 
stated in Islamic jurisprudential literatures, 
is to serve the interests (jalb al-masalih) of 
all human beings that include the protection 
of their faith (diin), their lives (nafs), their 
intellect (‘aql), their posterity (nasl) and 
their wealth (maal) (Al-Ghazaali, 1973;‘Izz 
al-Din ‘Abd al-Salam, 1999; al-Shaatibi, 
1975; Ibn Ashour, 2006).
Since freedom is a human instinct that 
is paramount to the meaningfulness and 
validity of actions, the manifestation of 
freedom in the five necessities is evident as:
•  The basis for the protection of faith 
promoted by Shari’ah is to avoid 
coercion in one’s belief as “there is 
no compulsion in religion” (Surah 
Al-Baqarah: 256). Hence, belief 
cannot be achieved unless there is 
freedom of embracing it.
•  The preservation of life has similar 
interrelation with freedom as it 
cannot be achieved unless the person 
has the freedom of action in all his 
personal affairs, independent of any 
types of coercion and enslavement.
•  This preservation of intellect cannot 
be achieved unless the person has 
the freedom of choice, as intellectual 
competence is the cornerstone of 
responsibility and the core condition 
for the validity of actions.
•  The protection of posterity cannot 
be achieved unless the person has 
the freedom to choose a partner who 
shares with him/her the responsibility 
of building a family and raising kids to 
ensure the continuation of mankind. 
•  Wealth protection, which is the fifth 
of the Muslim jurist classification 
of necessities, enjoys the same 
consideration with regards to 
freedom as wealth protection cannot 
be achieved unless a person has the 
right on his ownership and has full 
freedom of access on his wealth and 
property. This is of course within 
the parameters of Shariah. Al-Shafii, 
in elucidating this meaning, says, 
“People are given power over their 
wealth; no one has the right over it 
except where they are commanded to 
do so [Zakat]” (al-Shafi‘i, 1973).
Thus, we can conclude that the 
preservation of freedom is considered as the 
basis for all the five necessities representing 
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the core of the Shari’ah objectives since 
one of the major objectives of the Shari’ah 
is to put an end to slavery and establish 
permanent freedom. Allah established 
the objective of freedom in terms of 
establishing its requisites and eliminating 
its obstacles (Ibn Ashour, 2006).
In establishing the requisites of 
freedom, Allah has created human 
beings with free will. The Shari’ah then 
prescribed a number of rules to ensure the 
sustainability of freedom in all stages of 
human life. Among these rulings are:
•  Considering any assault on freedom 
as a grave act of injustice and a harm 
that should be eliminated. The verse 
related to freedom of belief says, 
“There is no compulsion in religion” 
(Surah Al-Baqarah: 256) and the 
statement of Umar Ibn Al-Khatab 
that says, “When did you start 
turning people into slaves when their 
mothers gave birth to them as free 
human beings?”, (Al-Kandahlawi, 
2003) are clear manifestation of 
these facts.
•  Putting in place rulings and 
procedures that would abolish 
the practice of slavery. Numerous 
texts recommending the freeing of 
slaves and prescribing the freeing 
of slaves as a condition to correct 
some breaches. For instance, 
compensation of the family of the 
victim in an accidental homicide 
(Al-qatl –al-khataa) in the verse that 
says: “It is not for a believer to kill a 
believer unless [it be] by mistake. He 
who has killed a believer by mistake 
must set free a believing slave, and 
pay the blood-money to the family 
of the slain, unless they remit it as 
a charity” (Surah Al-Nisa’: 92), 
the expiation from a deliberate oath 
(kafarat al-yamin) in the verse that 
says: “Allah will not take you to 
task for what is unintentional in 
your oaths, but He will take you to 
task for the oaths which you swear 
in earnest. The expiation thereof 
is to feed ten of the needy with the 
average of that with which you feed 
your own people, or to clothe them, 
or to free a slave, and for him who 
finds not [the wherewithal to do so] 
then a three days’ fast” (Surah Al-
Ma’idah: 89). Sexual intercourse in 
the fasting month, in the verse that 
says: “Those who put away their 
wives [by saying they are as their 
mothers] and afterward would go 
back on what they have said, [the 
penalty] in that case [is] the freeing 
of a slave before they touch one 
another. To this, you are exhorted; 
and Allah is Informed of what you 
do” (Surah Al-Mujadalah: 3], etc.
In terms of eliminating any obstacles to 
the establishment of freedom, the Shari’ah 
sets provisions to preserve the objective of 
freedom. Among these provisions are:
•  Prohibiting all forms of coercion, 
either in belief, marriage, or business 
transaction, unless it is a legitimate 
coercion that serves the whole 
community.
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•  Putting in place special provisions 
for the coerced such as nullifying 
transactions made under such coercion.
•  Prohibiting the wrongful restriction 
of people’s freedoms (Abu Zaid, 2014). 
•  Occasional restriction of the 
freedom of individuals to avoid 
harming public interest as a whole 
and maintaining the right to freedom 
for everyone such as the restriction 
imposed on the weak-minded (safih) in 
using his property (Ibn Ashour, 2006).
Hence, we can conclude that freedom 
is a discernment bestowed by Allah to 
mankind from the first day of their birth. It 
is also the core fundamental of legislation, 
and one of the objectives of the Shari’ah.
Based on the above premises promoting 
freedom, the questions to be answered are: 
•  What is the position of imprisonment 
in Islam? 
•  Is it an original punishment or a 
precautionary measure prior to the 
decided punishment?
•  And to what extent is it considered 
to be valid to punish the offender by 
depriving him of his liberty?
The Concept of Custodial Sentences in the 
Islamic Law
The issue of custodial sentences is well-
addressed in classical Muslim Jurists’ 
writings. They refer the concept of 
custodial sentencing to the following three 
major meanings:
First: To impede a person to act upon himself 
by placing him in a house or in a mosque or 
in a place dedicated to detention (prison).
Second: To not allow a person to leave 
his house (house arrest) or prohibit him 
from travelling outside his city, or to 
assign a security guard to accompany him 
whenever he wants to go out. It is termed in 
classical Jurisprudence writing (al-tarsiim) 
that refers to House arrest.
Third: To inhere the debtor to the creditor 
until he pays his debt, and the inherence 
here should be a result of a legal judgement 
(Al-Ahmad, 2011).
The above types, as discussed by 
Muslim jurists, mean that custodial 
sentences in the Islamic law are broader in 
meaning than the currently applied. This 
view is supported by Ibn Hazm and some 
Hanbali jurists including Ibn Taimiyyah. 
Ibn Hazm says, “with regards to prison no 
one disagreed that the prophet (Peace be 
upon him) had never had a prison” (Ibn 
Hazm. N.d). Ibn Taimiyyah, for instance, 
in explaining this broader meaning says, 
“Prison in Shari’ah is not confined to the 
placement of a person in a narrow place; it 
is rather restricting a person by forbidding 
him to act in his affairs, either by restricting 
him to his house, the mosque or to give 
the power of attorney to the debtor or his 
agent to do so, and that is why the Prophet, 
peace be upon him, called him a captive”. 
He evidenced his opinion by the hadith 
reported by Abu Daud and Ibn Majah that 
the grandfather of Hirmas ibn Habib said, 
“I brought my debtor to the Holy Prophet 
(peace be upon him). He said to me, Stick 
to him. He again said to me: O brother of 
Banu Tamim, what do you want to do with 
your prisoner”. He concluded his view 
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by saying, “This is the prison in the time 
of the prophet, and there was no specific 
dedicated place used for imprisonment in 
the time of the prophet and the time of Abu 
Bakar. However, when there was a disperse 
of citizen in the time of Umar, he bought a 
house in Mecca and used it as a prison. He 
also said, “Imprisonment does not mean 
keeping him in a jail; it is rather preventing 
him from his normal activities” (Fatawa 
Ibn Taimiyyah, 1985).
Causes of Custodial Sentences in the 
Islamic law
Classical Islamic criminal law literature 
highlighted many causes for custodial 
sentences. Among them are:
1.  Failure to pay off a debt: Muslim 
jurists when discussing custodial 
sentences, often refer to the failure 
of paying debts. So the debtor will be 
detained until he pays off his debt. In 
this respect, Muslim jurists differ on 
the conditions and the period of this 
imprisonment. As they differentiate 
between the person known to be of 
good character, the person known 
to have prior criminal history and 
the person who is unknown as 
he may be a foreigner. They also 
differ on the maximum period of 
imprisonment to determine his 
status (Al-Mawardi, n.d.).
2.  Investigating an accusation: In 
this regard, Muslim jurists confine 
the accusation that necessitates a 
temporary imprisonment to serious 
accusations such as a murder 
or a robbery. Hence, when the 
investigation is completed, the 
accused will either be released or 
executed. This is clearly narrated 
in hadith Bahz bin Hakim that 
“the Prophet (peace be upon him) 
imprisoned a man for an accusation, 
and then let him go” (Ibn Al-Qayyim, 
2008). Imprisonment here is restricted 
to necessity (darurah) that is to 
be terminated by the result of the 
investigation. Ahmad Ibn Hanbal in 
commenting on the hadith of Bahz 
said, “These custodial sentences 
are temporary procedures until the 
ruler receives full information on 
his case” (Ibn Al-Qayyim, 2008).
3.  To use the prison as a means to assist 
the prisoner to repent from his sins 
or to return the rights of others. Thus, 
if he repents or returns the rights of 
others, he should be released.
4.  To prevent the person who has been 
sentenced from escaping so that the 
punishment of hadd or qisas may be 
executed.
5.  To restrict the person who presents a 
threat to people’s lives and property 
so that he will be placed in a prison to 
prevent his threat (Al-Ahmad, 2011).
It is noteworthy that these reasons 
are not a matter of agreement among 
Muslim jurists. It is rather a compilation 
of what has been highlighted in Islamic 
jurisprudential books.
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Temporary Custodial Sentences as Ijtihadi 
Measures (ta’ziri)
Based on the established premise that 
freedom is the basis for the five necessities 
of the Shari’ah, considered a stand-alone 
Shari’ah objective, and based on the above 
stated meaning and causes of custodial 
sentences in the Islamic law that is used in 
general as a precautionary and temporary 
measure, we can say that it is difficult to 
justify the contemporary conceptualised 
and implemented custodial sentences from 
the text of the Quran and the Sunnah, and 
in the judicial rulings of the Prophet’s 
Companions and their successors. Thus, 
it can be said that the custodial sentences 
currently practised in Muslim countries 
applying the Shari’ah law were adopted 
from the conventional laws as some of 
them have their effective acts dated before 
independence. Consequently, they were 
developed to be an integral part of Muslim 
law under the concept of ta’zir, where the 
ruler or judge has the discretion to apply his 
ijtihad in introducing punishment even if it 
is not stated in the Quran and the Sunnah 
with the condition that they do not contradict 
the general fundamentals of the Shari’ah.
One may agree that the ruling of 
imposing a punishment that is not stated 
in the Quran and the Sunnah based on 
the judge’s personal qualified discretion 
and personal reasoning (ijtihad) is a valid 
one. However, the question that needs to 
be posed is: Does the application of the 
punishment of custodial sentences, as it 
is excessively applied currently, fulfil the 
general fundamentals of the Shari’ah or the 
Maqasid of Shari’ah?
Custodial Punishments: Proponents 
versus Opponents
It is an established fundamental in Usul al-
Fiqh and Maqasid al-Shariah that in the 
case of an ijtihadi matter that has no explicit 
and definitive ruling in the Quran, Sunnah 
and Ijmaa. The ruler has to apply ijtihad 
on the issue based on the calculus between 
benefits and harms of the subject matter 
at hand. Hence, by examining the benefits 
promoted by the proponents of custodial 
sentences and the harms promoted by the 
opponents, we will be able to make our 
preference based on the calculus between 
harms and benefits.
Proponents of Custodial Sentences
The proponents of the custodial sentences 
agree that on the one hand, “The custodial 
punishment is reserved to crimes so serious 
that neither a fine alone nor a community 
sentence can be justified for the offence” 
(UK Legislation, n.d.). However, they 
stress that a custodial punishment plays 
an important role in reducing crime and 
protecting the people. Their arguments can 
be summarised in the following:
•  Surveys indicate that both the public 
and offenders consider prison to be 
the most severe or effective punisher 
of criminal behaviour.
•  The expectations of the public and 
policymakers are that incarceration 
has powerful deterrent effect.
•  Individuals experiencing a more 
severe sanction are more likely to 
reduce their criminal activities in the 
future.
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•  Incarceration imposes direct and 
indirect costs on inmates, thus, faced 
with the prospect of going to prison 
or after having experienced prison 
life, a rational individual would 
choose not to engage in further 
criminal activities.
•  Studies support the prison as 
punishment. An ecological study by 
Fabelo in 1995, where the results are 
based on rates or averages (aggregate 
data), reported a 30% increase in the 
incarceration rates across 50 U.S. 
states, corresponding to a decrease 
of 5% in the crime rate for a five-year 
period (Gendreau & Goggin, 1999).
The Opponents of Custodial Punishments
Custodial punishments though promoted as 
a measure to protect people by preventing 
criminals from causing harm to them, the 
reality of this measure on the ground as 
promoted by the opponents and the facts and 
numbers regarding its negative impact on 
the prisoner, his family, the government and 
society at large, refute the arguments upheld 
by the proponents. For instance, the negative 
impacts on prisoner can be seen as follows:
•  The prisoner will experience 
damaging exposure as each prisoner 
will convey his experience in crimes 
to other prisoners. This means that 
the prisoner, instead of correcting 
his behaviour, will be exposed to 
new criminal ideas and experiences. 
Therefore, he will be released 
from jail with additional criminal 
experiences. That is why the 
opponents call prisons as “schools 
of crime”. Bentham, De Beaumont 
and de Tocqueville, Lombroso and 
Shaw for instance, suggested that 
prisons were breeding grounds for 
crime. It also reinforces the notion 
that prisons are mechanistic, brutal 
environments that would likely 
increase criminality (Mason, 1998).
•  Prisons have shown a poor record 
for reducing the number of prisoners 
reoffending. For instance in the UK, 
46% of UK adults are reconvicted 
within one year of release. Those 
serving sentences of less than 12 
months increased to 58%. Over two-
thirds (67%) of the prisoners under 18 
year-olds are reconvicted within a year 
of release (Prison Reform Trust, 2014).
•  Furthermore, some studies 
have shown that what is called 
“coincidence crimes” turn in to 
professional crimes, as it has been 
noted that 29% of those committing 
ethical crimes turn to theft crimes 
and some of them turn to drug 
crimes. The study advocates these 
developments to prison environment 
and its negative consequences on 
personal ethics and conduct that 
create additional criminal and crime 
expertise (Ahmad, 2012).
•  Prison disables prisoners from 
engaging in their normal occupation 
to earn his living.
•  It prevents him from developing his 
skills and deprives the society from 
benefiting from his area of expertise.
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•  The prisoner usually faces health 
problems due to the large number of 
prisoners who are usually put in one 
cell in addition to the deterioration of 
health services.
As for the negative impacts on the 
family, a custodial punishment deprives 
the prisoner’s family of financial income in 
the case where the prisoner is the family’s 
breadwinner. For instance, approximately 
200,000 children in England and Wales had 
a parent in prison at some point in 2009. This 
is more than double the number of children 
affected in the same year by divorce in the 
family. This usually leads family members 
to deviation (Prison Reform Trust, 2014).
The impact on the state is as negative as 
other impacts; this is because it burdens the 
government with extra budget that yields 
no revenue. For instance, reoffending by 
all recent ex-prisoners in 2007-08 cost the 
economy between £9.5 and £13 billion. 
This is in addition to the disruption of 
the productivity of this segment of the 
workforce (Prison Reform Trust, 2014).
With regards to the negative impact on 
the society, it is because the prisoner thinks 
that the society has expelled him. For such a 
reason, he turns against the society in all of 
his conducts. Therefore, he turns from being 
a useful member of society to a harmful one.
In short, the view of the opponents is 
that custodial punishments do not solve 
the problem of crimes nor contribute in 
their prevention. This is evidenced by the 
constant increase in the number of prisoners 
and the high percentage of them returning 
to crime after their release from prison. This 
is in addition to the high negative impacts 
on the prisoner, his family, state and 
society. There is no guarantee to the limits 
of the damage which could be inflicted 
on him. These include health problems, 
possible dismissal from work, emotional 
damage caused to the prisoner’s spouse, 
parents and children from being deprived 
of their legitimate rights of maintenance, 
and damage to the community with the 
increase in the number of crimes caused by 
the custodial punishment.
The Preferred Opinion
In view of the two opinions above, with 
regards to custodial sentences and based 
on the established fundamental Shari’ah 
principles, we can conclude that the current 
custodial sentences as they are applied clash 
in principle with the concept of freedom that 
is considered a basis for the five necessities 
of the Shari’ah. It also contravenes the 
most basic objectives of punishment in 
Islam, that is, to deter criminals from 
repeating their crimes, to reform them, 
to compensate for the crime caused and 
to serve the interest of the whole society. 
Hence, alternatives should be considered 
in minimising custodial sentences. In fact, 
a few of them have already been already 
proposed in the conventional arena such as 
Correctional supervision and community 
service orders implemented in South 
Africa (Lukas et al., 2005). However, 
since this paper is not concerned with 
proposing a detailed number of alternatives 
to custodial sentences, this needs another 
independent research. Instead, it concerned 
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with setting parameters for the alternatives 
as they are crucial to ensure a correct 
and comprehensive execution of these 
alternatives.
Parameters for the Alternatives of 
Custodial Sentences
Among the parameters that can be proposed 
for the alternatives of custodial sentences are:
•  The alternatives should not 
contravene the higher objectives of 
the Shariah (Maqasid al- Shariah) 
in general and the objectives of 
punishments in Islam in particular. 
Freedom and extending punishment 
to family are instances of this 
contravention.   
•  It should be allowed by the Shariah 
as it should not contradict texts of 
the Quran and the Sunnah.
•  It should not cause harm to 
the offender sentenced as that 
contradicts the nature and objective 
of the punishment.
•  It should not violate his dignity as 
a human being or cause harm to the 
offender, nor should it aim to defame 
the offender by portraying him as a 
deviant person.
•  It should be a supportive element that 
creates a balanced adaptation of the 
offender psychologically and socially.
•  It should facilitate the development 
of his educational and professional 
levels and help him to continue 
his social and family role and gain 
income for him and his family in a 
dignified way.
•  It should take into consideration the 
consequences of its application, so that 
if it is found that it is not appropriate 
and has negative consequences, it 
should be revised and replaced by a 
more appropriate alternative.
•  It should be reciprocal to the type of 
crime committed as this is part of the 
fundamental of justice and fairness 
commanded by Allah.
•  It should be appropriate with the 
crime so that the circumstances 
of the crime should be taken into 
consideration.
•  It should consider both the personal 
and social circumstances of the 
criminals as they are not of the same 
personality and thus, the effect of 
punishment on them is not the same.
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that sentencing the 
offender is essential to establish justice 
and protect society. However, opting for 
custodial sentences as a mean to sentencing 
the offender is not the right approach, as 
justified by Shari’ah principals and objectives 
mentioned above and the established negative 
facts of these sentences, especially with the 
clear facts that show the mega spending on 
prisons and prisoners’ maintenances that 
burdens governments’ budget in addition 
to the reverse impacts on prisoners, their 
families and society. Therefore, it is time to 
explore better alternatives that protect society 
in a comprehensive and balanced manner. 
In doing so, this article sets a number of 
Maqasidi-driven parameters that serve as 
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building blocks for the implementation 
of alternative custodial sentences. It also 
recommends to governments to benefit from 
some implemented alternatives to custodial 
sentences and explore new innovative 
alternatives that serve the society as a whole. 
In short, if it is considered impossible to 
put an end to custodial sentences, it is very 
possible to reduce it to the minimum, so all 
related parties to the prisoners including the 
governments will benefit in the long run.
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ABSTRACT
The enforcement of Shari’ah criminal offences in Selangor has always been subjected 
to public scrutiny. The commission of selected Shari’ah criminal offences has been 
rigorously enforced against by the Religious Enforcement Division of the Department of 
Islamic Affairs. Alas, there are times that the manner in which the enforcement has been 
carried out has led to public criticism. This article studies the power of the enforcement 
officers, the modus operandi of enforcement and the challenges faced by the Selangor 
Religious Enforcement Division. Using a mixed mode of content analysis and personal 
observation, the article argues that there is still much that needs to be done to improve the 
image and modus operandi of the enforcement of Shari’ah criminal offences in Selangor 
specifically and in Malaysia generally.
Keywords: Shari’ah criminal offences, Enforcement, Selangor, Religious Enforcement Officer
INTRODUCTION
Armed with the power to enforce Shari’ah 
criminal offences, the Islamic Religious 
Divisions have acquired a rather hostile 
and negative perception among the public. 
Some of their actions have been the subjects 
of public scrutiny and heavy criticism. 
Many quarters question the necessity of 
having moral policing as it gives the idea 
of encroachment on the personal liberty of 
individuals by the state, which is frowned 
against in modern liberal democracy. The 
state may only encroach into the private 
lives of individuals if it can be shown 
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that such act can cause harm to others. 
The polemic here in Malaysia is “what 
constitutes harm to others?”
While modern liberals tend to look at 
individuals’ rights as the right to be left 
alone and the right to privacy, as well 
as personal space to do what ever one 
wishes, the Islamic position has a slight 
twist. Although the Shari’ah respects the 
privacy of individuals, there is also the 
responsibility of every Muslim to enjoin 
others to do good and forbid anyone from 
committing evil. Therefore, in certain 
circumstances, some personal acts may 
be “curtailed” in order to ensure that these 
acts do not harm the public and are not 
taken as a norm as they are prohibited in 
Islam.
It is at this juncture that the need 
for enforcing the Shari’ah becomes a 
necessity. However, due to the lack of 
understanding amongst the public and the 
existence of executive intervention, this 
has led to some ‘highly’ publicised and 
criticised enforcement actions taken by 
the Department. This  includes the raid on 
popular night clubs like The Ship in Subang 
Jaya, Selangor, in 1997 and the Zouk in 
Kuala Lumpur in January 20051 to pre-
empt Muslim women from participating 
in beauty contests2; the issuance of an 
investigation order against a well-known 
and respected Muslim cleric,  Dr. Mohd 
Asri Zainal Abidin, the then Mufti of 
Perlis, for conducting unlicensed religious 
1 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4276077.
stm
2 News Straits Times, 15th July 1997.
sermons in 20093; the mass arrest of the 
Shi’ite faith followers among the Malays 
in Gombak, Selangor, and 4the detention of 
Al-Arqam sect leaders in 2012.5
Due to the negative image portrayed 
by the media on the enforcement of 
Shari’ah criminal offences in Malaysia by 
the Religious Enforcement Division, an 
elucidation on the ‘make up’, ‘legal basis’, 
‘powers’, as well as ‘challenges’ of the 
Division is therefore crucial. This article 
begins with an introduction of Shari’ah 
criminal offences in Malaysia. The article 
then moves into the historical setup of the 
Religious Enforcement Division, a look into 
its inherent power, as well as laying out the 
challenges it faces in the actual execution and 
implementation of the Shari’ah Enactment.
SHARI’AH CRIMINAL SYSTEM IN 
MALAYSIA
Despite the negative media reports that 
highlight the encroachment of personal 
rights and liberties by enforcement 
officers of the Selangor Islamic Religious 
Department, in reality, only a limited 
number of acts are categorised as Shari’ah 
offences in Malaysia. This is because the 
Federal Constitution vests the power to 
regulate criminal offences under the civil 
courts [Federal Constitution, Schedule 9, 
List I (Federal List), item 1]. The state is 
given a limited power to regulate “offences 
by persons professing the religion of Islam
3 http://www.malaysiaharmoni.com/v2/index.
php/nasional/3603-dr-maza-bebas-tuduhan-
mengajar-agama-tanpa-tauliah
4 The Straits Time, Singapore, 5th January 2011
5 New Straits Times Malaysia, 5th November 2012
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against precepts of that religion-except 
in regard to matters in the Federal List 
(Farid Suffian, 2012). The state’s power 
to enact laws to regulate criminal matters 
is further delineated by the Syariah Courts 
(Criminal Jurisdiction Act) Act 1965, as 
amended in 1984, which practically limits 
the maximum sentences imposed to three 
years imprisonment, or a fine of 5,000 
ringgit and six strokes of the cane 2 of the 
Muslim Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) 
(Amendment) Act 1984. Hence, the power 
of sentencing is lower than the magistrate 
courts and the range of criminal offences 
that can be potentially regulated by the 
Shari’ah criminal system is very much 
restricted (Abdul Monir, 2009).
For example, the crimes of theft, 
robbery, false accusation of adultery, 
fornication, riddah and al-baghyu (which 
are also known as hudud crimes) can no 
longer be based on the Shari’ah. These 
also include qisas crimes such as causing 
death or bodily injury to others. These 
crimes, except for taking intoxicants, 
fornication and qazaf, are now governed by 
the Penal Code and fall squarely under the 
jurisdiction of the civil courts. Meanwhile, 
the crimes involving consumption of 
intoxicants, fornication and qazaf no longer 
maintain the original punishments due to 
the curtailing of the power of the Shari’ah 
Courts in all states in Malaysia. Crimes 
that have been included in the Enactments 
such as gambling, eating during the 
month of Ramadhan are regarded as ta’zir 
crimes which aim to protect the public 
and individuals from harm. This is the 
justification for criminalising such acts.
These offences are tried under the 
Shari’ah courts. Unfortunately, unlike 
the Shari’ah courts that underwent major 
changes with the establishment of the 
Department of Syari’ah Judiciary in 1998, 
the enforcement divisions have been 
neglected (Ramizah, 2011). 
Shari’ah criminal offences are part 
and parcel of the Islamic legal system in 
Malaysia. It is therefore imperative that 
they are properly administered so that 
the negative image attached to them can 
be reduced, if not eliminated all together 
(Lindsey & Steiner, 2013). 
RELIGIOUS ENFORCEMENT 
DIVISION
Enforcement of Shari’ah criminal offences 
is conducted by the state religious 
departments. In Selangor, the body that is 
responsible for these offences is the Selangor 
Islamic Religious Department, a division 
under the Selangor Islamic Religious 
Office. Selangor is one of the pioneering 
states that introduced the administration of 
Islamic laws in Malaysia in 1952 (Abdul 
Monir, 1998), By way of comparison, the 
prosecution and enforcement department 
in Kelantan which existed during the reign 
of Sultan Muhammad 1 (1800-1837) is 
among the oldest department in that state 
(Abdullah Alwi, 1996).
From its birth, the Selangor Islamic 
Religious Department has metamorphosed 
from a department initially set up to stem 
the spread of communist ideology to a 
full-fledged enforcement agency. During 
its hey days, the Department was birthed 
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from the vision of the by the late Sultan 
Hishamuddin Alam Shah Al Haj due to the 
concern over the fact that the Muslim faith 
might be corrupted by ‘Zeitgeist’ influence.
At the time of its inception, i.e. on 1st 
October, 1945, Yang Mulia Raja Nong bin 
Raja Hussin was appointed as the Secretary. 
As the Department was visualised by the 
Sultan, naturally the whole operation of the 
office was directly under His Highness’s 
purview. Its temporary administrative office 
was located at the Sultan’s office adjacent to 
Istana Kota in Klang, and was fully financed 
by the Royal Highness.
The broad objectives of the Department 
were to strengthen and defend the Islamic 
faith and Muslims in totality through 
research, monitoring and enforcement. 
With this noble objective, the Religious 
Department is tasked with the ‘moral 
policing’ of the Muslims by taking pre-
emptive measures against ‘immoral action’ 
which have been made triable offences under 
the Shari’ah Enactments. In delivering this 
task, the Department is capable of receiving 
reports and complaints, and conducting 
thorough investigations which will result 
in the preparation of complete investigation 
papers (IP) for purposes of prosecution.
The legitimacy to enforce Shari’ah 
criminal offences in Selangor is derived  from 
a number of State Enactments, which include 
the Syariah Criminal Procedure (State of 
Selangor) Enactment, 2003, the Syariah 
Criminal Offences (State of Selangor) 
Enactment, 1995, the Administration of 
the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) 
Enactment, 2003, the Islamic Family Law 
(State of Selangor) Enactment 2003, the 
Syariah Court Civil Procedure (State of 
Selangor) Enactment 2003 and the Non-
Muslim Religious (Development Control 
among Muslims) Enactment, State of 
Selangor, 1988. A broad range of Shari’ah 
criminal offences fall within this purview, 
from matters pertaining to faith, sanctity of 
Islam, drinking, gambling, sexual offences, 
as well as offences under relating to family 
matters (Zulkifli Hasan, 2007). Only 
criminal offences specified under these 
enactments will fall under the jurisdiction 
of the religious enforcement division as the 
broad power to regulate criminal offences 
falls under the civil court, as specified under 
List 2 of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution (Siti Zubaidah Ismail, 2013; 
Farid Suffian, 2012).
In the execution of its powers, the 
religious enforcement officers face public 
opposition who view their action as a gross 
interference into the personal affairs of an 
individual (Ahmad Azam, 2007). For that 
reason, the religious enforcement officers 
have been labelled as ‘moral policemen’, 
‘spies’ or even ‘Peeping Toms’ for 
performing their duties (Siti Zubaidah & 
Muhammad Zahiri, 2007).
On the other hand, there are others 
who viewed that the Religious Department 
should have been more proactive in their 
enforcement. Azizah and Noradha (2014) 
lamented that more needs to be done to 
stem the declining moral standards among 
the Muslims in Malaysia and blamed the 
inefficiency of the religious enforcement 
department. Inordinate delays and simply 
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lack of enforcement could have resulted 
from the lack of understanding of the various 
constraints faced by them. As a result, the 
enforcement officers have been labelled 
as ineffectual, harsh, unprofessional, 
and the like. The article continues with a 
deliberation on the various constraints faced 
by the religious enforcement authorities.
CHALLENGES FACED BY THE 
RELIGIOUS ENFORCEMENT 
DIVISION
Enforcement of Shari’ah criminal offences 
has never been an easy task. The division 
faces a number of problems ranging from 
non-uniformity of the Shari’ah laws to more 
practical issues relating to lack of manpower 
and resources.
Non-uniformity of the Shari’ah laws
As Shari’ah falls within the jurisdiction 
of the states, the list of Shari’ah offences 
varies from one state to another. This leads 
to a non-uniformity of laws among states in 
Malaysia (Zulkifli Hassan, 2007). The non-
uniformity of laws gives rise to conflicts 
of laws between one state to another in 
Malaysia (Abdul Hamid, 2002). These 
offences range from conducts deem to be 
offending Islam to offences against persons 
or immoral behaviour (Farid Suffian, 2012).
Acute shortage of manpower
The dearth of quality religious enforcement 
officers poses a major constraint towards the 
effectiveness of the Islamic law enforcement 
in Malaysia. The root of such weakness 
lies in the poor planning and coordination 
of the enforcement process prior to its 
full execution. From the data given by the 
Enforcement Division, JAIS, in 2011, there 
is a gross lack of enforcement officers in 
comparison to the total number of Muslim 
population (see Table 1).
TABLE 1
The number of Muslim population and religious enforcement officers in Selangor by district6
District Muslim Population Religious 
Enforcement 
Officers
HQ/ Shah Alam/ Petaling 830,125 30 
Klang 369,059 9 
Sepang 124,449 8 
Kuala Langat 132,053 8 
Hulu Langat 565,618 9 
Gombak 382,774 8 
Hulu Selangor 127,783 8 
Kuala Selangor 146, 113 8 
Sabak Bernam 76,852 9 
TOTAL 2,754,826 97 
RATIO 28,400 1 
6 State of Religious Department (2012), unpublished. Data obtained from personal interview with 
the religious enforcement agency.
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Table 1 illustrates that the total number of 
the religious enforcement officers is highly 
disproportionate to the total number of the 
Muslim population. In particular, the per 
head ratio in Selangor stands at 1:28,400. 
If we were to draw a comparison to the 
ideal ratio of policeman to citizens by 
INTERPOL, i.e. one policeman to two 
hundred and fifty citizens, there is a 
serious discrepancy in the number of 
religious enforcement officers compared 
to the Muslim population in the country. 
In Malaysia, the current number of police 
officers is 122,000. That makes the ratio 
of policemen to citizen in Malaysia at 
one to two hundred and seventy-two 
(1:272)7. Of course, some would argue 
that such comparison cannot be drawn 
as the job scope of the police force 
is considerably much larger than the 
religious enforcement agencies. However, 
by drawing such comparison, one could 
not help but understand the burden faced 
by the religious enforcement officers in 
carrying out their duties, whereby one 
enforcement officer is expected to cater to 
28,400 Muslims!
7 My SinChew. (2008, December 3). Police to 
have 150,000 Personnel Target By 2011
My SinChew. Retrieved from http://www.
mysinchew.com/node/18850
See also Bernama (2008, December 22). Police 
Probe Malaysian Passports being Misused 
Abroad. Bernama. Retrieved from http://
www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/printable.
php?id=379841
Specialised training and skills
A significant number of the Religious 
Enforcement officers are civil servants in 
the Religious Office / Officer of Islamic 
Affairs scheme. Like other civil servants, 
they are subject to unilateral transfer to 
other division such as  Dakwah,  Mosque 
Management,  Education,  Research and 
the like (Siti Zubaidah, 2008). As a result, 
there is difficulty in retaining experienced 
officers, and as it takes time to recruit and 
train new officers, the effective running of 
the division is significantly affected.
Another serious problem is in the issue 
of recruitment. Currently, the recruitment 
of new officers is not determined by 
whether the candidates possess a degree 
in Shari’ah (Siti Zubaidah, 2008). This 
makes the training of officers twice as hard 
as they need to be ingrained with the basic 
knowledge of Shari’ah first before they can 
truly grasp the rudimentary knowledge of 
the various Shari’ah offences under the 
Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment and 
Syari’ah Criminal Procedure Enactment.
Like other enforcement agencies, 
the religious enforcement agencies must 
develop standard operating procedures 
(SOP) so that their operations will 
withstand legal challenges (Ibrahim & 
Hanipah, 2015). Among the standard 
procedures that require consideration are 
receiving complaints, taking statements 
from the witness, carrying out investigation, 
conducting operations, arresting, preparing 
investigation papers for the purpose of 
instituting prosecution, analysing evidence, 
collecting evidence for the purpose of court 
Ramizah Wan Muhammad, Abdul Shukor Abdul Hamid, Abdul Rahman Thobroni and Nasimah Hussin
Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 23 (S): 31 – 42 (2015) 37
exhibits and dealing with witness in the 
Court when the case was finally heard. Siti 
Zubaidah (2008) alluded to this by stating 
that despite the positive efforts of the 
Islamic Religious Department in coming 
out with SOPs for handling information 
and complaints, standing instructions on 
pre-emptive measures on public morality 
and power of arrests such as Arahan Tetap 
Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Negeri 
2007 (Garis Panduan Penguatkuasaan 
Undang-undang Jenayah Syariah) need to 
be done to refine them further.
Investigation procedures and the 
pursuant preparation of evidence are 
crucial in the effective prosecution of a 
case (Zulfakar, 2015). The make and break 
of a case depends on the successful proof 
of the elements of the offence and the full 
compliance of all the procedures related 
to the offence. The inefficiency of the 
enforcement officers inadvertently affects 
the prosecution of a case. This further mars 
the already negative image of the division. 
As a result, a few cases are prosecuted 
with the most popular cases being those 
involving proximity and indecent acts, 
which are easier in terms of burden of 
proof compared to cases like qazaf or false 
accusation of zina (fornication) (Zulkifli 
Hassan, 2007).
Another observable challenge is the 
lack of devotion, zeal and commitment 
in the work force. Enforcement requires 
sacrifice, time and expenses, as well as 
meticulousness in meeting evidential and 
procedural rules. The officers frequently 
face condemnation, verbal abuse, physical 
abuse, threats and even physical threat, 
which may jeopardise retention of talents. 
The officers further worry over the issue 
of insurance coverage in case anything 
happen to them. Aside from that, the lack 
of opportunities for promotion and small 
pay have exacerbated the situation further 
and subjected the officers to be vulnerable 
to the abuse of power and corruption in 
order to make ends meet. It is therefore 
not surprising that, in 2013, three religious 
enforcement officers of JAIS were 
detained by the Malaysian Anti Corruption 
Commission (MACC) for allegedly 
abusing power by accepting a bribe from a 
couple who committed the offense of close 
proximity. It appeared that the officers had 
been earning tens of thousands of ringgit 
within a month.8 This is indeed a serious 
problem as the stature of an officer whose 
duty is to combat Shari’ah offences must 
be beyond reproach. If they are susceptible 
to this type of crime, which is declared as 
a crime in Islam and in the Enactments, 
the current system therefore needs to be 
revamped.
Lack of Resources
Proper resources and equipment are essential 
in the effective execution of Shari’ah 
enforcement in Malaysia (Mohammad 
Fathi & Nazri, 2015). Unfortunately, the 
Religious enforcement Division suffers 
8 Utusan Malaysia (2013, December 3). Pegawai 
JAIS didakwa terima suapan lupus fail khalwat. 
Utusan Malaysia. Retrieved from http://ww1.
utusan.com.my/utusan/Mahkamah/20130903/
ma_05/Pegawai-JAIS-didakwa-terima-suapan-
lupus-fail-khalwatk
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from lack of equipment that is necessary 
to assist them in their enforcement duties. 
The use of devices is imperative to prove 
some offences such as alcohol detection 
device. Evidence from alcohol testers has 
formally been accepted by the Shari’ah 
court as admissible evidence (Amir & Nik 
Azlan, n.d.).
Another major problem faced by the 
division is the lack of support in terms of 
logistics. There is a need to add and improve 
the necessary transportation needs of the 
officers and suitable devices for storing 
evidence to be used in courts as exhibits. 
Failure to fulfil these needs may render 
cases to be thrown out of court as they are 
inadmissible. Aside from that, the lack of 
temporary detention rooms or lock ups has 
led to detainees escaping, which in some 
circumstances has rendered the officers 
vulnerable to negligence suit.
Other constraints, which are probably 
minor problems, include the lack of uniforms, 
which gives the image that these enforcement 
officers lack both discipline and force. On 
a more fundamental note, however, the 
Enforcement Officers are not armed unlike 
the police officers. This has subjected them to 
physical harm especially when they are faced 
with life threatening situations. The cold 
blooded murder of the Chief of the Religious 
Enforcement Officer of Pahang in November 
2013 is a defining example of how dangerous 
the task of religious enforcers can be in 
carrying out their duties. In Malaysia, only the 
Terengganu Islamic Religious Enforcement 
officers are allowed to carry firearms in their 
daily duties.
THE WAY FORWARD
The findings from the field work attest 
to the fact that the Shari’ah criminal 
enforcement in Malaysia is in a dire need 
of a progressive change. The challenges 
that have been identified are not small feats 
but this does not mean that they are not 
insurmountable. Like any other criminal 
enforcement agencies, the division requires 
capital, resources and manpower upgrade. 
Among strategic initiative mooted is the 
creation of a new scheme of service for 
Shari’ah enforcement officers. The current 
officers are on “S” grade which is an 
ordinary scheme for all the officers in the 
prosecution and enforcement department. 
In order to reduce the possibility of 
corruption and bribery, it is wise to place 
the enforcement officers at a higher 
rank with higher pay. In order to further 
strengthen the division, the enforcement 
division should be made as independent 
from the state religious office, free to make 
decisions on day-to-day operations and 
prosecution without being subjected to the 
control of the state religious department.
The realisation that the religious 
enforcement department should be 
autonomous has been felt at the highest 
level. For example, this has been raised 
by the then Chief Minister of Malacca at 
the closing ceremony of the Conference 
for Religious Enforcement Officer and 
Prosecutor Entire Malaysia held from 6th to 
8th December 2009 at Everly Resort Hotel 
in Tanjung Keling, Malacca. The then 
deputy minister at the Prime Minister’s 
Department, Datuk Dr. Mashitah Ibrahim, 
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also agreed with this suggestion, stating that 
autonomy is the only way forward for the 
department. In line with that call, Rahimin 
(2010) espoused for the department to be 
upgraded into one that is highly regarded 
for its excellence in enforcement, at par 
with other enforcement agencies. Farid 
(2011) also echoed the concern that the 
enforcement division should be separated 
from the state religious department.
Corollary to the new scheme is to give 
the officers more professional training so 
that the new Shariah enforcement agency 
will be at par with other enforcement 
agencies such as JAKIM and the Copyright 
Enforcement Division of the Ministry of 
Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs. 
Like any other scheme of service, there must 
be opportunities for training, promotion, 
critical allowance, perks and the like. By 
upgrading the scheme of service, more 
talented candidates could be attracted to 
join the agency’s manpower. The welfare of 
the enforcement officers must also be taken 
into consideration. Like other enforcement 
officers, the religious enforcement officers 
are subjected to ridicule, harassment, 
as well as physical and bodily threats. 
The officers must be insured from any 
impending injury and the family members 
must be properly compensated in the event 
of death in the carrying out of official duty.
Security issue is another major concern 
(Cho, 2013). Arming the enforcement 
officers has been mooted since 1995, but 
it was not seriously regarded until the 
murder of the Religious Enforcement 
Chief of Pahang, Ahmad Raffli in 1995. 
Other than the suggestions mentioned 
above, Religious enforcers must also equip 
themselves with any martial arts skills as a 
form of self defence.
Needless to say, the enforcement 
officers must also be equipped with state-
of-the-art technology which includes 
breathalysers, audio spy devices, voice 
recorders, spy cameras, night vision 
cameras, etc. Enforcement of Shariah 
criminal offences has become more and 
more challenging with the rise of deviant 
teaching such as Rasul Melayu, Syiah, 
Qadiani and Al-Arqam, which require 
religious enforcement to infiltrate into 
groups to gather intelligence.
In addition, continuous training is 
imperative in order to upgrade the skills of 
the enforcement officers. The training must 
also include understanding of the various 
Shariah Enactments that are applicable to 
them, procedural rules and relevant court 
decisions (Najibah, 2012). These include 
skills required for conducting investigations 
and arrest, gathering evidence, preparing 
evidence to be used in courts, preservation 
of court exhibits, as well as questioning 
witness in court. Officers could acquire 
such skills through attachments at the 
Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) or Institut 
Latihan Kehakiman dan Perundangan 
(ILKAP) or mock trials.
Meanwhile, the creation of a 
professional image, the use of special 
uniforms should be created to distinguish 
the Shari’ah enforcement officers from 
other officers at the Religious Department. 
There have been initial efforts made by 
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Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor (JAIS) 
when the Enforcement Division of 
JAIS introduced new uniforms for JAIS 
enforcement officers on 19 July 2011. 
The event was launched by JAIS Director, 
Dato ‘Hj Marzuki bin Hussin, and it 
was one of the many initiatives taken to 
give a professional image to religious 
enforcement officers.
Much effort has been taken to 
professionalise the Shari’ah courts in 
Malaysia. It is now time for the enforcement 
division to be given the much needed 
professional outlook. After all, upholding 
justice is the backbone of the Shari’ah 
system and in keeping with that, all the 
agencies involved must be further moulded 
to make this a reality.
In what way will all these suggestions 
help to change the public perception? The 
increase in professionalism will definitely 
help create a more systematic method of 
carrying out duties. This will hopefully 
minimise the negative perception that has 
long tainted the image of the Department 
and the officers. However, a mere system 
and even lucrative incentives will not be 
enough. The requirements used for selecting 
enforcement officers must also be increased 
to include not only academic qualifications 
but also the possession of the true Islamic 
akhlak (morals).
This is pertinent to ensure that 
whenever the enforcement of Islamic 
Criminal offences is carried out, it is done 
in the most delicate manner, while taking 
into consideration the issue relating to the 
right to privacy and the sensitivity of the 
situation. As criminals under the Penal 
Code are informed of the reason for their 
arrest, similarly, those committing Islamic 
offences must also be made to understand 
the reason for their arrest. The Department 
of Religious Affairs of each state also has 
the imperative duty to educate the Malaysian 
public on the necessity of espousing good 
and preventing evil by the State. Hopefully, 
with the improvement, the enforcement of 
Shari’ah crimes will no longer be negatively 
perceived in the future. Instead, it will help 
Muslims and non-Muslims in Malaysia to 
understand that the concept of imposing 
“harm to others” as it is understood that the 
common law system is slightly different 
from the Islamic legal system. This is 
because what is regarded as causing harm 
to others in the common law system is 
decided on a case-to-case basis, whereas in 
the Shari’ah, it is determined by Allah s.w.t.
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ABSTRACT
The law of Qisas is a concept under Islamic law which allows the victim who has been 
physically hurt by an offender or the heirs of the deceased to a murder to play a role in 
determining the fate of the offender once he is found guilty. This includes the ability to 
choose whether to opt for equal punishment (qisas) or to demand monetary compensation 
(which is diyat), or to forgive the offender altogether. This article concentrates on the 
concept of forgiveness in qisas involving murder. The aim of the article is to show that 
contrary to popular criticism, the law of qisas is not about revenge. This is proven by 
the choice of forgiving the offender in total for the hurt or even life that he has taken. If 
compared to the current position in Malaysia, the right to forgive an offender is not given 
to the heirs of the decease but instead, it is given to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler 
of ALL States. This goes against the rights of the victim’s heirs who not only is deprived 
of any compensation but also deprived of seeing justice done for the deceased. Malaysia 
is taken as an example of a modern country and the criminal law practised here is similar 
to many modern countries such as Singapore and India. Hence, this article submits that 
this concept of forgiveness should be revisited and re-applied to allow the victim or his 
heir(s) to decide the fate of the offenders instead of merely leaving it to the Rulers. This 
submission is arrived at after critically analysing primary sources being the injunctions in 
the Holy Qur’an and secondary sources that have interpreted its application. Meanwhile, 
the Malaysian position is examined in light of the Penal Code and the right to forgive as 
provided by the Malaysian Constitution.
Keywords: Concept of forgiveness, qisas, Islamic 
criminal law, diyat.
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INTRODUCTION
“In the Law of Equality (Qisas) there 
is (saving of) life to you, O you men of 
understanding, that you may restrain 
yourselves.” (al-Qur’an, al-Baqarah, 2: 179)
The above mentioned verse clearly 
states that with qisas, there is the saving 
of life. If one were to read this verse in 
isolation, one could not help but be baffled. 
This is because, according to the literal 
and direct translation of the word qisas, it 
means “to retaliate”, then one cannot help 
but be confused. Why is it that Allah has 
promised that there is life in qisas when at 
face value it would seem like a simple act of 
revenge. How could there be life if the law 
allows, for example in the case of murder, 
the heir(s) of the deceased to take revenge 
over the person who had committed the act 
of murder? If taken from this angle, then in 
qisas, there is no life, there is only certain 
death!
This article is about the other side of the 
law of qisas, which is rarely highlighted. In 
actual fact, the law of qisas provides options 
for the victim of a hurt or the heir(s) of 
the deceased in cases of murder to choose 
from if the accused is found guilty of 
causing hurt or death by the Court (Awang 
Osman, 1996; Anwarullah, 2004). The first 
option is of course the choice of qisas or 
equal retaliation. The second option is to 
choose payment of diyat or compensation 
from the offender, and the third option is 
to forgive the offender and accept payment 
of compensation or to forgive the offender 
without any compensation whatsoever. 
This article concentrates on the concept 
of forgiveness in qisas cases involving the 
crime of murder. The aim of the article is 
to show that contrary to popular criticism, 
the law of qisas is not about revenge. This 
is proven by the choice of forgiving the 
offender in total even if he has committed 
one of the most heinous crimes to man, i.e. 
by taking the life of another human being 
without just cause. 
Compared to the current position in 
Malaysia, the right to forgive an offender 
is not given to the heirs of the decease but 
it is instead given to the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong or the Ruler of each State. This goes 
against the rights of the heirs of the victim 
who not only deprived of any compensation 
but also deprived of seeing justice done for 
the deceased. Hence, this article submits 
that this concept of forgiveness should be 
revisited and re-applied to allow the victim 
or his heirs to decide on the fate of the 
offenders instead of merely leaving it to the 
Rulers. This submission is arrived at after 
critically analysing primary sources being 
the injunctions in the Holy Qur’an and 
secondary sources that have interpreted its 
application such as in the books of Tafsir. 
Meanwhile, the Malaysian position is 
examined in light of the Penal Code and 
the right to forgive, as provided by the 
Malaysian Constitution.
The article is divided into four parts. 
The first part is the crux of the article, where 
it discusses the interpretation behind the 
Qur’anic verse mentioned above, as well 
as its preceding verse. This understanding 
is important because it provides the 
basis for forgiveness in such a difficult 
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circumstance. From here, part two of the 
article looks at the existing law in Malaysia 
to see how the crime of murder is being 
punished. Malaysia is taken as an example 
of a modern country and the criminal law 
being practiced here is similar to that in 
many modern countries such as Singapore 
and India. In this part, a critical analysis is 
made on the concept of forgiveness being 
practiced under the Malaysian correctional 
system. The third part of the article looks at 
whether or not the concept of forgiveness 
as it is practiced in Islam could be adopted 
to the modern Malaysian scenario. This 
is the final part of the article where it is 
concluded that the concept of forgiveness 
under Islamic law should be revisited and 
applied to the modern world, especially in 
Malaysia, whereby in the interest of justice 
and fairness to the heirs of the deceased, 
the option to  forgive should be given to 
them instead of placing it in the hands of 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Rulers of 
each state. 
THE LAW OF QISAS AND THE 
CONCEPT OF FORGIVENESS  
Siddiqi (1985) rightly sums up the law of 
qisas as:
“The subject of qisas must be 
considered, first, as to occasions affecting 
life and, secondly, as to retaliation in 
matters of hurts or causing bodily injury.”
Nevertheless, since the article only 
discusses the issue of forgiveness in cases 
of murder, there is a need to return to 
the abovementioned verse. This verse is 
preceded by verse 178 which discusses 
the hukum or legal ruling of qisas as 
being mandatory for Muslims under the 
Shari’ah.1 The word `kutiba’ signifies 
`wajib’ or a mandatory obligation to fulfil 
the rights of those who demand for it (Al-
Maraghiy, 2001). Meanwhile, the word 
‘qisas’ literally means to make a thing equal 
or fair to another thing (Siddiqi, 1985; Al-
Maraghiy, 2001). It is further explained 
that the word ‘scissors’ in Arabic is known 
as `miqas’, which shows that both sides of 
the shape and size of the blades are similar 
(Al-Maraghiy, 2001). The word `musawah’ 
has also been used to describe the meaning 
of qisas as taking something that is similar 
or equal to another thing (Shabbir, 2003). 
The preceding verse reads as follows:
“O you who believe! Retaliation has 
been prescribed for you in the matter of 
murder. The free for free, the slave for a 
slave, the woman for a woman.2 If any 
remission is made by the brother of the 
slain, then grant any reasonable demand 
and compensate him with gratitude. This is 
a concession and a mercy from your Lord 
1 The implementation of the Islamic criminal 
justice system is actually dependent on whether 
or not the Government of the day accepts the 
whole corpus of the Shari'ah as the applicable 
law of the State. This will depend largely on 
the political will of Muslims who are in power. 
2 In relation to the meaning of this part of 
the verse, it does not mean that the there is 
discrimination in terms of the punishment 
where for example if a woman kills a man then 
there will be no qisas as the verse specifically 
mentions "the woman for a woman". On the 
contrary, according to al-Marghiy, this means 
that if a woman commits the crime of murder 
than a woman shall be punished. 
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and after this whoever exceeds the limits, 
shall be in grave penalty.” (al-Qur’an, al-
Baqarah, 2, 178)
The verse mentions the right of 
requesting for diyat in place of qisas in the 
case of intentional murder (Anwarullah, 
1997; Oudah, 1999). This part of the verse 
shows the permission given by Allah to 
the victim or the heirs to the victim of a 
qisas crime to opt for diyat (Al-Sagoff, 
2007; Ismail, 2012). According to this 
verse, when the victim or the heirs of 
the deceased opts/opt for this option in 
place of qisas, they must not do so with 
an intention of asking for an unreasonable 
amount. The request for diyat must be 
done according to the specific calculation 
on the amount of diyat to be awarded to 
the victim or the heirs of the deceased 
(Ismail, 2012). As for the offender, if diyat 
has been requested, he must endeavour to 
pay the amount as soon as possible and 
it must be done in a cordial way within 
the prescribed period, without forsaking 
the rights of the victim or the heirs of the 
deceased (Al-Maraghiy, 2001).
Should the offender be in a difficult 
position to pay the amount of diyat that 
has been determined, the Court has the 
power to order that the payments be made 
in instalments. Another option for the 
offender is to seek assistance from his 
‘aqilah or next of kin (Haneef, 2000). 
There are jurists like Imam Abu Hanifah 
who are of the view that there can be 
concessions made by the heirs of the 
deceased. If this happens then through 
sulh, the offender can offer any other 
concessions and if this is accepted, this 
is known as badal al-sulh (Anwarullah, 
1997).
Forgiving the Enemy (al-’Afw)
The jurists are unanimous that to forgive 
the offender gratuitously is the principal 
ground for remitting qisas. It is considered 
in remitting the punishment from an 
offender only if it is granted from the 
victim’s side and not from the ruler’s side. 
Thus, when the victim or his relatives 
forgive the offender, the prescribed 
punishment cannot be inflicted on him. 
However, the forgiveness of the victim and 
his relatives does not affect the right of the 
ruler to impose a ta‘zir punishment on the 
offender after that, if the public interest 
necessitates it. The ruler, on the other hand, 
cannot remit the prescribed punishment 
of qisas on the offender by granting his 
pardon, if the victim does not allow him to 
do so (Oudah, 1999).
The right of the victim or his relatives 
to forgive the offender from the punishment 
of qisas is in fact encouraged by the Prophet 
s.a.w., who said:
 No person is caused to suffer injury on 
his body and then he forgives him (who 
injured him) but Allah elevates him a 
degree on that account or expiates his 
sin (Ansari, 2000; Ibn Majah, n.d.; 
Hadith no. 2693).
Anas ibn Malik is reported to have said 
that the Prophet s.a.w. invariably advised 
forgiving cases involving qisas (Ansari, 
2000; Ibn Majah, n.d.).
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The right given to the victim or 
the heirs of the deceased to forgive the 
offender must be done freely and without 
any pressure or insistence on the part of 
the offender. The verse shows that once the 
heirs have chosen to forgive the offender, 
there can be no longer any ill-feelings or 
dissatisfaction or vengeance towards the 
offender. Anyone who wishes to avenge the 
death of the victim shall be given painful 
recompense (Al-Zuhayli, 1991).
Al-Maraghiy (2001) continues to 
explain the situations that the offender 
could be forgiven instead of demanding 
for qisas or even diyat. These include a 
situation where the offender is the sole 
breadwinner of the family and the exercise 
of qisas on him which would result in the 
whole family having no means of fending 
for themselves. If the offender were to be 
given the qisas, then this would not only 
affect him alone, but it would also give a 
negative impact on his family (Anwarullah, 
1997). This is especially so in situations 
where the offender has a family with small 
children depending on him. However, 
the choice to forgive does not depend on 
these reasons. If the heir of the deceased so 
wishes, forgiveness need not be prompted 
by these reasons.
The main aim of the law of qisas that 
is administered in a fair and proper manner 
is actually to educate the victims to have 
forgiving heart, for even after having been 
victims to the most heinous crime, where 
their loved one is killed and taken away, 
they can still forgive for the sake of Allah. 
This means that they are willing to let the 
offender go so that his family will not feel 
the pain that they are suffering from. It is 
this sacrifice which in the end sets them 
free from any need for revenge because 
Allah has promised them the best rewards 
in this world and more importantly in the 
Hereafter. The belief in the existence of the 
Hereafter and the fact that it will last far 
longer than this existing world has become 
an impetus for Muslim victims to forgive 
the offender and hope for Allah’s blessings 
and mercy. This is further confirmed in the 
following verse, which mentions:
 “And if you punish (your enemy) then 
punish them with the like of what which 
you were afflicted. But if you endure 
patiently, verily, it is better for those 
who are patient.” (al-Qur’an, Surah 
al-Nahl(16), 126)
This verse emphasises the virtue 
of patience over retribution against the 
offender. It shows that in order to give 
forgiveness to an offender, the heirs of 
the victim must have absolute trust in the 
hidden benefits and rewards that only Allah 
can award to His servants who are patient. 
It is an ultimate test in faith and trust in the 
will of Allah and it is a test to the believers 
as to the extent of their belief in Allah as 
the best recompense and the existence of 
the Hereafter, where each individual will 
be answerable for their deeds in this world.
This is what is meant by there is `life’ 
in qisas. Although the act of forgiveness 
allows the offender to continue to live, 
it does not mean that Allah s.w.t. allows 
offenders who have done wrong to simply 
be set free and endanger the rest of the 
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society. Instead, verse 178 states the need 
of the offender to “compensate him (the 
victim) with gratitude. This is a concession 
and mercy from your Lord and after this, 
whoever exceeds the limits shall be in grave 
penalty”. This shows that once forgiven, 
the offender is to show remorse and truly 
repent for all the wrongful act that he has 
committed and vow to never commit the 
same crime again. Nevertheless, according 
to the views of Imam Malik, which is 
agreed upon by Maulana Abdullah Yusuf 
Ali, the State may still impose other types 
of ta’zir punishment to ensure that the 
offender has really repented and to provide 
rehabilitation programmes to this effect 
(Ibn Rushd, 1983; Al-Mawardi,1973; Abu 
Zahrah, n.d.).
The Effect of Forgiveness
Once forgiveness has been granted, even 
by only one member of the heirs of the 
deceased, the result would be the lifting 
of the death penalty (Al-Maraghiy, 2001). 
The right of forgiveness is only given to the 
heirs of the deceased because to award it to 
the State or any other pardon body would 
not result in fairness. It is the family who 
has been left bereft without a member, who 
feels the pain, who will be directly affected 
by the loss. If the power to forgive was 
to be awarded to the State or the Pardons 
Board, this would violate the rights of the 
victim as well as his heirs. If the State or 
the Pardons Board were given the right to 
forgive offenders who committed murder, 
then this would also bring with it the 
dangerous possibility of bribery and issues 
relating to integrity. Since they do not 
personally know the victim, a State that 
issues a pardon to an offender has no way 
of ensuring that the rights of the heirs of 
the victim are well cared for. Aside from 
that, if pardoning by a third party would 
result in dissatisfaction on the part of the 
heirs of the deceased as they might feel 
that justice has not been done. This feeling 
of dissatisfaction could later develop and 
promote the need for revenge. This will lead 
to a prolonged feeling of hatred and add to 
the possibility of causing unrest in society 
which may lead to further  condemnation 
or fitnah (Al-Maraghiy, 2001; Abu Zahrah, 
n.d.).
Coming back to the issue of lifting 
the qisas, once this has been done, then it 
becomes the responsibility of the offender 
to pay diyat unless that too has been 
remitted by the heirs of the deceased. This 
is based on a reading of the following 
verse, which means:
 “...and verily has paid diyat which has 
been given to the heirs of the deceased, 
except if they have agreed to give it up 
(as-sadaqah) and forgiven her.” (al-
Qur’an, An-Nisa’ (4): 92)
According Abu Syuraih al-Khuzai r.a., 
Rasulullah s.a.w. was reported to have said:
 “And whoever has been victimised by 
murder or insanity, verily they may 
choose one of three:
 1. To ask for qisas; or
 2. To award forgiveness; or
 3. To make payment of diyat.
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 If more is asked verily stop it with your 
hand and whoever transgresses, verily 
the Hell of Jahannam are open and 
there they will stay forever.” (Bahreisy 
et al., 1988; Abu Dawud, 1998; Hadith 
No. 4496)
It is important to note that the fact that 
the heirs of the deceased have forgiven the 
offender does not mean that the offender 
can go free. As mentioned above, the 
State may provide for ta’zir punishment 
such as imprisonment for a determined 
amount of time, together with a structured 
rehabilitative programme aimed at 
reforming the offender and preparing him 
to be released as a better person than he 
was before.
THE PUNISHMENT FOR MURDER 
IN MALAYSIA 
This part of the article concentrates on the 
punishment for the crime of murder under 
the Malaysian Penal Code. A discussion 
shall also be made on the possibility of 
forgiving the offender. The position in 
Malaysia could be taken as a reflection of 
the position in Singapore and India as the 
Malaysian and Singaporean Penal Code 
are in pari materia with the Indian Penal 
Code. Section 302 of the Malaysian Penal 
Code provides:
 “Whosoever commits murder shall be 
punished with death.”
This section clearly does not provide 
any options to the heirs of the deceased 
to have any say in the punishment of the 
offenders. This is largely due to the fact 
that under the Malaysian criminal justice 
system, a criminal act is considered an 
unlawful act against the State as it affects 
the public at large. Hence, once the 
punishment of a particular crime has been 
determined by way of statute, the individual 
has no say in the matter, although he is the 
one who has been victimised. The State 
views criminal acts against any of its 
citizens as criminal acts against the State. 
This is because the citizens have subjected 
their rights to be protected by the States 
(Aun, 2005).
The current law relating to the 
punishment for the crime of murder 
only provides for the death penalty to be 
awarded to an offender who has been found 
guilty of the offence. The punishment is 
retributive in nature and does not reflect 
any consideration made to the welfare of 
the surviving heirs of the deceased (Dhillon 
et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, Article 42(1) of the 
Malaysian Constitution provides:
 “The Yang di-Pertuan Agong has the 
power to grant pardons, reprieves 
and respites in respect of all offences 
(emphasis added) which have been 
tried by court-martial and all offences 
committed in the Federal Territories of 
Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan; 
and the Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri 
of a State has power to grant pardons, 
reprieves and respites in respect of all 
other offences committed in his State.”
Article 42(1) uses the word “pardon” 
to describe forgiveness. This power to 
pardon offenders is given to the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong for crimes committed in the 
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Federal Territories. For crimes committed 
in other parts of the country, each of the 
Rulers of the States has similar power to 
pardon criminal offenders.3
The above discussion shows that 
although the concept of pardoning an 
offender under Malaysian law does exist, 
the exercise of this particular concept 
is different from the position under the 
Shari’ah. The most glaring difference lies in 
who has the power to grant pardon between 
the two systems. Under the Shari’ah, only 
the heirs of the deceased may choose to 
forgive the offender in cases of murder. This 
is clearly different from the position under 
the Malaysian law which gives the power 
of remitting the death punishment to the 
State Ruler or the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, 
who does not know the reasons behind the 
cruel act, who has not suffered the effects 
of the crime and who does not know any 
who has not felt the loss which has been 
suffered by the victim and his family. 
Therefore, what right does the Ruler have 
to forgive an offender who has committed 
the crime of murder? On the contrary, 
under the Shari’ah, the heirs of the victim 
are given the powers to decide whether to 
opt for qisas, diyat or forgiveness. This is 
justified because the heirs of the deceased 
are the ones who are directly affected by 
the act of the offender.
Nonetheless, there is the issue of 
whether it is right for the heirs of the 
deceased to forgive the offender, which 
leads to the release of a murderer into the 
society and hence endangering the lives 
of other citizens of the state. Therefore, 
there is a need to remember that one of the 
influencing factors which can lead to the 
heirs forgiving the offender is the fact that 
the offender has shown total remorse and 
repented for all his terrible acts. Aside from 
that, the State has the authority to provide 
for ta’zir punishment to ensure that the 
offender can no longer hurt other members 
of the public (Anwarullah, 2004). What is 
clear here is that, contrary to the practice 
under Malaysian law where the Ruler may 
remit the prescribed death penalty, the law 
of qisas does not allow the Ruler to remit a 
Qisas punishment unless the victim allows 
him to do so.
The Process of Pardoning in Malaysia
Article 42(4) mentions that when exercising 
his powers to grant pardon, the Ruler and/
or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri is to exercise 
based on the advice given by the Pardons 
Board which is constituted under Clause 
(5) of Article 42.4 The Pardons Board is 
to be constituted at each State and shall 
consist of the following:
3 For example the Sultan of Kedah has the 
power to grant pardons for crimes of murder 
committed in the state of Kedah. This power 
is reflected in Article 42(1) of the Kedah State 
Constitution.
4 In the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, 
Labuan and Putrajaya, a single Pardons Board 
shall be constituted and the provisions of Clauses 
5,6,7,8 and 9 of Article 42 shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to the Pardons Board under Clause 11 
except that reference to the "Ruler or Yang di-
Pertua Negeri" shall be construed as reference 
to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and reference to 
"Chief Minister of the State" shall be construed as 
the Minister responsible for the Federal Territoty 
of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya.
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 a.  The Attorney General of 
Malaysia;5
 b.  The Chief Minister of the State;
 c.  Not more than three other 
members, who shall be 
appointed by the Rulers or the 
      Yang di-Pertua Negeri.6
Although the Article mentions that 
the members of the Pardon Board are 
appointed for a term of three years and 
may be eligible for reappointment, the 
Article does not specifically mention how 
many times the Board must meet in order 
to hear applications. As such, this gives rise 
to the issue of prolonging detention time 
while waiting for pardon to be given by the 
Ruler or the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. This 
in turn goes to the rights of the offender 
to have his case being determined within 
a specified period of time. There is a case 
where the offender had to wait for years to 
have his petition for pardon or clemency 
heard by the Pardons Board. Among the 
reasons for this is the absence of a fixed 
duration that requires the Board to meet 
and settle such petitions. As a result, the 
offender is subjected to the punishment of 
imprisonment and the death penalty if his 
petition for pardon is not granted by the 
Pardons Board.
An analysis of cases in Malaysia 
such as Juraimi bin Husin v Lembaga 
Pengampunan Negeri Pahang & Ors 
[2001] 3 MLJ 458 and Sim Kie Chon v 
Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors. 
[1985] 2 MLJ 385 show that the Courts 
do not consider the requests for pardon 
to the Pardons Board as a legal right. 
Justice Faiza Tamby Chik, in the case of 
Juraimi bin Husin for example held that 
“mercy is not the subject of legal rights. It 
begins where legal rights end.” Therefore, 
he decided that, “the exercise of a royal 
prerogative of mercy by His Royal Highness 
the Sultan of Pahang cannot be varied or 
confirmed.” In this case, although the Court 
of Appeal agreed with the Appellant that 
the prolonged delay in the execution of the 
death sentence had deprived him of his life 
in accordance with law, this decision was 
reversed by the Federal Court. In justifying 
the prerogative of the Ruler in making 
his decision, Abdul Hamid in the case of 
Sim Kie Chon stated that, “...the power of 
mercy is a high prerogative exercisable by 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler 
of the State ...who acts with the greatest 
conscience and care and without fear or 
influence from any quarter.”
The above discussion also shows that 
there are no cases or statutes that provide for 
a time limit to petitions for clemency to be 
heard. There are also no cases or statutes to 
show that if there is a delay in the execution 
of the death penalty, then the offender may 
be absolved from the death penalty.
5 The Attorney General may delegate his 
functions as member of the Board to any other 
person provided that he does so through an 
instrument in writing. See Article 42(5) of the 
Federal Constitution.
6 There is a caveat here, in that a member of the 
Legislative Assembly of a State or the House 
of Representatives shall not be appointed by 
the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri to be 
a member of a Pardon Board or to exercise 
temporarily the functions of such a member. 
See Article 42(7).
Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 23 (S): 43 – 54 (2015)
Majdah Zawawi and Nasimah Hussin
52
Another issue relating to the issuance 
of pardon by the Ruler or Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong is the fact that Article 42 is also 
silent on the criteria that would allow 
pardon to be given. Nothing is mentioned 
on the need to look at the views of the heirs 
of the deceased on this matter. Neither is 
there any specific consideration given to 
repentance, remorse and willingness to 
rehabilitate and mend his ways on the part 
of the offender. It is true that the Ruler or 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong does rely on good 
behaviour reports and the fact that the 
offender has already served a long-term jail 
sentence is a factor which may influence 
him to commute the death sentence to the 
sentence of life imprisonment. However, 
there is an absence of a definitive law which 
lays down what needs to be fulfilled by the 
offenders in order to have his petition to be 
pardoned accepted by the Ruler or Yang di-
Pertuan Agong. Therefore, it is submitted 
at this point that the current practice of 
awarding pardon or clemency to offenders 
in Malaysia needs to be revisited and 
improved in order to ensure that justice is 
done not only to the heirs of the victim but 
also to the offender.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY 
RECCOMMENDATIONS 
There have been suggestions made by 
writers such as Guru Dhillon, Noor 
Mohammad and Ng Yih Miin (2012) that 
the mandatory death sentence in cases of 
murder be replaced with a compulsory 
compensation scheme for the heirs of 
the deceased. Making compensation 
compulsory, however, still does not 
address the issue of recognising the rights 
of the heirs of the victim. To this, the three 
writers did agree that in determining the 
punishment for murder, the Court should 
decide according to the wishes of the 
victim’s family. Hence, it is submitted that 
in order to ensure that the rights of both 
the victim and offender are protected, an 
adoption of the full concept of qisas as 
a whole is necessary. This would entail 
the recognition given to the heirs of the 
deceased to exercise the three options, 
i.e., whether to choose qisas or equal 
retaliation, or to opt for diyat, or to opt 
for pardoning the offender, either with or 
without diyat.
It is submitted that the concept of 
forgiveness is possible as it is understood 
under the Shari’ah, and could be adopted 
in the Malaysian context. The spirit of the 
law is aimed at protecting the innocent 
party and allowing for the form of the law 
to be administered in order to bring the 
offender back to the right path by allowing 
him to realise his mistakes, repent and be 
rehabilitated. The challenge in this is to 
convince the Malaysian public, both the 
Muslims and the non-Muslims to accept 
a law that is based on religion. There is 
also a challenge of educating the public of 
the universal aim of the Shari’ah, that is, 
to protect the five essential values of life, 
religion, intellect, honour and property of 
every member of the society, regardless of 
their religion.
It can be seen that the concept of 
forgiveness should be revisited and re-
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applied to allow the victim or his heirs to 
decide on the fate of the offenders instead 
of merely leaving it to the Rulers.
This would indeed be possible with 
the amendment to Article 42 of the Federal 
Constitution to replace the power to give 
clemency to the heirs of the deceased instead 
of to the Rulers of the States, the Yang di-
Pertua Negeris, or the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong. Aside from that, there is also a need 
to amend Section 302 of the Penal Code 
to not only provide for mandatory death 
penalty as a punishment for murder, but 
also to allow for a remittance of the death 
penalty by paying a determined amount 
of monetary compensation if the heirs of 
the deceased wish so. The law should also 
provide that before the pronouncement of 
the punishment, the Court needs to consult 
the heirs of the deceased as to what options 
that they would prefer the Court to declare. 
The concept of justice in the law of qisas is 
aimed at being fair and just primarily to the 
victim, while at the same time providing 
hope and repentance for the offender.
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ABSTRACT
Islamic institutions including courts and fatwā have been in existence in Nigeria since the 
advent of Islam in the country. While the courts were established in order to adjudicate 
between disputant parties, muftīs were also used as assessors (court officials) responsible 
for assisting the courts in dispensation of justice. When the colonial administrators came, 
they introduced their legal system to the colonies, which led to a gradual wipe away of 
some aspects of the Islamic legal system (including the courts and fatwā institutions). The 
doctrine of the tripartite tests (i.e., the repugnancy test, incompatibility test and public 
policy test) was introduced into the country’s legal system to the extent that the full and 
hitherto application of Islamic law was modified and some were suspended. Muslims 
are left with only matters related to civil causes and personal matters. Islamic jurists 
such as muftīs become functus officio in the Shari’ah Courts. In view of this, the paper 
explores the possibility of finding an avenue on how to revive the past glory of muftīs 
in the Nigerian judicial system. Thus, it sets out some modalities on how fatwā can be 
streamlined to achieving this objective. One of such modalities is to institutionalise fatwā 
in the country.
Keywords: Shari’ah Court, role of a muftī, Nigeria, judiciary
INTRODUCTION
The role of muftīs in the Shari’ah courts 
is paramount, especially in dealing with 
an effective dispensation of justice. In 
Nigeria, this role has been robbed by some 
structures laid out by the colonial rule. The 
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British colonial administrators colonised 
Nigeria between the period of the late 
19th century (1861) and the middle of the 
20th century (1960), within which, many 
Islamic structures recorded some setbacks 
including the fatwā institutions. In fact, 
the role of fatwā and the administration of 
Islamic law generally started to decline by 
the advent of the colonial administration. 
Indeed, this has to do with the influence 
of the English legal system, which 
for long has been interacting with the 
Islamic law side-by-side in the country. 
The interaction between the two laws 
has no doubt resulted to the setback in 
the administration of Islamic law in the 
Nigerian courts. Practically, the existence 
of the English legal system in Nigeria 
has created a vacuum for the application 
of Islamic law, particularly in its judicial 
and the administrative systems. It has 
affected the entire Islamic system in the 
country to the extent that the Shari’ah 
Courts and other Islamic institutions lost 
their past glory. Thus, judges who preside 
over Shari’ah matters, lack requisite 
knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence talk 
more of the vast knowledge of Islamic 
law. Some of them cannot read even a 
portion in the Glorious Qur’an and the 
ahādith of the Prophet (s.a.w), not to talk 
about understanding the knowledge of 
how to apply and make use of sciences of 
the Qur’an and hadith. The worst part of 
all is that there is no qualified person to 
guide these judicial personnel whenever 
they find themselves in a fix position. 
Hence, their reliance has been always on 
the submissions of legal practitioners who 
do not have vast knowledge of Islamic 
law. As the role of muftī is paramount to 
the development of Islamic law and the 
administration of justice in the Nigerian 
courts, the paper reveals the necessity to 
revive the hitherto institution of fatwā and 
the role of muftīs in the Shari’ah Courts so 
that Islamic matters would be effectively 
determined.
NATURE AND ORIGIN OF FATWĀ IN 
NIGERIA
The nature and origin of fatwā in Nigeria 
is having a nexus with the development, 
nature and extent of the application of 
Islamic law within the country’s legal 
history (Juwayriya et al., 2011). Hence, 
in order to be well-informed about the 
concept of fatwā in Nigeria, it could better 
be traced from the historical antecedents 
of Islamic law in the country (Girbo: 
interview by Author, Nigeria, 2013). To 
begin with, the Nigerian legal system is 
a legal system that is hybrid in nature. It 
encompasses and deals with the entire 
laws, rules and all legal machineries 
obtained in the country (Asein, 2005). Just 
like some other Commonwealth countries, 
Nigeria is a diverse country that has been 
characterised with diversity of religions 
and legal pluralism (Tonwe et al., 2000). It 
is a Sovereign Nation located on the Gulf 
of Guinea in the West African Sub-Region. 
It shares boundary with the Republic of 
Niger at about 1497 km from the North, the 
Republic of Cameroun from the east at about 
1690 km, the Republic of Chad at about 87 
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km from the North-east, and the Republic 
of Benin from the West at about 773 km. 
It has a total area of about 923,678 square 
km including 13,000 square km of water 
boundaries. The country has been endowed 
with water ways such as river Benue and 
river Niger, Lake Chad and Atlantic Ocean. 
Its climate is arid in the Northern region, 
tropical at the centre and equatorial in 
the Southern Region. It has a population 
of more than 160 million and embraces 
multi religions (Islam, Christianity and 
traditional religions) and also comprises 
of a multi-ethnic society (over 250 ethnic 
groups), whereby major ethnics like 
Hausa-Fulani in the North, Igbo from the 
East and Yoruba in the West. Out of the 
total population, Muslims constitute more 
than 50%, Christians more than 30% and 
the traditionalists constitute the remaining 
percentage of more than 10%. The Country 
is a Federation consisting of 36 States and 
the Federal Capital Territory, within which 
the Presidential system of Government is 
practiced (Library of Congress, July 2008). 
Its legal system comprises the Received 
English law (Common law, Equity and 
the Statutes of General Application); 
Legislation; Case law; Islamic law (Ubah 
1982); and the Customary laws (more 
than 250 ethnic groups and each with its 
own peculiar custom) spread all across 
the country (Tobi, 1996). In the case of 
Laoye & ors V. Oyetunde (1944) A.C. 170, 
the application of the native customs was 
also judicially recognised by the court; 
thus, the Privy Council in examining the 
basis of the establishment of Native Courts 
said, “The policy of the British in this and 
in other respects is to use for purpose of 
administration of the country, the native 
laws and customs in so far as possible 
and in so far as they have not been varied 
or suspended by Statutes or Ordinances 
affecting Nigeria.” For the purpose of this 
discussion, the study focuses on the Islamic 
legal system under which the authority 
of a fatwā can be issued and applied. In 
Nigeria, the Islamic law is applicable based 
on the Qur’an, Hadith and the principles 
of Maliki Madhhab (School of Islamic 
jurisprudence) (Tobi, 1996). Meanwhile, 
the English system comprises the Common 
law, Equity and the Statutes of General 
Application in force in England as at 1st 
January 1900 (Yakubu, 2006). To this 
end, Section 28 of the High Court Laws of 
Northern Nigeria provides that, “subject 
to the provisions of any written law… 
Common law, the Doctrine of Equity, 
and the Statute of General Application 
which were in force on the 1st Day of 
January 1900, shall be in force within the 
Jurisdiction of the High Court”. The local 
enactments consist of the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and 
other Nigerian legislation (primary and 
subsidiary). In addition, the case law is a 
decisions of the courts applicable based on 
the doctrine of judicial precedent (Asein, 
2005). Custom, as a source of the Nigerian 
legal system, consists of usage or practices 
of a particular group of people, which by 
common adoption and acquiescence and 
by long and unvarying habit has become 
compulsory and acquired the force of law 
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with respect to the place or subject matter 
to which it relates (Kolajo, 2000). To this 
end, the law of the defunct Plateau State of 
Nigeria defines customary law as the rule of 
conduct which governs legal relationships 
as established by custom and usage (s. 2). 
Similarly, in the case of Lewis v Bankole 
(1908) 1 NLR 81 at 100), the Court defined 
customary law as unwritten law (jus non 
scripta) and a mirror of accepted usage 
recognised by the members of particular 
ethnic group.
Therefore, the above definition has 
designed a clear cut demarcation between 
customary law and Islamic law. The two 
laws are not same, even though most of 
the 20th century writers on the origin and 
nature of the Nigerian legal system have 
attempted to classify and incorporate the 
Islamic law to customary law with the 
belief that the Islamic law is a Muslim 
custom and therefore cannot be spared from 
being part of the customary law (Miles, 
2006). However, the story became an issue 
of the past in 1998 when the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria (Per Wali JSC) made it 
categorically in Alkamawa v Bello (1998)6 
SCNJ 27) that the Islamic law is not same 
as the customary law (Tobi, 1996) because 
it does not belong to a particular group of 
people (Alkamawa supra). According to 
the learned justice (Wali JSC), the Islamic 
law is a complete system of universal 
law and even more universal than the 
English Common law. Hence, the decision 
has settled that the Islamic law is not a 
customary law, but it is an independent 
source of Nigerian legal system (Abikan, 
2002).
Today in Nigeria, the concept of 
fatwā and the role of muftī, being part and 
parcel of the Islamic matters, have become 
functus officio in the legal system, which is 
largely an English-based system. Thus, by 
virtue of the current Nigerian legal system, 
the decisions of muftīs are considered as 
personal and non-binding. This has been 
affirmed by a Shari’ah Court of Appeal 
Qadi, Alhaji Ibrahim Wakili Sudi (Qadi 
Sudi, interviewed by the Author, Nigeria, 
2013), who reiterated the importance of 
fatwā in the country, especially in the 
dispensation of Shari’ah justice in the 
courts. To this end, he said:
 “Fatwā plays a very important role in 
the dispensation of justice in the courts, 
even though it is considered simply as 
an opinion by a learned Islamic scholar 
aimed at assisting and guiding the 
courts, it is however, advisory and not 
binding.”
The learned Qadi has lamented 
that it is unfortunate that there is no 
institutionalised and bureaucratised fatwā 
issuing body which could be saddled with 
responsibilities of issuing a binding fatwā in 
Nigeria. In fact, according to him, it is only 
the periphery committees of fatwā within 
different Muslim organisations that exist 
in the country. This also goes in line with 
the opinion of a learned scholar Shaykh 
Adamu Girbo (2013), who confirmed that 
fatwā in Nigeria is not institutionalised and 
something needs to be done by the authority 
concerned in order to make it possible 
(Girbo, 2013). Similarly, in the words of 
Senator Abubakar Sodangi (interviewed 
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by the Author, Nigeria, 2013) “fatwā is not 
institutionalised in Nigeria and the lack 
of its institutionalisation has left so many 
gaps in the country’s legal and judicial 
systems.” He confirmed that currently in 
Nigeria, there is no institutionalised fatwā, 
except the fatwā committees that are lying 
in various Islamic organisations such as 
those in the Nigerian Supreme Council for 
Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), Jamāʿatu Nasrul 
Islam (JNI), Jamāʿatu Izālatul- Bid’a wa 
Iqāmatis-Sunnah (JIBWIS) Fityānul Islam 
and others.
It is based on the above lacuna that the 
politicians and some legal luminaries such 
as lawyers and academia (law teachers) 
in Nigeria have more or less taken over 
the muftī’s job of issuing fatwā. They 
have been perceived as modern muftī(s) 
by some people (Haji et al., 2012) even 
though there are a lot of contentions on 
whether or not they could be regarded 
as such, especially looking at the tasks 
of becoming a muftī under the Islamic 
law, which indeed are not quite simple 
(Girbo, 2013). Such modern muftī(s) in 
Nigeria are those whose background in 
most cases is not fully Islamic; sometimes 
they possess a little combination of both 
Islamic and western knowledge. As a 
result of this, they may fall short of the 
requirements for being a muftī. Hence, 
they could not be considered as muftī(s) 
in the eyes of Shari’ah due to their lack 
of requisite requirements and sufficient 
expertise in the Islamic law (Muhammad, 
interviewed by the author, Nigeria, 2013). 
However, in order to tackle such problem, 
Shaykh Adamu Girbo (2013) suggests, 
among other things, that fatwā should 
be institutionalised and bureaucratised in 
Nigeria so that private and unqualified 
individuals would stop parading 
themselves as muftīs.
At this juncture, it is worthy to 
mention that Islam generally came into 
Nigeria centuries ago through Kanem 
Borno Empire in the North- Eastern part 
of the country (Balogun, 1969). For the 
purpose of this discussion, however, the 
concept and history of fatwā in Nigeria 
are considered from the period of the 
Fulani jihad (in the 19th Century) due 
to the commitments of the then leaders 
of jihad towards restructuring the 
administration of the Shari’ah justice in 
the region. The emergence of the Fulani 
Empire, which is otherwise known as “the 
Sokoto Caliphate”, has given the Shari’ah 
a new outlook in Nigeria from its system 
of governance, economic policy, foreign 
policy, administration of justice, as well 
as the organisation of the society (Yadudu, 
1992). Apart from that, the Caliphate was 
also famous for the conception of law and 
utilisation of its institutions in order to 
achieve maximum benefits for the Muslim 
Ummah (community) in the country 
(Ladan n.d.). For this reason, this paper 
traces the nature and origin of fatwā from 
the following periods: the period prior to 
the Fulani jihād; the period of the jihād 
but before the colonial era; the period of 
the colonial administration; and the post-
colonial period.
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Period Prior to the Fulani Jihād
Before the Fulani jihad in the 19th century 
(1804), Islam in itself had experienced a 
serious setback, where the whole system 
was adulterated with so many customs 
and conventions (Juwairiyya et al., 2011). 
Islam was just a caricature of itself, thus 
corruption and all forms of injustice were 
well pronounced. Shari’ah was flagrantly 
abused and most of the people were 
ignorant of the religion. The practice of 
Islam was reduced to dry rituals, thus Islam 
was not in the social, political and economic 
spheres of the community (Kumo, 1997). 
In the aspect of administration of justice, 
the Islamic law was only applied in cases 
where the interests of the then tyrant Kings 
were to be served. In short, the development 
of the Islamic law and practice in the pre-
jihād period can best be described as a to-
and-fro movement on the negative axis of 
a graph. It should, however, be noted that 
despite the nature of the regime before the 
jihad and the flagrant abuse of the Shari’ah 
by the oppressive and ignorant Kings and 
some venal scholars, other honest and 
prominent scholars played positive roles to 
save the situation (Albasu, 1985). Shaikh 
Jibril Ibn Umar, who was a teacher to 
both Shehu Usmanu Dan-Fodio and Mal 
Abdllahi Dan-Fodio (popularly known 
as Abdullahin Gwandu, a brother to the 
latter), was indeed a role model. It should 
be added that in the aspect of law and its 
administration in Nigeria (present Northern 
Nigeria) before the jihad, local traditions 
and enactments by rulers were the two main 
sources of law. When Shehu Usmanu Dan-
Fodio started preaching Islam preparatory 
to the jihad, the King of Gobir Nafata (who 
was a pagan) did all he could to stop him 
through some of his arbitrary and anti-
Islamic legislation, but to no avail. The 
wicked legislation was to the effect that it 
was illegal for Shehu Usmanu Dan-Fodio 
to preach to people; that converts must 
revert back to their religion and that no one 
should wear turban and women should not 
cover their groin in line with the teachings 
of Shari’ah (Kumo, 1997).
The above proclamation was made in 
the market place and it became the law 
with immediate effect. This shows that 
in the pre-jihad period, the Kings were 
the supreme leaders of their subjects and 
anything they said became a law. They 
were the masters and their people were 
slaves. In fact, the Kings made the laws 
and they remained immune from the law. 
This simply means that Shari’ah and proper 
administration of justice did not thrive in 
the pre-jihād period. Hence, the concept of 
fatwā was not even the supposing issue talk 
more about the role mufti supposes to play 
(Olorunfemi, 1985).
The Period of the Jihād (the Period before 
the Colonial Era) 
The jihād of Shehu Usmanu Dan-Fodio has 
brought an end to the leadership of the then 
contemptuous and oppressive Nigerian 
Kings especially in the Northern part of the 
country (Shagari et al., 1978). The Islamic 
law and practice were restored by the Shehu 
with vigour, leading to the replacement of 
old and infiltrated Islamic practices with the 
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new and pure Islamic system. Thus, Qādis 
were appointed to try cases in line with 
the Islamic injunctions and they were also 
assigned jurisdictions. During that period, 
Shehu Usmanu Dan-Fodio showed keen 
interest in matters related to administration 
of justice because of its importance. This 
was why he appointed certain officials 
in addition to Qādis to ensure a smooth 
administration of justice. The officials 
include Na’ib (Deputy Judge), muftī 
(jurist-consult), Kātib (court clerk), Qāsim 
(estate distributor), ʿAwn (messenger) and 
Tarjumān (interpreter) (Kumo, 1977). It 
should be noted that, among these officers, 
the office of the muftī is the most important 
one for the reason that muftī being a jurist 
can assist the court in arriving at a just 
decision. By implication, this means that 
the concept of fatwā in the pre-colonial 
Nigeria was tilted and inclined largely 
towards the administration of justice than 
any other sector.
The Period of Colonial Administration
The concept of fatwā under this period 
has experienced a serious retardation due 
to the restrictions placed by the colonial 
administrators against the complete 
application of the Islamic law in Nigeria. 
However, according to Suleiman Kumo, 
the Islamic law did not suffer any setback 
during that period; rather, it thrived under 
the colonialists contrary to the expectation 
of many (Kumo, 1980). The early period 
of jihād indicates a return to the Islamic 
system of government and by extension, 
the application of the Islamic law in the 
administration of justice. This continued 
for about two decades before the demise 
of the original founders of the Caliphate 
(Shehu Usmanu Dan-Fodio and his allies). 
After their demise, the successors took 
over the mantle of leadership and since 
then, decadence in the system resurfaced. 
The learned scholar described the situation:
 “By the middle of the century, when 
the founders of the Caliphate had 
passed away, their heirs and successors 
had become altogether something 
different. Their conduct and general 
comportment had become identical in 
practically every respect with those of 
the pre-jihād Hausa Rulers and by the 
time the British conquered the country, 
there was not one emirate throughout 
the Sokoto Caliphate, where the 
principles, the methods and the 
procedures of an Islamic government 
were applied. The rulers of that time 
had arrogated to themselves the powers 
of life and death over their subjects in 
total and contemptuous disregard for 
the Shari’ah, and the original principles 
upon which the jihād leadership was 
founded were totally discarded.”
This simply suggests that during the 
period of the British indirect rule, Emirs in 
Nigeria had free hand in the administration 
of justice subject to such limitations as may 
be imposed by the British. In this regard, 
the Emirs were allowed to appoint the 
judges and other court officials and also 
decide where to place a court. The Resident 
(who was usually sent by the British) only 
gave a warrant but the control was vested 
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in the hands of the Emirs. The provision of 
the first Proclamation called the “Native 
Courts Proclamation” of 1900 was clear on 
this. The only hurdle in the law was that 
it gave the Resident the power to establish 
the court and possess the power of 
supervision of the court. Another obstacle 
was that the law ousted the application 
of Hadd punishments for Zina and other 
hudūd (the prescribed punishments) 
offences. However, it has not tempered 
with the office of the mufti since the power 
to appoint the judge vested in hands of the 
Emir. This simply means that the Emirs 
had ample opportunity and responsibility 
of choosing the correct or ensuring that 
the correct person is appointed to deliver 
justice in the courts (Kumo, edited by 
Bobboy et al., n.d.). However, other 
scholars, like Prof. A. A. Gwandu who 
relied so much on the thesis and other 
publications of Dr Suleiman Kumo (PhD 
Thesis, SOAS London), were of the view 
that the colonialists were responsible for 
the sorry state of affairs of Shari’ah in 
Northern Nigeria, particularly in relation to 
the office of muftī. He stated that:
 “Gradually with the coming of the 
colonialists, the office of the muftī 
began to be neglected to the extent 
that while the title of muftī remained, 
the qualifications and status of the 
occupant of that office became no more 
than those of the court clerk”.
It is clear from the above that 
the learned scholar believes that the 
colonialists were responsible for the 
setback people were experiencing in the 
application of Islamic law generally and 
that, they are responsible for the weakness 
and subsequent disappearance of the office 
of the muftī in the country.
The position remained almost the 
same under the 1906 Native Courts 
Proclamation, notwithstanding some 
changes introduced by the law in respect 
of re-establishing the status of the Alkāli,1 
the Emirs,2 the Shari’ah/Alkāli courts and 
the Judicial Council. Their establishment 
was made by warrant under the hand of 
the Resident. The Alkāli presided over the 
Alkāli courts, with or without councillor 
helpers, while the Judicial Councils were 
to be presided over by the Emirs or Chiefs 
with other members to be determined by 
the Resident. Another change was on the 
appointment of the judges. It now shifted to 
the Resident but he was required by law to 
consult an Emir or a chief before exercising 
such power. Apart from these changes, the 
position remained as it was subject to no 
interference by the British Courts either 
through appeals or the like. In addition, 
the 1916 Native Courts Ordinance did 
not bring much change either (Kumo PhD 
Thesis SOAS London).
The Post-Colonial Era 
When Nigeria became an independent 
state on the 1st October 1960, a lot of 
reforms were put in place, especially in 
1 This is a Hausa native term referring to “Al-
Qādi” in Arabic language, which in anglicized 
form refers to a Shari’ah judge.
2 This is referred to as “Amir” in Arabic 
language, a Muslim leader or a commander. 
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respect of the position of muftī and the 
application of Islamic law in general. 
Islamic law was applied partially, fatāwa 
were issued privately and personally in 
an informal way, muftīs were no longer 
called muftīs but with different description 
and nomenclatures. Sometimes, they were 
referred to as “assessors” of the courts (s. 
5 (1) and (2) of the Area Court Law 1968). 
This provision has been maintained and 
applied by the Area courts of Northern 
Nigeria for quite some times. To this effect, 
a section of the Area court law provides the 
features of the Area courts, as follows:
“ (1)  An Area Court may with or 
without assessors.
 (2)  An assessors for each Area Court 
shall be approved by the Chief 
Justice or by such person as he 
may appoint for such purpose.
 (3)  Assessors shall act in an advisory 
capacity and shall have no vote 
in the decision of the court.” (s. 5 
(1) and (2) of the Area Court Law 
1968).
Furthermore, effort was also made 
by the military administration in 1975 
under the leadership of General Murtala 
Ramat Mohammed to revive the practice 
of issuing fatwā (iftā) within the Shari’ah 
courts in Nigeria but unfortunately it was 
not seen the light of the day. The then 
military head of state even announced the 
appointment of the Grant Muftī of Nigeria 
(Shaykh Abubakar Mahmud Gummi), 
whose appointment should have taken 
effect around April 1976. Due to the 
assassination of the then military leader 
(General Murtala Ramat Mohammed) in 
a bloody coup d’etat in February 1976, 
however, the appointment was thereafter 
set aside by his successor (General 
Olusegun Obasanjo) following a series 
of criticisms (Mustapha, interviewed by 
the author, Nigeria, 2013). The situation 
continued until 1999, when about 12 
Northern states3 passed a Bill into law for 
the implementation of Shari’ah (complete 
Shari’ah in both civil and criminal cases) 
within their respective states. This also 
called for the revitalisation of the hitherto 
practice of fatwā and the position of muftī 
in the administration of justice and the 
Islamic administration generally in such 
states (Ostien, 2007). Thus, some states in 
northern Nigeria, through the legislative 
process, were able to establish some 
institutions such as the State Shari’ah 
Commission or its equivalent, and The 
Council of Ulamā’ with important advisory 
and executive functions. In light of this, 
it is the opinion of Professor Mustapha 
that the concept of institutionalisation of 
fatwā will tackle the contemporary issues 
and challenges that may arise before the 
courts such as the concept of artificial 
insemination, polio vaccines, family 
planning and their effects. He further 
affirmed that the smooth implementation 
of Shari’ah would be considered 
ineffective and incomplete without fatwā 
being institutionalised (Mustapha, 2013).
3 Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, 
Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, 
and Zamfara states
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CONCLUSION
Generally, the concept of fatwā in Nigeria 
is as old as the history of the application 
of the Islamic law in the country. It has 
become functus officio since the beginning 
of the colonial administration. In fact, 
the whole Islamic system encountered 
some setbacks when the British colonial 
administrators trooped into the country. 
They rendered most parts of the Islamic 
system and structure not functional as 
they used to say, it is repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience; it 
is incompatible directly or indirectly to 
the law for the time being in force; and 
it is also contrary to the public policy. 
In the past, fatwā and muftīs played a 
significant role in Nigeria, ranging from 
rendering legal and consultancy services 
to the courts, as well as giving advisory 
services to the Islamic Rulers of the time. 
However, such roles and services rendered 
by fatwā committees or muftīs have 
nowadays remained a mirage due to the 
lack of well-structured Islamic institution, 
lack of a suitable legal framework and 
lack of qualified personnel. Several efforts 
were made thereafter by subsequent 
administrations in the country to revive the 
hitherto system and put things into the right 
direction, but to no avail. Consequently, 
the citizens (especially the Muslims) in the 
country who have the rights to freedom of 
religion, as enshrined in the Constitution, 
are left without any statutorily established 
Islamic institutions such as the fatwā 
institution that can assist in regulating 
their conduct of religious activities in the 
country. Most of such activities in recent 
times are taken over by unqualified legal 
practitioners who have been perceived 
as modern muftī(s). At this moment, the 
opinions of muftī and the status of fatwā 
in Nigeria have been regarded as a “take 
it or leave it” issue. In fact, it has been 
considered as a mere advisory opinion. 
Thus, the courts in Nigeria require 
a distinct and well-structured fatwā 
framework and institutions in support 
to effectively function and compete 
with their conventional counterparts in 
the world. In view of this, it is indeed 
significant to have in the Nigerian judicial 
system, a workable relationship between 
muftī and the courts similar to the practice 
in some modern Muslim countries such 
as Malaysia. In Malaysia, there exists a 
formal relationship between muftī and 
the courts to the extent that the decision 
of fatwā committee, after being published 
in the Gazette, shall become binding on 
the Shari’ah courts (Section 34 (4) the 
Administration of Islamic Law (Federal 
Territories) Act 505, 1993). In fact, fatwā 
in Malaysia is regarded as a binding piece 
of legislation and judicial precedent, 
which every Muslim and Shari’ah courts 
should be bound by (Farid, 2012). To 
make this aspiration a reality, the paper 
suggests the following:
i.  The Nigerian Government (at 
both federal and state levels) 
should enact a fatwā legal 
framework in preparatory to its 
institutionalisation. This can 
be done by amending some 
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provisions in the constitution 
and/or relevant laws that are 
standing as stumbling blocks to 
actualization of this suggestion.
ii.  The Nigerian Government (at both 
federal and state levels) should 
establish the fatwā institutions or 
committees that will from time to 
time, or based on request, liaise 
with the judiciary with the view to 
assisting same in resolving some 
fix matters concerning Islamic 
law. This can be done after the 
first suggestion has been put in 
place
iii.  The Nigerian Government should 
establish a special induction 
training institute for training muftis 
and fatwā committee members, so 
that they will be well-equipped 
with not only the theoretical 
knowledge of the Shari’ah but also 
with the knowledge of present day 
reality.
iv.  The Nigerian Government should 
educate and enlighten the public 
about the significance of fatwā, 
the role of mufti and the necessity 
of having a fatwā institution in 
a diverse country like Nigeria, 
especially towards ensuring a 
stabilised and harmonised judicial 
system. This can be done through 
organising periodic seminars and 
workshops.
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ABSTRACT
Islam prohibits all acts that endanger the life of a child or exposes children to abuse including 
dumping of babies. Those acts are crimes punishable under the law. In a similar vein, 
internationally, baby dumping and all acts that expose children to danger are prohibited 
under the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC). Malaysia and 
Nigeria, like most nations of the world, are signatories to most international legal frameworks 
on child protection including the CRC. In Malaysia and Nigeria, baby dumping is an alarming 
phenomenon. Many babies suffer or even die as a result of the act of baby dumping. This 
article intends to examine the laws relating to the protection of babies from dumping in 
Malaysia and Nigeria. Discussions will include the position of baby dumping in Islam to 
serve as a comparison. Examination will extend to analysis on whether the laws in Malaysia 
and Nigeria are adequate to address the problem of baby dumping and to fully protect children 
from baby dumping. The study is basically a library based research where reference is made 
to books and articles. A comparative legal research methodology is employed in looking at the 
positions in Islam, Malaysia and Nigeria. It is hoped that the findings on child protection laws, 
particularly those related to baby dumping in the Islamic, Malaysian and Nigerian laws, will 
provide better protection for babies and prevent them from being dumped.
Keywords: Baby dumping, Islamic law, Malaysian law, Nigerian law
INTRODUCTION
Dumping of babies may happen at any 
place and in any society. The classic 
case of children dumped by parents is 
the exposure of babies to the elements 
for rescue by ‘kind strangers’ though the 
act barely sidesteps infanticide. Western 
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anthropologists have mentioned the case of 
Prophet Musa who was placed in a basket 
and floated at the edge of Nile River and 
rescued by Fir‘awn’s people as a proof that 
dumping of babies is not something new 
(Brick , 2000; Mohd, 2008). A historian, 
John Boswell, estimates that during the first 
three centuries of the Christian era, about 
twenty to forty percent of newborns were 
dumped or abandoned in Rome. Similarly, 
a large number of newborns were dumped 
in the middle ages (Kertzer, 2000; Mohd, 
2008). Historical research reveals that a 
foundling system arose in Europe as early 
as the thirteenth century (Guimaraes, 2000; 
Mohd, 2008). The number of foundlings 
home grew as they first spread throughout 
much of Italy and later to France, Spain 
and Portugal (Viazzo et al., 2000; Mohd, 
2008). By the nineteenth century, foundling 
homes had appeared not only throughout 
these countries but also in Ireland, Poland, 
Austria and Russia. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, over hundred thousands 
of babies were dumped per year in Europe 
by people with no family, kin and property 
(Kertzer, 2000; Mohd, 2008).
In Malaysia, the nature and the rate 
of reported cases on baby dumping are 
disturbing. In most cases, perpetrators 
of this heinous crime, discard the babies 
in any place without being mindful of 
the consequences of such action on the 
innocent baby. This is largely due to fear of 
arrest and attempt to conceal their identity. 
It is therefore common to see babies 
dumped in the garbage or dustbin, along 
road side or wrapped in newspaper and 
kept under the harsh beating sun (Termizi 
et al., 2014). Students who deliver at the 
hostel abandon such babies in the toilet or 
birth room (Adesiyun, 2010). The manner 
and place of dumping are often linked 
directly with the effects of such dumping 
on the baby. A baby dumped in the mosque 
or motherless baby’s home has a greater 
chance of survival than a baby dumped 
inside a dustbin or left under the scorching 
sun (New Straits Times, 18 July 2010). The 
Federal Criminal Investigation Division 
Director, Datuk Seri Mohd Bakri Zinin, 
reported that the cases of baby dumping 
in Malaysia are increasing. From 2005 to 
January 2011, a total of 517 baby dumping 
cases were registered in the country. He 
said 203 of the cases involved boys, 164 
girls, while the gender of the other 150 
babies could not be ascertained. He also 
told reporters that, “for cases in which the 
gender cannot be identified, post-mortems 
could not be carried out because the bodies 
were too badly decomposed. Of the total, 
230 were found alive while 287 were dead” 
(Bernama, 9 February, 2011). Meanwhile, 
according to PDRM’s statistics on baby 
dumping cases in the subsequent years, 
there were 98 cases in 2011, 88 cases in 
2012, 90 cases in 2013 and 13 cases as 
of March 2014 [Malaysian Royal Police 
(PDRM), 2010-2014). Additionally, 
in Parliament, the Deputy Minister of 
the Ministry of Woman, Family and 
Community Development, Datuk Azizah 
Mohd Dun, stated that there were about 
26 reported cases of abandoned babies 
nationwide for the first quarter of 2014 
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(BERNAMA, 2014). According to JKM’s 
statistics on abandoned child as described 
under section 17 (1)(e)(ii) of the Child Act 
2001, there were 49 cases in 2010 (Jabatan 
Kebajikan Masyarakat, 2011), 59 cases 
in 2011 (Jabatan Kebajikan Masyarakat 
2011), 49 cases in 2012 (Jabatan 
Kebajikan Masyarakat, and 47 cases in 
2013 (Jabatan Kebajikan Masyarakat, 
2013). This information seems to highlight 
the worsening yearly scenario of baby 
dumping in Malaysia that requires serious 
attention from all including the public.
In Nigeria, the rising scourge of baby 
dumping has led to the question as to 
whether this tradition of dumping babies 
still exists (Adesiyun, 2010). Although 
there are no accurate data on cases of baby 
dumping in Nigeria, the figures put together 
by some states led to the rising concern of 
the rampant cases of baby dumping across 
the country. For example, the Special 
Adviser to the Lagos State Government on 
Youth and Social Development recently 
revealed that Lagos State in 2011 recorded 
497 cases of abandoned babies dumped 
in different streets of the state (Okoje, 
2012). In fact, baby dumping has been 
acknowledged as one of the common forms 
of child abuse in Nigeria (Akani & Erhabor 
2006). It is a cruel act that is contrary to 
the Nigerian law in every respect; hence, 
wrong doers must be made to face the full 
wrath of the law (Ali, 2014).
This article therefore aims at examining 
the menace of baby dumping vis-à-vis its 
position under the Islamic law, Malaysian 
law and Nigerian Law. The article provides 
a general overview of baby dumping in 
Islam and looks at how Islam protects 
babies from being dumped. The article 
finally analyses and provides suggestions, 
where relevant and necessary, on how 
babies can be given better protection from 
the menace of baby dumping.
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF BABY 
DUMPING IN ISLAM
The Arabic word for a baby who is dumped 
is al-tifl al-laqit (Al-Subail, 2005). Al-
Sarakhsi defines a foundling (laqit) as “a 
name given to a living child who is dumped 
by his relatives due to fear of the family 
or accusation” (Sarakhsi, 2000). The 
Qur’an has mentioned some incidences 
of dumping. The Qur’an mentions the 
story of Prophet Yusuf who was dumped 
into a well by his siblings (Qur’an, Yusuf, 
12:10). However, the case of Yusuf is 
slightly different from our topic since he 
was grown up and the crime was done by 
his brothers out of jealousy (Mohd, 2008). 
Similarly, the Qur’an also mentions the 
story of Prophet Musa (a.s.) (when he was a 
baby) whose mother was inspired by Allah 
the Almighty to put him in a basket and 
dumped him into the river. The basket was 
later on picked up by the Pharoah’s servant 
(Qur’an, Taha, 20: 38-39; Qur’an, Qasas 
28: 7-8). In relation to the Sunnah of the 
Prophet, the Prophet (PBUH) gave several 
verdicts with respect to the position of the 
baby. For example, the Prophet (PBUH) 
stated in one of his traditions that when a 
dumped baby is found, just two witnesses 
should be notified and the story must not 
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be made a secret (Ahmad, vol. 29, Hadith 
17481). However, it was during the time 
of the companions that the cases of baby 
dumping became known. Hassan al-Basry 
reported that in one occasion a dumped 
baby was found and brought before Ali 
(RA) and Ali stated that the person who 
took the baby had done a commendable 
act and the baby is a free person (Sarakhsi, 
2000). This occasion seems to highlight 
a very important rule on the duty to take 
up a dumped baby, which is considered as 
a recommended act. The above occasion 
also shows that Islam appreciates the 
person who helps the vulnerable child. 
The incident further upholds the status of a 
dumped baby as to be a free person.
How Islam Protects Babies from Dumping
Islam enjoins love and mercy to children. 
The Prophet states “He is not from us, he 
that does not have mercy on our young 
and does not respect our old” (Abu 
Dawud, Vol. 4, Hadith 4945). Therefore, 
no harm can ever be imposed on children, 
particularly if dumping may lead to death. 
To that effect, Islam prohibits infanticide 
out of any reason that may include poverty 
or shame. The Quran states to the effect 
that “Kill not your children on a plea of 
want, we provide sustenance for you and 
for them” (al-Quran; al-An’am 6:151). The 
Quran further states that “If a man kills 
a believer intentionally, his recompense 
is Hell, to abide therein (for ever)” (Al-
Qur’an, Nisa 4:93). The killing of a human 
being is considered a very serious matter 
that the Qur’an equates it with the killing 
of the whole of mankind (Al-Qur’an, 
Al-Maaidah 5: 32; Sudan et al., 2012). 
Similarly, abuse of dignity is an effect of 
dumping; the Qur’an protects the right to 
dignity of every child (Qur’an, Isra 17: 70). 
The Qur’an states “Verily, We created man 
in the best mould” (Qur’an, al-teen: 4). 
The messenger of Allah equally describes 
the dignity of man in the following words, 
“People are God’s children and those 
dearest to God are the ones who treat His 
children kindly” (Al-Tibrizi, 1979; Hadith 
4998). In yet another tradition, the Prophet 
(PBUH), while facing the Holy Ka’aba, said 
“You are most pure and most dignified, but 
by the One in whose hands Muhammad’s 
life reposes, the sanctity and honour of a 
believer, his life and his property, is far 
greater than yours in the eyes of God” (Al-
Tibrizi, 1979; Hadith 2724). The verses of 
the Quran and the hadith of the Prophet 
(PBUH) clearly prohibit any act that may 
harm a baby. The Quranic provision clearly 
and strictly prohibits infanticide, and 
killing of children leads to an inference that 
the act of dumping of babies is condemned 
and regarded as an offence. Where the act 
of dumping babies leads to the death of 
babies, it can fall under the crime of murder 
that is strictly prohibited in Islam.
Furthermore, the place in which a 
baby is dumped may affect his health and 
well being. For example, a baby that is 
dumped in a very cold weather can develop 
asthma, pneumonia and other lung related 
diseases (Jackson, 2011). Islamic law also 
emphasises on the right of a child to good 
health. As a mark of acknowledgement 
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of the importance of health in Islam, the 
Quran states the words of Prophet Ibrahim 
who mentioned, “And when I am ill, it is 
He who cures me” (Qur’an, al-Shu‘ara: 
80). Al-Tha’labiy opined that attributing 
cure to Allah is a mark of respect and the 
believer is expected to take all the practical 
steps towards attainment of good health 
(Al-Tha’labiy, 2002).
The fact that Islam places great importance 
to the right of a child to good health can be 
appreciated from the fact that Islam calls for 
steps to be taken to ensure that the child’s 
health is respected even before the child is 
born by ensuring that the expecting mother is 
given adequate care and protection so that the 
foetus is delivered unharmed (Arfat, 2013). 
Although fasting is one of the five pillars of 
Islam, a pregnant or breastfeeding mother 
is allowed by shari’ah to leave the fasting 
of the month of Ramadan if the fasting can 
be a threat to the health of the mother or her 
foetus (Qur’an, Al-Baqarah: 184; Shaybany, 
1406 AH). These authorities have made clear 
the fact that it is obligatory on the believers 
to avoid any thing that could be a threat of 
the right of a child to dignity. Baby dumping 
is indeed a terrible practice that exposes a 
child to various acts of danger, all things that 
could lead or cause baby dumping must be 
avoided because prevention is always better 
than cure (Noordin et al., 2012). If this step 
is not taken, the innocent children will be the 
ones to suffer.
The definition of abandoned baby 
(laqit) in Islam clearly provides fornication 
or adultery as one of the causes of 
baby dumping. It seems that this cause 
is common in all jurisdictions since 
thousands of years ago. Based on the 
concept of ‘prevention is better than cure’, 
the Islamic law strictly prohibits adultery 
and regards it as a serious criminal offence. 
The Quran states, “Do not approach 
adultery; it is indeed an abomination and 
an evil way” (Qur’an, Isra: 32). In fact, it 
is prescribed as a grave sin in the eyes of 
Allah, which requires sincere repentance 
from the adulterer (Qur’an, Furqan: 68-
69). The Qur’an prescribes punishment 
of 100 lashes for fornication (Qur’an, 
Nur: 2). According to al-Qaradawi, zina 
is a crime under the Islamic law that 
opens the gate for other crimes. Believers 
should therefore distance themselves from 
anything that could lead them to commit 
such a wrongful act (Al-Qaradawi, 1995). 
Based on this provision, it is very clear that 
the rationale of prescribing the punishment 
by the shari’ah is to serve as deterrence 
and not actually the infliction of harm (Al-
Qurtubi, 2002). The fact that four reliable 
witnesses are required to prove adultery 
equally underscores the fact that it is 
meant to be for deterrence purposes since 
it will be very difficult for such witnesses 
to witness such a crime at the same time 
(Audah, 2005).
For those who may think of committing 
baby dumping for financial reasons, Islam 
makes it clear that the sustenance of the 
baby is in the hands of Allah. The Qur’an 
states “Kill not your children for fear of 
want. We shall provide sustenance for them 
as well as for you. Verily the killing of them 
is a great sin” (Al-Qur’an, 17: 31). The 
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Prophet (PBUH), in response to a question 
asked, “what is the greatest sin?” replied, 
“To ascribe partner to Allah, when he is the 
one who created you.” “What next?” asked 
the companion, and the Prophet (PBUH) 
replied saying, “To kill your child out of 
fear that he will share your food” (Muslim, 
Vol. 9; Hadith 6861; Bukhari, Vol. 6; 
Hadith, 4761).
A further supporting fact about the 
Islamic law’s approach to preventing 
baby dumping is the fact that Islam allows 
marriage of girls without specifying a 
particular age limit. The Qur’an does not 
specify any specific age for marriage. 
However, the Qur’anic verse states that, 
“And test the orphans [in their abilities] 
until they reach marriageable age” (Qur’an, 
Nisa: 6); by age of marriage in this verse, 
Allah refers to attainment of adulthood 
(Al-Baghwy, 1997; Jimeta, 2008). This 
position helps girls who attain maturity 
to lawfully get married and satisfy their 
sexual urge without indulging in zina, 
thereby leading to pregnancy outside their 
matrimonial home.
Islam promotes al-‘amr bi al-ma’ruf 
wa al-nahyu ‘an al-munkar (calling others 
to do good and prevent wrong doing). 
The Qur’an, in several places, encourages 
believers to call each other to good and 
prevent wrong doings (Qur’an, Ali Imran, 
3: 104 and 110). Taking this approach 
will enlighten the potential parents of 
the danger and repercussion of the crime 
of baby dumping in this world and in the 
hereafter, and help in curtailing this serious 
crime because it discourages the practice 
and all acts that lead to it.
Further protection is manifested 
through provision on punishment of 
wrong doers accordingly if the crime 
is committed so that it will serve as 
deterrence to the individual and to others. 
If the baby dies as a result of the dumping, 
the offender will be punished based on 
the principle of retribution. However, if 
it has not resulted in death, the ta’azir 
(discretionary) punishment will be the 
appropriate punishment for the crime (Al-
Subail 2005). Finally, it is important to 
provide for reformation of the offenders 
after their punishment. This will help in 
preventing return to the crime because if 
they are reformed, they will become good 
persons and hence there will be no chances 
of returning to the crime (Danbazau, 2007).
The Islamic law further protects babies 
who are dumped by enjoinment of picking 
up. However, the nature of this protection 
is more on reforming the act of dumping 
rather than preventing. Muslim Scholars 
opined that picking a dumped baby is a 
very commendable act of piety that comes 
next to the belief in Allah (Al-Subail, 
2015). This opinion is premised on the 
Qur’anic provision that repeatedly calls 
for the respect of the sacred of the life of 
human beings (Qur’an, al-An’am 6: 151). 
In fact, the Qur’an states that saving a 
single life of a human being is like saving 
the life of the whole mankind (Qur’an, 
Maaidah 5: 32). Islam enjoins to be good 
to others as it states, “And do good that you 
may prosper” (Al-Quran, Surah al-Hajj, 
22: 77). It follows that the dumped baby 
can be taken care of either by the finder 
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who is qualified or surrendered to the 
government (al-Sarakhsi, 2010; al-Hattab, 
1992; al-Dimyati, n.d.). If that happens, the 
innocent baby will enjoy better protection.
PROTECTING BABIES FROM 
BEING DUMPED IN MALAYSIA
Several factors could be attributed as the 
causes of baby dumping in Malaysia. 
A factor that is generally seen as the 
common cause of baby dumping is extra 
marital relationship. When young girls 
get pregnant outside marital ties, the baby 
becomes a burden in many aspects. It 
affects the mother socially, educationally, 
financially and emotionally. In a society 
like Malaysia, religion is valued and the 
social norm rejects immorality, where a 
woman who gets pregnant outside her 
matrimonial home will be rejected by the 
society (Yousif, 2004). Similarly, having a 
baby outside the marital home will have a 
serious financial implication on the girl. This 
is because since the child lacks a legitimate 
father, the mother becomes responsible for 
the training and upbringing of the child. 
Under the Islamic law, even if the person 
responsible for the pregnancy is known 
and has acknowledged responsibility for 
the pregnancy, he is not considered as the 
father of the child that will be saddled with 
the financial responsibility of the child’s 
upbringing (Gunaim, 1995).
Further, educationally, the child will 
be a source of disturbance and problem for 
the mother. It is a fact that child upbringing 
requires time and energy; where the child 
is legitimate, the family especially the 
father can support the mother in raising 
their child. If the child is illegitimate, 
however, the mother will do everything 
alone without the support and assistance 
from the father. This will seriously affect 
her educational pursuit. Psychologically, 
having an illegitimate child will no doubt 
affect a woman especially in a social setting 
like that of Malaysia, where religious 
and cultural norms are highly respected. 
If the society rejects the woman for that 
action, she will feel isolated and will have 
psychological trauma (Smith, 2004).
The effect of ratification of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) by the Malaysian government 
has led to the enactment of the Child Act 
2001 (the CA) (Act 611) (Khalil, 2001). 
Generally, children in Malaysia enjoy 
special protection under the CA. In relation 
to protection of babies from dumping, 
the CA regards the act of dumping or 
abandonment as an offence punishable 
under the law from a fine not exceeding 
twenty thousand ringgit to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding ten years, or both 
[Child Act 2001, section 31(1a)].
The CA also impliedly protects an 
unborn foetus from being dumped through 
protecting the unwedded mother of the 
child as part of children in urgent need of 
protection [Child Act 2001, section 41 (2)
(d)]. Although the law obviously attempts to 
protect a pregnant female child, it indirectly 
provides protection for the pre-born baby 
as this provision is in fact included to give 
protection to unborn babies so that they 
are delivered in a safe and protected place 
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and at the same time, the scenario of baby 
dumping can be decreased (Majid, 2002). 
Dumping of babies is also regarded as 
a criminal offence punishable under the 
Penal Code with imprisonment for a term 
up to seven years, or with a fine, or both 
(Malaysian Penal Code, Act 574, section 
317; Rathakrishnan, 2013).
Although the act of baby dumping and 
its punishment have been stated by existing 
laws in Malaysia, this unfortunately does 
not absolve a person’s responsibility for the 
dumping or any other criminal liability as 
a result of the dumping. By virtue of the 
vulnerability of the baby and its inability 
to protect itself, death, injury and any form 
of abuse can result from this action. The 
illustration of section 317 of the Penal Code 
clearly buttresses this point. According 
to the illustration, the punishment for 
dumping a baby does not stop the court 
from administering further punishment 
for harm or injury caused to the baby as a 
result of the dumping.
The scenario and circumstances 
surrounding the dumping will largely 
determine the nature of the mens rea 
(criminal intention) and the actus reus 
(criminal action) of the offence (Abdul 
Rahim, 2012). Where the baby is put inside 
a plastic bag or thrown inside a gutter, the 
probability in all these situations is that the 
child will die, hence amounting to culpable 
homicide. The Penal code states, “Whoever 
causes death by doing an act with the 
intention of causing such bodily injury as is 
likely to cause death, or with the knowledge 
that he is likely by such act to cause death, 
commits the offence of culpable homicide” 
(Penal Code, Section 299; see also Section 
300 of the Penal Code).
On the contrary, where the act of 
dumping is made in such a manner that 
death is unlikely such as dumping the child 
in a mosque, Police station or motherless 
baby’s home but unfortunately results in 
death, it will be unreasonable to charge the 
offender under section 317, and there is a 
need to further charge the offender under 
section 304 which os provided for culpable 
homicide not punishable with death. 
Where the child dies as a result of 
the dumping and such act is done by the 
mother immediately after the child’s birth, 
she could have lesser punishment if she 
could establish that she became mentally 
disturbed as a result of the child birth and 
thereby dumping the baby. Such act is 
referred to as infanticide by the Penal code 
(Section 309A). The punishment for the 
offence is prescribed, “Whoever commits 
the offence of infanticide shall be punished 
at the discretion of the Court, with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend 
to twenty years, and shall also be liable to 
fine” (Section 309B of Penal Code).
The punishment provided for baby 
dumping is a positive move towards 
protecting children from being dumped. 
With the provision of the Penal Code 
that provides for even a more serious 
punishment in case of death or other harm 
to the child, deterrence will be achieved 
and that is very commendable. Similarly, 
the Malaysian government has equally 
embarked on campaigns on secondary 
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school girls on matters relating to 
sexuality to fight against the crime of baby 
dumping, according to Women, Family and 
Community Development Deputy Minister, 
Datuk Azizah Mohd Dun; to tackle baby 
dumping, the ministry now has seven 
programmes which include the National 
Policy and Plan of Action on Reproductive 
Health and Social Education, introduced 
in 2009. Besides that, the Reproductive 
and Social Health Programme (Pekerti) 
was introduced in 2012 as a co-curricular 
activity in schools, which targeted students 
in Year Six, Form Three and Special 
Education. In 2012, 2,376 students from 33 
schools took part in the programme. The 
project was then implemented in 2014 by 
carrying out Training for Trainers (TOT) 
course at three primary, secondary and 
special education schools in September 
2014 (New Straits Times online, 19 June 
2014).
There are also efforts to prevent 
baby dumping by non-Governmental 
organisations (NGO) through protection 
of unwed mothers until delivery of the 
baby. These include Raudatus Sakinah, 
KEWAJA, Darul Wardah, etc. (Rumah 
Perlindungan Wanita, n.d.). It is also 
interesting to note that apart from legal 
sanctions and social programmes to tackle 
baby dumping, Orphan Care (an NGO) 
introduced Baby Hatch facility in 2008 to 
reduce cases of baby dumping. Through the 
Baby Hatch facility, a person may place his 
or her baby in a safe place without dumping 
him (Orphan Care Children, n.d.). Even 
though there is contention that this kind of 
protection may encourage more babies to 
be dumped and act of adultery, so far there 
is no research done that proves this. The 
contention seems to be a mere contention. 
Furthermore, before the establishment of 
the baby hatch, the number of abandoned 
babies was alarming. Meanwhile, where 
babies are abandoned, something must 
be done in order to protect the dumped 
babies. These are positive efforts that will 
immensely help in reducing the cases of 
baby dumping at unsafe places.
Baby dumping is contrary to the 
CRC for which Malaysia is a signatory. 
Baby dumping contravenes the provision 
of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child which states that every child has the 
right to know and to be cared for by his 
parents (Article 7 of the CRC). It equally 
contravenes the right to survival and 
development (Article 6 of the CRC) and 
the right to dignity provided by the CRC 
(Article 19 of the CRC).
PROTECTING BABY FROM 
DUMPING UNDER NIGERIAN LAW
Several factors are attributable as the 
causes of baby dumping in Nigeria. Extra 
marital relation is no doubt a major cause 
of baby dumping. Due to fear of societal 
stigma, some women try to conceal the 
pregnancy and after delivery, dump the 
baby (Ojedokun & Atoi, 2012). After 
birth, the financial challenges associated 
with taking care of babies equally make 
mothers dump their babies (Ojedokun 
& Atoi 2012). Similarly, in Nigeria, 
before the Child’s Right Act 2003 was 
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passed into law, the practice had been 
the expulsion of any female student that 
became pregnant before completing her 
secondary education. The situation was 
so bad that even pregnancy tests had to 
be conducted on the girls before they 
sat for their final examination. However, 
the Child’s Right Act categorically states 
“A female child who becomes pregnant 
before completing her education shall 
be given the opportunity, after delivery, 
to continue with her education on the 
basis of her individual ability” (Section 
2(5) of the Child’s Right Act 2003). The 
implication of childhood/extra marital 
pregnancy on the educational pursuits 
of young girls will certainly push some 
of them into abandoning their baby after 
he/she is delivered (Ojedokun & Atoi, 
2012). Similarly, poverty is another very 
important factor that contributes to baby 
dumping. Modernity, with its challenges 
and demands, has made the task of raising 
children very difficult. Providing children 
with their needs such as food, shelter, 
medical care and education could be very 
challenging and hence resulting in the 
dumping of babies by parents who they 
feel they cannot take care of their babies 
(Ojedokun & Atoi, 2012).
Baby dumping becomes problematic 
because it is unethical and grossly violates 
the dignity and sanctity of life of the 
most vulnerable members of the society 
(Ojedokun & Atoi, 2012; see Section 237 
of the Penal Code). To that effect, the state 
must impose strict sanctions on all those 
who violate the rights of children.
The explanation to the section states 
that the section does not prevent the trial 
of the offender for culpable homicide if the 
child dies in consequence of the exposure 
or abandonment (Explanation to section 
237 of the Penal Code). Going by the 
Penal Code, a person will be held directly 
responsible for any harm that befalls a 
child as a result of dumping. Even where a 
baby does not die or suffer harm as a result 
of dumping, baby dumping undoubtedly 
amounts to a denial of the child’s right 
to dignity. According to the constitution, 
“Every individual is entitled to the 
respect of the dignity of their person, and 
accordingly, no person shall be subject to 
torture or to inhuman degrading treatment” 
(Section 34(1) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The 
Child’s Right Act 2003 equally states that 
no child shall be subjected to any cruel or 
inhumane kind of treatment (Article 37 
Child’s Right Act 2003). It further states 
that “Every child has a right of survival 
and development” (Section 4 of the Act). 
The 1999 Constitution also states that 
every person has a right to life and no one 
shall be deprived intentionally of his life, 
save in execution of the sentence of a court 
in respect of a criminal offence of which 
he has been found guilty in Nigeria. In 
Esabunor v Faweya ((2008) 12 NWLR (pt 
1102)) the Court of Appeal re-echoed the 
provisions of Section 33 of the Constitution 
and reaffirmed that any attempt to take the 
life of an individual outside the provisions 
of the Constitution is illegal and must be 
condemned.
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Under the Criminal Code and the 
Penal Code, the act of causing the death 
of another person is a homicide punishable 
by law. The Criminal Code has clearly 
mentioned that a child that is born alive 
is capable of being killed. That indicates 
where a baby dumped immediately after its 
birth dies, the mother will be charged for 
murder (Section 307 Criminal Code).
This is similar to Malaysia, a mother 
who kills her baby due to disturbance of 
the mind caused by the child birth will 
get a lighter punishment for manslaughter 
and not murder under the Nigerian law. 
According to the Criminal Code, a woman 
who wilfully kills her child who is under 
twelve months old, and at the time of the 
killing, her balance of mind was disturbed 
because she had not fully recovered from 
the effect of childbirth or because of the 
effect of lactation following the birth of the 
child, is guilty of the felony of infanticide, 
and the woman is dealt with as if she has 
committed manslaughter (Section 237A 
Criminal Code).
The CRA states that a child can bring 
an action for any harm done to him before 
his birth. It states, “A child may bring an 
action for damages against a person for 
harm or injury caused to the child wilfully, 
recklessly, negligently or through neglect 
before, during and after the birth of the 
child” (Section 17(10) of the Act). This 
provision has clearly shown that a baby 
who is dumped is allowed by the Child’s 
Right Act to institute a legal action against 
his parents or any person responsible for 
dumping him upon attaining maturity.
In a similar vein, the threat to child’s 
health caused by dumping makes it 
contrary to the Child’s Right Act 2003. This 
is because the Act has guaranteed the right 
of every child to good health and all acts 
or omissions that threaten the right of the 
child to good health are contrary to the Act. 
The Act states, “Every child is entitled to 
enjoy the best attainable state of physical, 
mental and spiritual health” (Section 13 of 
the Act).
The right to health is part of the rights 
reflected under chapter II of the 1999 
Constitution (Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy), which 
provisions are non-justiciable (Fawehinm 
v Abatcha (1998) HRLRA p549; Section 
13 of the 1999 Constitution). The Child’s 
Right Act 2003 equally guarantees the 
rights of the child to protection from all 
forms of harms and injury (Section 11 of 
the Act).
Nigeria is a signatory of the CRC 
and the African Charter on the Right and 
Welfare of the Child. Baby dumping is 
clearly a contravention of both instruments. 
The African Charter on the Right and 
Welfare of the Child guarantees every 
child the right life (Article 5), right against 
torture and cruelty (Article 16), right to 
parental care and protection (Article 19), 
and the right to good health which baby 
dumping contravenes (Article 14 of the 
African Charter on the Right and Welfare 
of the Child).
The punishment provided by the 
several laws mentioned is a good means 
in protecting babies from being dumped 
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due to the deterrence involved in the 
punishment. Similarly, the non-expulsion 
of young girls from school is equally a 
good step because it prevents dumping 
due to fear of education (Section 2(5) of 
the Child’s Right Act 2003). Meanwhile, 
creating awareness and addressing poverty 
will equally help in protecting babies from 
being dumped. Baby dumping in Nigeria 
is a crime and the Nigerian law is very 
clear to the effect that anyone who dumps 
a baby and thereby causes harm to a baby 
will face the full wrath of the law. There is 
no gain saying the fact that the punishment 
provided under the law in Nigeria is 
commensurate to the wrong being done 
to the child. However, the enforcement 
mechanisms need to be improved to 
enable the law to effectively work for the 
good of our children. The Police, courts 
and social workers need to be trained 
and retrained on the effective ways of 
ensuring that the laws are effectively 
harnessed for the betterment of all. Even 
if the laws are in place, if the ordinary 
man does not know of the existence of the 
law, the effectiveness of the law cannot 
be appreciated. It will therefore be proper 
to state that enlightenment needs to be 
made on the existence of the law and 
punishment provided by the law for baby 
dumping. In order to realise the much 
needed deterrence, trial of cases of baby 
dumping needs to be given the highest 
level of publicity.
CONCLUSION
Baby dumping is a crime under the Islamic 
law, Malaysian law and Nigerian law. The 
crime attracts similar punishment in the 
form of sanction under all laws. Although 
under the Islamic law, there is no fixed 
punishment, the punishment can be higher 
depending on the effect of the dumping 
on the baby. The Islamic approach of 
prevention will equally be a suitable 
and appropriate approach to be applied 
in Malaysia and Nigeria in tackling the 
menace of baby dumping. Prohibition 
of adultery, intoxication and all forms of 
evil is a good measure towards preventing 
baby dumping. The permission of early 
marriage and promotion of justice in the 
distribution of wealth so that poverty will 
be reduced are positive steps towards 
the prevention of the crime of baby 
dumping. In view of the seriousness of 
this crime and the personalities involved, 
it is suggested that campaign on sexuality 
needs to be improved. The government 
needs to create and improve motherless 
baby homes for the purpose of taking care 
of dumped children. Most importantly, 
the government should allow parents who 
cannot take care of their babies to keep 
such babies in such homes for that will 
significantly reduce the cases of dumping. 
The sanctions provided by the Malaysian 
and Nigerian laws are reasonable and 
satisfactory; however, to make the laws 
more effective, there is a need to ensure 
that proper investigation is done to 
apprehend and sanction wrong doers in 
accordance with the law.
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ABSTRACT
The downing of Malaysian Airliner MH 17 is not the first incident of shooting down a 
civilian airliner. There are several other cases where civilian aeroplanes carrying passengers 
were shot down. The case of MH 17 is a recent incident that attracts condemnation 
from the international community. MH 17 was shot down within the territorial air space 
of Ukraine, an area under the control of the separatists who are fighting against the 
government of Ukraine. It was alleged that the airliner was downed by the separatists 
who are enjoying the support of the Russian government. The same accusation is levied 
against the Ukrainian government. Thus, this article examines the shooting down of the 
Malaysian airliner MH 17 and determines who should be responsible for the heinous crime. 
It examines whether the conflict in Ukraine amounts to an international armed conflict 
under international humanitarian law (IHL) which can be linked with the downing of MH 
17. The article further examines the probable responsibility and jurisdictional problems 
to be faced in prosecuting the crime of shooting down MH 17 and the possible claims 
for compensation to the victims’ family. The article posits that the situation in Ukraine is 
indeed an armed conflict and the shooting down of Malaysian airliner MH 17 constitutes 
a war crime of targeting civilians as envisaged under the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). The jurisdictional problems in prosecution of the crime may be 
addressed by invoking universal jurisdiction. It is recommended that an international 
criminal investigation should be launched on the downing of MH 17 in order to find 
the culprits responsible for the crime for the purpose of subsequent prosecution for war 
crimes and compensation claims.
INTRODUCTION
The current crisis in the eastern part of 
Ukraine between the Ukrainian Army and 
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the Russian separatists who are fighting 
for regional autonomy has a relationship 
with the downing of MH 17. The conflict 
in the eastern Ukraine is connected with 
the recent annexation of Crimean and 
Sevastopol by the Russian Federation. 
Our concern with the Ukrainian conflict is 
central for the purpose of establishing and 
linking the shooting of MH 17 with war 
crimes. The existence of an armed conflict 
is a condition precedent to the commission 
of war crimes. Thus, it is necessary to 
establish the existence of either type of 
armed conflict before a wrongful act 
amounts to a war crime. In essence, the 
downing of MH 17 can only constitute a 
war crime if the armed conflict in eastern 
Ukraine has influenced or played a vital 
role in shooting down the plane.
The offence of war crime, as envisaged 
under Article 8 of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), may 
take different forms. The crime can be 
committed in either international or non-
international armed conflict, provided 
that the wrongful act is directed against 
the people protected under the Geneva 
Conventions and other laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflicts. Thus, the 
downing of Malaysian airliner MH 17 
with 298 civilian passengers on board may 
constitute a war crime since it has satisfied 
the actus reus of the core international 
crime - war crime. This may raise issues 
concerning the appropriate venue for the 
prosecution of the crime and whether 
universal jurisdiction can be invoked in 
order to allow for the prosecution of the 
crime in the ICC. Another issue of concern 
is the possibility for compensation to the 
victims’ family, which may be through 
judicial or non-judicial process, as in the 
case of Iranian Air Flight 655.
A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE 
UKRAINIAN CONFLICT AND THE 
DOWNING OF MH 17
The current crisis in Ukraine can be traced 
to the Russian annexation of the Crimean 
peninsula. It was a direct aftermath of 
the Ukrainian revolution in February 
2014, which forced President Viktor 
Yanukovych to leave the country for 
Russia. Following this event, the next day, 
the Ukrainian parliament impeached the 
President in flagrant abuse of the laid down 
constitutional due process (“Ukraine’s 
Political Crisis”, 2014). The parliament 
constituted a new interim government 
and an interim President. The newly 
constituted government of Ukraine has 
been considered as illegitimate by the 
Russian government. According to Russia, 
Yanukovych is still the Ukrainian president 
being the democratically elected president 
who was unlawfully deposed (Putzier, 
2014). However, the United States of 
America, the European Union and the 
United Nations have recognised the newly 
constituted interim government in Ukraine 
despite the fact that due process was not 
followed in the usurpation of the elected 
president (“US, EU, UN Recognize”, 
2014).
It is important to mention that Crimea 
has been annexed by Russia despite 
Mohammad Naqib Ishan Jan and Abdulrashid Lawan Haruna
Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 23 (S): 83 – 96 (2015)
War Crimes and the Downing of Malaysian Airliner MH-17
85
condemnation from the West and the 
United Nations. The Crimean accession 
was followed by another secessionist’s 
movement from the eastern part of Ukraine 
(Byers-Lane, 2014). The secessionists 
are agitating for a regional autonomy 
and Russia has been accused of giving 
support to the rebels. Subsequently, 
Russia amassed a large number of its 
military on the Ukrainian border and it 
threatens to invade should the Ukrainian 
government continue to crackdown on the 
Russian separatists (Mearsheimer, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the Ukraine government 
continued to crackdown on protesters in 
the eastern Ukraine and this led to armed 
confrontations between the Ukraine Army 
and the separatists. Thereafter, Russia 
began to provide arms and diplomatic 
support to the separatists who are more or 
less dragging the country toward civil war 
(Chandrashekhar, 2015).
Meanwhile, on 17 July 2014, MH 17 
was shot down when it was cruising over 
the air space of the Ukrainian territory 
under the control of the eastern separatists. 
The Malaysian Airliner en route from 
Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot 
down with 298 passengers on board 
including the cabin crews, and all the 
passengers died (Ngui, 2014; Rusli, 2014). 
A report of the preliminary investigation 
shows that MH 17 was flying on a safe zone 
and the airliner had neither mechanical nor 
crew fault. An initial review of the MH 
17 black-box data revealed that “the crash 
was caused by shrapnel puncturing the 
fuselage, causing massive decompression 
and breakup of the Boeing 777 that had 
been flying at an altitude of more than 
33,000 feet” (Zeitchik et al., 2014).
However, despite the fact that most 
experts believe the plane was downed by 
the Russian separatists, the report has not 
assigned blame or responsibility on anyone 
at this stage. The separatists in the eastern 
Ukraine have already dismissed any 
allegation linking them with the downing 
of MH 17 claiming that they lack a weapon 
that can shoot a plane cruising at 33,000 
feet (“MH17 Preliminary”, 2014). Russia 
on its part has claimed to have a record of a 
Ukrainian combat jet approaching close to 
the MH 17 before it was shortly shot down 
(“Dutch report”, 2014). In view of the 
allegations and denials made, the nagging 
question has been who is responsible for 
the downing of MH 17 and whether the 
downing of the plane has any nexus with 
the conflict in eastern Ukraine in order to 
qualify the act as a war crime. It is vitally 
essential that the second limb of this 
question be answered in the affirmative 
before the shooting of the plane constitutes 
a war crime since war crimes can only be 
committed during an armed conflict.
THE CONCEPT OF ARMED 
CONFLICT AND THE UKRAINIAN 
CONFLICT
Although the term armed conflict is the 
preferred term in the contemporary IHL 
instruments, these instruments do not 
define the term. For instance, there is no 
definition of ‘armed conflict’ in the Geneva 
Conventions and their two Additional 
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Protocols. Substantial evidence suggests, 
in fact, that the drafters of the Geneva 
Conventions purposely avoided any rigid 
formulation that might limit the law’s field 
of application. However, jurisprudence 
of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has 
clarified the definition of “armed conflict”. 
In Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-
AR72 (Oct. 2, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 32, 54, the 
Tribunal’s first case, the Appeals Chamber 
defined the term “armed conflict” in the 
following words:
 [A]rmed conflict exists whenever there 
is a resort to armed force between 
states or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and 
organised armed groups or between 
such groups within a state.
Thus, armed conflict generally refers 
to military confrontations between two or 
more States, a State and a body other than 
a state, a state and a dissident faction or 
two ethnic groups within a state territory 
(Carswell, 2009). Based on the above 
definition and as also inferred from the 
IHL legal instruments, armed conflict can 
be categorised into two broad categories, 
namely, International armed conflict’ and 
non-international (internal) armed conflict 
(Reisman et al., 1988). This definition 
has shown that the situation in the eastern 
Ukraine is indeed an armed conflict 
between a State and an armed group, which 
is covered by the Geneva Conventions.
It is important to clarify whether 
the conflict in Ukraine is international 
armed conflict or non-international armed 
conflict because war crimes connected 
with international armed conflicts are 
distinguished from those connected 
with non-international armed conflicts, 
as provided in Article 8 of the Statute 
of International Criminal Court (ICC) 
(Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005). 
International armed conflict is defined 
as “a declared war or any other armed 
confrontation between two or more States, 
even if the state of war is not recognised 
by one of them”. It also includes wars of 
national liberation and cases of occupation 
(ICRC, 2008). On the other hand, non-
international armed conflict refers to 
protracted armed confrontation between 
governmental armed forces and one or 
more armed groups, or between such armed 
groups arising on the territory of a State. 
Article 1(2) of the Additional Protocol II 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 further 
clarifies that armed conflict does not 
include situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts 
of a similar nature as not being armed 
conflicts. However, a non-international 
armed conflict may change its character to 
internationalise armed conflict where there 
is involvement of a state in support of an 
armed group (Vite, 2009).
Therefore, the conflict in the eastern 
Ukraine is a non-international armed 
conflict since it involves a state and an 
armed group. However, this raises question 
as to whether the involvement of Russia 
in the conflict in eastern Ukraine has 
internationalised the armed conflict or 
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not. In the first place, the Tadic’s test for 
determining whether an internal armed 
conflict has become international is 
whether “some of the participants in the 
internal armed conflict act on behalf of an 
other State.” A similar question was raised 
in the Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua (Merits) case, 
(1986) ICJ Rep., where the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) had to determine the 
responsibility of the United States for the 
armed conflict between the contras it had 
sponsored and the Nicaraguan government. 
The Court applied the “effective control” 
test to determine whether an insurgent’s acts 
can be attributed to a State. In applying this 
test to the facts, the ICJ found that despite 
a high degree of participation and a general 
degree of control over the contras, who were 
highly dependent on that foreign assistance, 
the United States was not responsible for the 
violations of humanitarian law perpetrated by 
the contras since those violations “…could 
be committed by members of the contras 
without the control of the United States.”
However, the Tadi´c case, as cited 
above, has overruled the strict “effective 
control” test espoused in the Nicaragua 
case, declaring the ICJ’s reasoning 
“unconvincing […] based on the very logic 
of the entire system of international law 
on State responsibility.” Consequently, an 
internal armed conflict may be considered 
as an international armed conflict if a 
foreign State has overall control over the 
conduct of the warring parties. Overall 
control test requires that a State has a role 
in organising, coordinating or planning the 
military actions of the group, in addition 
to financing, training and equipping or 
providing operational support to that group 
but that it “does not go so far as to include the 
issuing of specific orders by the State, or its 
direction of each individual operation.” This 
particular test may be invoked to determine 
whether the support Russian has provided to 
the separatists in the eastern part of Ukraine 
internationalizes the armed conflict.
The second limb of the Tadic’s test for 
determining whether an internal armed 
conflict has become international is whether 
“another State intervenes in that conflict 
through its troops”. In the Prosecutor v. 
Bla˘ski´c, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgement, 
3 March 2000, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
after examining the evidences before it 
found that Croatia’s direct interference in 
the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina turned 
that internal conflict into an international 
one. In the case of Prosecutor v. Raji´c, 
Case No. IT-95-12-R61, the ICTY found 
that an internal armed conflict could be 
rendered international if troops intervene 
“significantly and continuously”.
Therefore, based on the analysis of the 
decisions of the ICTY, the current conflict 
in Ukraine has been internationalised by 
the involvement of Russian. The Russian 
support in terms of arms, diplomatic 
support and military involvement has 
internationalised the armed conflict and 
consequently, the laws of international 
armed conflict apply. This raises question 
as to who bears the responsibility for the 
possible war crimes committed by the 
downing of Malaysian Airliner MH 17.
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WAR CRIMES AND THE DOWNING 
OF MH 17
War crimes are grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and other serious 
violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts as outlined 
in Article 8(2)(a) of the ICC Statute. The 
provision of Article 8 of the Rome Statute 
has provided for different categories of war 
crimes. It starts by defining war crimes 
as contained in the various provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions - meaning grave 
breaches of the Conventions. The second 
aspect of the provision considers other 
serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict 
within the established legal framework of 
international law as provided in Article 
8(2)(b). Thirdly, the provision addresses 
non-international armed conflict and 
has made serious violations of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions a 
war crime. Since the provision of Article 
8 of the Rome Statute has spelt out several 
acts that constitute war crimes, we are 
only concerned with the acts that relate 
to targeting a civilian plane during armed 
conflicts as a war crime.
To begin with, in case of grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions, it is a war crime 
to wilfully kill a person who is protected 
under the Geneva Conventions or to cause 
extensive destruction of protected property, 
which is not justified by military necessity 
as contained under Article 8 (2)(a)(i) and 
(iv) of the ICC Statute. This provision 
depicts that killing of civilians who are 
not participating in hostilities as well as 
destruction of civilian property that has 
not been used for military purpose as war 
crimes. Invoking this position of the law, 
the shooting of MH 17 which is a civilian 
property not used for military purpose, 
as well as the killing of the 298 civilian 
passengers on board clearly constitutes war 
crimes. Thus, the act of shooting a civilian 
plane not used for military purpose and 
the killing or death of civilian passengers 
on board amount to grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions and therefore 
constitutes a war crime under Article 8(2)
(a) of the ICC Statute.
In an international armed conflict, 
Article 8 (2)(b)(i) and (ii) provides that 
intentionally directing attacks against the 
civilian(s) or civilian objects which are 
not used for military purpose is a serious 
violation of the laws and customs applicable 
in international armed conflicts. According 
to Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute, it 
is equally a serious violation of laws and 
customs applicable in international armed 
conflicts to intentionally launch an attack 
with the knowledge that such “attack will 
cause incidental loss of life or injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian objects.…
which would be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated.”
It can be asserted that the 
aforementioned provisions clearly show 
that directing an attack against civilian(s) 
or civilian objects, which have not been 
used for military purpose constitutes a 
serious violation of the laws and customs 
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applicable in international armed conflict. 
MH 17 is a civilian plane that is carrying 
civilians. Thus, directing an attack against 
MH 17 with civilians on board constitutes 
a serious violation of the laws and customs 
applicable in an international armed 
conflict, and this constitutes a war crime.  
However, it is significant to mention 
that for a crime to be punishable as a war 
crime, it has to satisfy not only the actus 
reus of the crime but the requisite mental 
elements of the offence. The Rome Statute 
provides that unless otherwise provided, a 
person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material 
elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge (Detter, 2000). A person is said 
to have intent where: 
(a)  In relation to conduct, that person 
means to engage in the conduct;
(b)  In relation to a consequence, 
that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it 
will occur in the ordinary course of 
events (Article 30(2); Keim, 2014).
While knowledge means awareness 
that a circumstance exists or a consequence 
will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
This element of war crime is important 
in determining the responsibility for the 
commission of the crime. In this context, 
it is not yet due to ascertain whether the 
shooting down of MH 17 was done with 
the requisite mental element of war crimes. 
This is in view of the fact that international 
or criminal investigation on the commission 
of the crime has not been done.
It is important to further stress that 
war crimes can only be committed during 
an armed conflict i.e. the crime must have 
some nexus with an armed conflict. In the 
case of Tadić cited earlier, the ICTY has 
made it clear that for an act to constitute a 
war crime, it must be closely related to the 
armed conflict as a whole. Likewise, in the 
case of Prosecutor v. Kayishima, Case No. 
ICTR-95-1-T, 21st May 1999, the Tribunal 
emphasises the need for “a direct link 
between crimes committed against these 
victims and the hostilities.” The ICTY in 
the case of Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case 
No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, 12 June 
2002, has clarified that the mere existence 
of an armed conflict does not qualify every 
act of criminality as a war crime. The armed 
conflict must have influenced and played 
a significant role in the commission of 
the offense. However, the Tribunal agrees 
that it suffices the requirement of the law 
if “the perpetrator acted in furtherance of 
or under the guise of the armed conflict.” 
In other words, it constitutes a war crime 
if the conduct took place in the context of 
and was associated with an armed conflict.
 Furthermore, for a war crime to be 
committed, the violation must be directed 
against protected person under IHL, it must 
be a breach of customary or treaty IHL 
binding on the accused, it must be a serious 
violation that involves grave consequences 
for the victim and the accused is aware of 
the existence of an armed conflict.
Applying this position to the case of 
MH 17, it is obvious that the downing of the 
airliner was done during an armed conflict. 
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Whoever might have shot down the plane 
did so under the pretext that it could be an 
enemy plane. The armed conflict in eastern 
Ukraine influences and plays a vital role in 
shooting down the Malaysian airliner. This 
conviction can be inferred from the fact 
that had the situation in eastern Ukraine 
was a ‘peace time’, it would be difficult 
or even impracticable for someone to just 
shoot down a civilian plane. Obviously, 
the persons on board were protected under 
IHL and the downing of the plane has 
serious consequences on the victims. In this 
context, the downing of MH 17 satisfied the 
law in terms of the requirements for war 
crimes. It is however not clear who bears 
the responsibility for the crime committed 
despite the fact that the plane was shot down 
in the airspace of Ukraine under the control 
of the Russian separatists.
ISSUES OF RESPONSIBILITY, 
JURISDICTION AND 
COMPENSATION
In the first place, international investigation 
has commenced on the shooting down of 
MH 17 but the report of the investigation 
is not yet available to be able to rely on for 
the purpose of determining responsibility. 
However, various accusations have been 
directed towards the Russian separatists 
in eastern Ukraine since the plane was 
downed within the territorial airspace 
under their control (Carroll, 2014). If the 
allegations are established, the separatists 
will be responsible for the crime committed. 
This will raise a question as to the extent 
of the Russian involvement in the armed 
conflict. As we have earlier established 
that where an armed group has received 
support from a particular state in an armed 
conflict, the character of the conflict would 
change to internationalised armed conflict. 
Meanwhile, if the allegations against the 
Kiev government turn out to be true, then 
the Ukrainian government should be held 
responsible (Pusztai, 2014).
Thus, the issue of state responsibility 
for acts of its agents either de facto or 
de jure agent cannot be denied. In this 
context, the separatists may be viewed 
as de facto agent of Russia. However, 
for responsibility to stem from this 
relationship, the law requires that the 
separatists are not only paid or financed 
by Russia and their actions coordinated by 
Russia, but also that they received specific 
instructions concerning the commission of 
the unlawful acts in question. This standard 
can only be established or denied when a 
criminal investigation on the downing of 
MH 17 has been concluded.
It is significant to mention that the 
principles of international law concerning 
the attribution to States of acts performed 
by private individuals are not based on 
rigid and uniform criteria. According 
to Article 8 of the Draft on State 
Responsibility adopted on first reading 
by the United Nations International Law 
Commission, if it is proven that individuals 
who are not regarded as organs of a State 
by its legislation nevertheless do in fact 
act on behalf of that State, their acts are 
attributable to the State. The justification 
for this rule is to preclude States from 
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denying international responsibility by 
making private individuals carry out 
responsibilities that may not or should 
not be performed by State officials, or 
by claiming that individuals actually 
participating in governmental authority are 
not classified as State organs under national 
legislation and therefore do not engage 
State responsibility (Sassoli, 2002). In other 
words, States are not allowed on the one 
hand to act de facto through individuals and 
on the other hand to disassociate themselves 
from such conduct when these individuals 
breach international law. In invoking this 
assertion, one may be tempted to conclude 
that the Russian involvement in the affairs 
of the separatists in eastern Ukraine may 
confer responsibility on Russia for any 
breach of international law committed by 
the separatists.
The next issue of concern is the venue 
for the prosecution of the perpetrators of 
the crime. MH 17 is an airliner belonging to 
Malaysia; it was downed within the territorial 
airspace of Ukraine under the control of 
the Russian separatists and the passengers 
on board made up of mainly (193) Dutch 
nationals. The act of shooting down of the 
plane could have been done by Ukrainian 
nationals or Russians as alleged, who are 
subject to either Ukrainian or Russian 
jurisdiction as the case may be (Füllsack, 
2015). This is based on trite international 
criminal law consideration of territoriality 
of where the offence was committed and the 
nationality of the perpetrators or victims of 
the crime (Zemach, 2011). The problem is, 
however, what will happen to the interest 
of Malaysia being the owner of the airliner 
and Dutch government that suffers the 
highest number of victims? Does it mean 
that the Malaysian and Dutch governments 
should move to Ukraine for the purpose of 
prosecuting the crime? 
In order to solve these probable 
jurisdictional conflicts, it is important 
to reflect on the nature of the offence 
committed. Since the crime alleged to 
have been committed is a war crime, it is 
subject to universal jurisdiction. Universal 
jurisdiction is a criminal jurisdiction based 
solely, on the nature of the crime, without 
regard to where the crime was committed, 
the nationality of the alleged or convicted 
perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or 
any other connection to the state exercising 
such jurisdiction (Zemach, 2011). Under 
normal circumstances, a State assumes 
criminal jurisdiction only over crimes 
committed on its territory or by its 
nationals. However, IHL confers universal 
jurisdiction over grave breaches on all 
States. This means that states are required 
to prosecute war criminals, regardless 
of their nationality, the nationality of the 
victim, and where the crime was actually 
committed (Sassoli et al., 1999). However, 
universal jurisdiction has no link to 
territoriality or nationality (of both the 
perpetrator and the victim) between the 
State and the conduct of the offender, nor 
is the State seeking to protect its security or 
credit (O’Keefe, 2004).
It is significant at this juncture to point 
out that universal jurisdiction only serves 
as a substitute for other countries who 
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would be in a better position to prosecute 
a crime by stepping in for the state in 
whose territory the crime was actually 
committed and has failed to prosecute 
for whatever reason. In other words, the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction centres on 
the inability or failure of the concerned state 
on whose territory the crime was committed 
to prosecute the criminals (O’Keefe, 2004). 
Therefore, it can be submitted that invoking 
the notion of universal jurisdiction to the 
crime of downing of MH 17 will solve the 
probable jurisdictional conflicts or forum 
inconveniences that may arise. The principle 
will confer jurisdiction on other States other 
than Ukraine to prosecute the crime.
More aptly, the crime can be prosecuted 
in the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
That is the reason behind allowing the ICC 
to assume jurisdiction over war crimes, 
particularly when the state concerned is 
unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the 
investigation or prosecution (PCHR, 2010).
Furthermore, Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 
of the four Geneva Conventions respectively 
require that in cases of grave breaches of the 
Conventions, states are ‘under the obligation to 
search for persons alleged to have committed, 
or to have ordered to be committed, such 
grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, 
regardless of their nationality, before its own 
courts.’ The preamble of the ICC statute has 
called on states to cooperate for the purpose 
of ensuring the effective criminal prosecution 
of international crimes. It can be further 
submitted that the jurisdiction of the ICC is 
the suitable neutral forum for the prosecution 
of the crime of downing of MH 17.
Another issue that calls for concern 
is the issue of claims for compensation 
by the families of the victims of MH 17. 
Traditionally, violations of international law 
and IHL in particular are attributed to States 
and measures to stop, repress and redress 
such violations have to be directed against 
the State responsible for the violations. 
There was no provision for compensation 
in case of violation of the international law. 
Today, however, Article 91 of the Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
provides that a Party to the conflict which 
violates the provisions of the Conventions 
or of the Protocol shall, if the case demands, 
be liable to pay compensation. Thus, the 
families of the victims of MH 17 may claim 
for compensation against whichever state 
that is found responsible. If the Russian 
separatists are responsible for the downing of 
MH 17 as alleged, it then follows that Russia 
may equally bear responsibility and may be 
liable to pay compensation for the families of 
the victims of the Malaysian plane. Similarly, 
where the allegation against Ukraine has 
been established, the Kiev government will 
be responsible for the crimes committed and 
may as well pay compensation.
The issue of compensation may also 
be considered from the perspective of the 
Iranian Air Flight 655 incident. When the 
United States Navy shot down the Iranian 
plane in July 1988, Iran filed a suit against 
the United States in the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ). Though the United States 
failed to admit responsibility and liability 
for the downing of the plane and has 
shown no remorse for the wrongful act, the 
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compensation was paid. The case was settled 
out of court through non-legal process. The 
United States agreed to pay compensation 
of USD 61.8 million to the 243 Iranian 
passengers on board for Iran to discontinue 
the case (Ghasemi, 2004). It is important to 
mention that the United States did not admit 
liability for the heinous act but it has paid the 
compensation ex-gratia to Iran. Therefore, 
it can be submitted that the case of MH 
17 may equally be settled through similar 
process, particularly where the report of the 
investigation shows that legal responsibility 
cannot be clearly established.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine 
has reached the required threshold for an 
armed conflict. The Russian involvement 
and support for the separatists in the 
conflict has internationalised the armed 
conflict. The downing of Malaysian 
airliner MH 17 in the territorial airspace of 
Ukraine under the control of the separatists 
is indeed a heinous act against humanity. 
Shooting down of a civilian plane that 
has nexus with an armed conflict may 
constitute a war crime under Article 8 of 
the Rome Statute. The party responsible for 
the commission of the crime has not been 
ascertained as international investigation 
into the incident is still going on. However, 
there are allegations that the plane might 
have been shot down by the separatists 
in eastern Ukraine, an accusation that has 
been dismissed by the group. Meanwhile, 
Russian support for the separatists may 
make Russia responsible should the 
accusation against the separatists turn out 
to be true. The prosecution of the crime 
committed may be done in the ICC where 
the concerned states fail to prosecute the 
perpetrators. Despite the recently released 
preliminary report of the joint investigation 
committee which highlights the causes of 
the downing of MH 17, it is suggested 
that a further independent criminal 
investigation should be launched into the 
downing of MH 17 in order to determine 
the party responsible for the crime in order 
to initiate criminal prosecution and obtain 
compensation for the victims’ family.
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ABSTRACT
Terrorism is nothing new in present situations all over the world. Though there are different 
political manipulations of its definition, terrorism is a menace that affects the whole world 
at large. Boko Haram, a terrorist group based mainly in Nigeria started its first attack 
in 2004, and it has since been responsible for thousands of deaths of both Muslims and 
Christians in the country. The terrorist group is said to be demanding the adoption of the 
Islamic system of government and as a result has bombed many churches and schools. In 
2011, the terrorist group attacked the United Nations Office in Abuja with the aid of one 
of its suicide bombers. The terrorist activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria have been under 
the purview and preliminary criteria known as preliminary investigations as carried out 
by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court since 2010. The Office 
of the Prosecutor came out with a report in 2013 that concluded there is a reasonable basis 
to believe that Boko Haram has been committing crimes against humanity of murder and 
persecution since July 2009. However, up until date, despite the abduction of over 300 
schoolgirls by the terrorist group, the Nigerian government has not been able to bring 
the girls back or prosecute the perpetrators. When a State party to the Rome Statute has 
some form of armed conflict going on in its region, a referral may be made to the ICC to 
intervene. However, it must first be determined whether the crimes committed are those 
within the court’s jurisdiction and also whether the situation is admissible especially 
with regards to the complementary criteria 
as provided for in the Rome Statute. This 
paper will look into the admissibility of 
the Boko Haram situation and whether 
the International Criminal Court has 
jurisdiction over the crimes committed.
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INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is a recurrent or some form of 
violence directed against human and non-
human objects. This violence is usually 
carried out with the purpose of changing or 
sustaining at least a certain subjective norm 
or belief in at least one particular territorial 
unit or population. It is usually planned 
in secrecy at underground, unknown and 
probably ever-changing locations and 
members of such groups would normally 
hide their true identity and never disclose 
their whereabouts in order to protect their 
space and their violent agendas. In order to 
sustain their objectives and goals, continuous 
fear and violence are used (Gibbs 1989).
In United States, terrorist activity is 
said to encompass series of activities, which 
are ordinarily unlawful under the laws of 
the place where they have been committed. 
Some of these activities include:
 The hijacking or sabotage of any 
conveyance (including an aircraft, 
vessel, or vehicle); seizing or 
detaining, and threatening to kill, 
injure, or continue to detain, another 
individual in order to compel a third 
person (including a governmental 
organisation) to do or abstain from 
doing any act as an explicit or 
implicit condition for the release of 
the individual seized or detained; a 
violent attack upon an internationally 
protected person...or upon the liberty 
of such a person; an assassination; the 
use of any biological agent, chemical 
agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or 
explosive, firearm, or other weapon or 
dangerous device (other than for mere 
personal monetary gain), with intent 
to endanger, directly or indirectly, the 
safety of one or more individuals or to 
cause substantial damage to property; a 
threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any 
of the foregoing (Roach 2012) (8 U.S.C).
Terrorism has also been defined as 
an intentional and politically-motivated 
violence perpetrated against non-combatant 
targets (civilians) by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents (22 U.S.C). Therefore, in 
a situation where the Secretary of State of the 
United States confirms a group as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organisation – FTO; the following 
are the three consequences of being called 
a FTO. Firstly, the FTO may have its 
assets frozen; secondly, the FTO members 
are prohibited from entering the United 
States, and lastly, anyone who knowingly 
provides material support or resources to 
FTO is subject to criminal prosecution. 
Consequently, the resulting effects 
following a FTO designation could prevent 
Boko Haram from exponentially growing 
and continuing to torment Nigerians and the 
rest of the world (8 U.S.C) (18 U.S.C).
Christian Much believes that the 
International Criminal Court would play 
an important role in combating the surge of 
terrorism (Much, 2006). If a terrorist group 
is labelled an FTO, it will help the ICC to 
monitor its activities through data collected 
by governmental and non-governmental 
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organisations rather than if their activities 
are left to be on its own. After all, what 
all these terrorist organisations want is 
attention. The sooner seriously they are 
taken, the sooner they can be caught and 
prosecuted. Though terrorism in itself is not 
a crime under the Rome Statute, terrorists 
will usually normally commit crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the ICC in the form of 
crimes against humanity, genocide and in 
some cases, war crimes too (Watkins, 2011).
 Boko Haram has its base in Nigeria. It 
has been described as a cultural movement 
that means ‘refuse Western education’ 
that started out as non-violent movement 
demanding the installation of full Muslim 
sharia law throughout Nigeria. Boko Haram 
is officially called Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna 
Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad [people committed 
to the propagation of the Prophet’s 
teachings and jihad]. It arose in Maiduguri, 
Borno, NE Nigeria, and has since spread 
across the nation’s north, where Muslims 
are the majority and poverty is widespread; 
it is especially active in the states of 
Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in the north 
east of Nigeria, especially in rural areas. 
Some have claimed that the frustration 
with the Nigerian government neglect and 
corruption has contributed to the influence 
of the group, which is loosely modelled on 
the Taliban. Boko Haram also has operated 
in areas of Cameroon and Niger bordering 
Northeast Nigeria, but has mainly sought a 
safe haven and to recruit there (Columbia 
Electronic Encyclopedia, 2014).
Boko Haram mounted its first attack 
in 2004 and has since been responsible 
for varying violence including church 
burnings in the North and killings of 
Christians and Muslims alike. Since the 
middle of 2011, Boko Haram has become 
more violent, more daring attacks such 
as on the UN offices in the capital city of 
Abuja, blowing up government buildings 
including police stations and attacking 
Christian churches during the Christmas 
holidays. Thousands have been killed as a 
result (American Foreign Policy Interests, 
2012). Thereafter, the Boko Haram 
situation attracted the attention of the ICC 
through communications made by various 
NGOs and civil bodies especially making 
it easy for the ICC to intervene and give 
preliminary examinations because Nigeria 
is a State Party to the Rome Statute and has 
been a member since 27 September 2001.
The preliminary examination of the 
situation of Nigeria was made public 
in November 2010. It was initiated by 
the Prosecutor taking into consideration 
information on alleged crimes, including 
information sent by individuals or groups, 
States and non-governmental organisations, 
as well as additional information sought by 
the Office to analyse the seriousness of the 
allegations. Different groups committed 
alleged crimes at different times in 
different regions of Nigeria; however, this 
paper is interested in the activities of the 
Boko Haram. This paper seeks to look into 
the jurisdiction and the admissibility of 
the Boko Haram situation in Nigeria with 
regards to the pre-trial processes before the 
international criminal court. The ICC has 
been receiving communications (mostly 
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from non-governmental organisations) 
from Nigeria since 2005 but never from the 
Nigeria government. The communications 
reached 38 in 2011, 59 in 2012 and 67 in 
2013 (OTP Report 2013).
THE PROCESS OF PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATIONS BY THE OFFICE 
OF THE PROSECUTOR
The bulk of the process of preliminary 
examinations is the framework of decisions 
on jurisdiction and admissibility as it rests 
on the shoulders of the Prosecutor of the ICC 
but it is not final. It only helps to kick off the 
next process, which is the full investigation 
into a situation. When a situation in a 
particular country has been referred to the 
International Criminal Court, the Office 
of the Prosecutor (OTP) is responsible for 
determining whether a situation meets 
the legal criteria established by the Rome 
Statute to warrant investigation by the Court. 
For this purpose, OTP analyses all situations 
brought to its attention based on statutory 
criteria and the information available.
Article 15 (1) & (2) of the Rome Statute 
provides that the Prosecutor may establish 
an investigation proprio motu (on their 
own) on the basis of information on crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. The 
Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of 
the information received. For this purpose, 
he or she may seek additional information 
from States, organs of the United Nations, 
intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organisations, or other reliable sources 
that he or she deems appropriate, and may 
receive written or oral testimony at the seat 
of the Court.
In order to differentiate the situations 
that would give rise to an investigation from 
those that do not, the OTP has a sorting 
process that consists of 4 consecutive 
phases, namely:
a.  In the first phase, the Office does an 
initial assessment of all information 
on alleged crimes received under 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute 
(which are called ‘article 15 
communications’) to separate the 
information on crimes that are 
outside the jurisdiction of the Court. 
There are 4 crimes recognised by 
the Rome Statute and hence the ICC 
as well; thus, any crimes that do not 
fall within these four will disqualify 
such a crime to be prosecuted before 
the ICC.
b.  In phase 2, the Office analyses 
all information on alleged crimes 
received or collected to determine 
whether the preconditions to the 
exercise of jurisdiction under article 
12 of the Rome Statute are satisfied 
and whether there is a reasonable 
basis to believe that the alleged 
crimes fall under the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Court as per 
article 5 of the Rome Statute.
c.  In phase 3, the Office analyses 
admissibility in terms of 
complementarity and gravity as per 
article 17 of the Rome Statute.
d.  In phase 4, having concluded from 
its preliminary examination that 
the case is admissible prima facie, 
the Office, taking into account 
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the gravity of the crimes and the 
interests of victims, examines under 
article 53(1)(c) whether there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to 
believe that an investigation would 
not serve the interests of justice. For 
instance, several NGOs and even 
some Ugandans felt that since there 
were negotiations and conciliations 
going on with the Lord Resistance 
Army, the Ugandan government 
was too fast in jumping into laps of 
the ICC (Keller, 2008).
Article 15(6) states that if after the 
preliminary examination the Prosecutor 
concludes that the information provided 
does not constitute a reasonable basis for 
an investigation, he or she shall inform 
those who provided the information. This 
shall not preclude the Prosecutor from 
considering further information submitted 
to him or her regarding the same situation 
in the light of new facts or evidence.
From the Report on Preliminary 
Examination activities, 2011, the Office 
of the Prosecutor as at that time had not 
received any information with regards to 
the activities of Boko Haram. However, 
Nigeria was already being put through 
the preliminary examination process with 
regards to the killings that took place 
between July 2002 and April 2011, which 
led to the deaths of thousands of people 
in Nigeria as a result of inter-communal, 
sectarian and political violence. The OTP 
from their sources contended that these 
deaths were unevenly distributed over time 
and place (OTP 2011).
JURISDICTION AND 
ADMISSIBILITY 
Article 15 (3) – (5) provides that if the 
Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation, he or 
she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a 
request for authorisation of an investigation, 
together with any supporting material 
collected. If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon 
examination of the request and the supporting 
material, considers that there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation, 
and that the case appears to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorise the 
commencement of the investigation, without 
prejudice to subsequent determinations by 
the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and 
admissibility of a case. The refusal of the Pre-
Trial Chamber to authorise the investigation 
shall not preclude the presentation of a 
subsequent request by the Prosecutor based 
on new facts or evidence regarding the same 
situation.
The above provision shows that the 
process of determining whether there is 
jurisdiction and admissibility of a situation 
before the ICC is a continuous process that 
starts from the preliminary examinations, 
through full investigations, up until the 
pre-trial and finally the trial stage.
Jurisdiction of the ICC comprises of 
3 parts and they all share the nemesis of 
whether a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court has been or is being committed. 
The first part is about temporal jurisdiction 
which looks into whether the crimes were 
committed from the date of entry into force 
of the Statute, which is from the 1st of July 
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2002 onwards, the date of entry into force 
for an acceding State, date specified in a 
Security Council referral or in a declaration 
lodged pursuant to article 12(3). The second 
part of jurisdiction assessment is relating 
to territorial or personal jurisdiction. 
Territorial or personal jurisdiction looks 
into whether crimes alleged were or are still 
being committed on the territory or by a 
national of a State Party of the Rome Statute 
or by a State not Party that has presented a 
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
Court, or that it arises in a situation referred 
by the Security Council. The third part is 
concerned with material jurisdiction and this 
directly related to the crimes recognised by 
the ICC as provided for in the Rome Statute 
- genocide; crimes against humanity; war 
crimes; and aggression (OTP 2012).
The ICC will determine whether it 
has jurisdiction first before it considers 
the issue of admissibility. Article 19(1) of 
the Rome Statute provides that the Court 
shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in 
any case brought before it. The provision 
further states that the Court may, on its 
own motion, determine the admissibility 
of a case in accordance with article 17 
afterwards. It has been contended that 
the ICC does not get its jurisdiction 
from the inherent nature of the crimes 
within its jurisdiction but that it gets its 
authority from the specific surrendering 
of jurisdictional competence on the part of 
either the territorial or the national State of 
those that ratified the Rome Statute.
Admissibility looks into both 
complementarity and gravity. Complementarity 
is clear to a certain extent but not the same 
can be said of the gravity criterion. In the 
Ugandan case, the defence argued that 
since there was already some national 
proceedings going on in Uganda at the time 
with regards reconciliation and amnesty for 
war criminals, the Ugandan Government 
could be said to have fulfilled their part 
of willingness to take responsibility for 
the problems in their country. As a result, 
the ICC should not take the admissibility 
of the situation. However, the court ruled 
in favour of the Ugandan Government 
because the Ugandan Attorney General 
insisted that their Government would only 
look into the case of other suspects and 
surrender the cases before the ICC to be 
exclusively dealt with by the ICC (The 
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony 2009).
The Report on Preliminary 
Examinations Activities, 2013 summarised 
the complementarity principle and the 
interests of justice in the following words:
 Complementarity involves an 
examination of the existence of relevant 
national proceedings in relation to 
the potential cases being considered 
for investigation by the Office, 
taking into consideration the Office’s 
policy to focus on those who appear 
to bear the greatest responsibility 
for the most serious crimes. Where 
relevant domestic investigations or 
prosecutions exist, the Prosecution 
will assess their genuineness. Gravity 
includes an assessment of the scale, 
nature, manner and impact of the 
alleged crimes committed in the 
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situation. The ‘interests of justice’ is 
a countervailing consideration. The 
Office must assess whether, taking 
into account the gravity of the crime 
and the interests of victims, there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to 
believe that an investigation would 
not serve the interests of justice (OTP 
2013).
The 2012 report of the Office of 
the Prosecutor stated that there was a 
reasonable basis to believe that since July 
2009, Boko Haram has committed the 
following acts constituting crimes against 
humanity: (i) murder under article 7(1)
(a) and (ii) persecution under article 7(1)
(h) of the Statute. The report stated that 
commencing from the July of 2009, the 
Boko Haram had propelled a widespread 
and systematic attack in the Northern part 
of Nigeria that has resulted in the execution 
and bombardments of more than 1,300 
Christian and Muslims civilians in different 
locations throughout Nigeria including 
Yobe, Kaduna Borno, Bauchi, Katsina, 
Gombe and Kano States in the North, as 
well as Abuja, Kaduna and Plateau States 
in Central Nigeria. The frequent display 
of these violent activities shows that the 
group is well armed with the resources 
to carry out recurrent widespread and 
systematic attacks, and this exhibits that 
the group possesses organisational control 
and internal coordination to that effect.
These attacks were carried out in order 
to fulfil the mandate of the Boko Haram 
leadership, which is to establish an Islamic 
system of government exclusively in the 
Northern part of Nigerian notwithstanding 
the existence of the laws that may be guiding 
the Christians in the area. Opponents to 
this goal have been targeted as well. Boko 
Haram leaders or spokesmen have issued 
public statements revealing their intention 
to attack civilians in furtherance of this 
policy including a January 2012 ultimatum 
urging Christians to leave Northern 
Nigeria. The targeting of an identifiable 
group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender 
or other ground is a constitutive element of 
the crime of persecution under article 7(1) 
(OTP 2012).
Article 7 of the Rome Statute provides 
that crime against humanity means any 
of the following acts when committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack and these acts 
include:
 Murder; extermination; enslavement; 
deportation or forcible transfer of 
population; imprisonment or other 
severe deprivation of physical liberty 
in violation of fundamental rules of 
international law; torture; rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence 
of comparable gravity; persecution 
against any identifiable group or 
collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or 
other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under 
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international law, in connection with 
any act referred to in this paragraph 
or any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the court; enforced disappearance of 
persons; the crime of apartheid; other 
inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, 
or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health (Rome Statute).
In the 2013 Report on Preliminary 
Examination activities, the Office of the 
Prosecutor restated as they had already 
done in 2012 Report that there was a 
reasonable basis to believe that crimes 
against humanity had been committed in 
Nigeria, namely the acts of murder and 
persecution attributed to Boko Haram. 
Therefore, the Prosecutor has decided 
that the preliminary examination of the 
situation in Nigeria should cross over to 
the 3rd stage (admissibility) with a view to 
assessing whether the national authorities 
are conducting genuine proceedings in 
relation to those who appear to bear the 
greatest responsibility for such crimes and 
the gravity of such crimes.
However, with the abduction of over 
240 school girl whom have been reported 
to be used as sexual slaves while others 
were married off without their consent, 
the crimes of humanity may extend to 
enslavement, rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution and forced pregnancy.
THE BOKO HARAM SITUATION IN 
NIGERIA
Boko Haram members are alleged to have 
killed numerous Christian worshipers, 
police officers and soldiers, as well as 
local politicians, community leaders and 
Islamic clerics who oppose the group. 
The Nigerian Chief of Army Staff stated 
that Boko Haram is responsible for killing 
3,000 persons since the start of its violent 
campaign. According to Human Rights 
Watch, more than 1,200 Christian and 
Muslim civilians have been killed in so 
many attacks allegedly conducted by Boko 
Haram. Such attacks were alleged to have 
taken place in twelve northern and central 
Nigerian states, as well as in Abuja. It was 
reported in OTP Report 2012 that on 26 
August 2011, Boko Haram attacked the 
United Nations Headquarters in Abuja with 
a vehicle-borne suicide bomb, resulting in 
the deaths dozens of people. There were 
allegations, so said the Report, that the 
response of the Nigerian security forces 
against suspected Boko Haram members 
has involved the excessive use of force, as 
well as summary executions of civilians.
As a result of these religious 
persecutions, Boko Haram has caught the 
eye of United States government and it has 
been attributed that there is a newly founded 
concentration on Boko Haram’s operation, 
which arises from the fact that the United 
States has always placed religious freedom 
at the core of human rights and societal 
stability. Additionally, military leaders 
have expressed concern that Boko Haram 
is capable of posing a threat to the United 
States homeland.
Furthermore, Boko Haram has caught 
the attention of the United States and 
Nigerian officials chiefly because of Boko 
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Haram’s recent public message, declaring 
Boko Haram’s intention to carry out a 
religious cleansing against Christians 
in Nigeria. Moreover, scholars have 
suggested that a correlation exists between 
religious persecution and terrorism in 
which such intolerance of other non-
Muslim religions breeds terrorist groups 
within that particular country. Numerous 
governments and non-governmental 
organisations and world leaders have 
condemned Boko Haram’s vicious attacks 
on churches and non-Muslims. Because 
of Boko Haram’s deadly targeting of 
non-Muslims or “infidels”, a number of 
organisations had filed a petition with the 
United States Secretary of State urging 
that Boko Haram is pronounced a foreign 
terrorist organisation. Boko Haram’s 
intense hatred for any other religion or 
even Islamic sect that does not conform 
to their radical beliefs was depicted on 
the Christmas Eve of 2003 when the 
organisation launched its first brutal attack 
against non-Muslims. Boko Haram has 
since evolved into a highly sophisticated, 
globally linked, suicide-bombing terrorist 
entity with global aspirations (Nees, 2013).
Human Rights Watch reported that 
the armed forces of Nigerian and other 
related governmental parastatals have 
employed the use of inhumane and 
degrading treatment, torture and extra-
judicial executions of civilians with the 
hope of combating terrorism in the country. 
Such acts are not in line with the principles 
entailed in the Convention Against Torture 
and the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights, as well as other 
relevant human rights principles provided 
in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), all of which Nigeria 
is party to without reservations. The 
Convention against Torture states that in 
all circumstances there shall be no use of 
torture and it particularly states in its Article 
10 that the internal political instability or 
any other public emergency that a country 
may be undergoing cannot be used as a 
form of justification for torture. Reports 
were also made against the security forces 
as they were found transferring some 
suspected members of the Boko Haram to 
places unknown to the general populace. 
Despite the provisions of Article 10 of 
the Convention Against Torture, which 
requires the Nigerian government to look 
into the above stated allegations against its 
armed forces and other security agencies, 
its government continues to disassociate 
herself from the allegations of crying foul 
of yellow journalism. The report of extra-
judicial executions such as execution of 
family members and other forms of mass 
executions have escalated since 2009. 
These executions of suspected members of 
the Boko Haram infringed upon the rights 
to life, due process, amongst other rights, 
which can be seen in most international 
human laws and treaties and are well 
incorporated into Chapter 4 of the 1999 
Constitution of the Nigerian. These reported 
activities of the Boko Haram members and 
the Nigerian security agencies also raise 
allegations of crimes against humanity. 
The Rome Statute of the International 
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Criminal Court, which Nigeria has ratified, 
codifies the substantive elements of 
crimes against humanity. Articles 7 of the 
Rome Statute give provisions that rape, 
persecution, acts of murder, torture, and 
enforced disappearances are crimes against 
humanity when as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack against civilian 
populations in furtherance of a State or 
organisational policy or plan. The October 
8 attack by Nigerian troops was reported to 
have targeted civilians and also there were 
widespread reports of disappearances, 
torture and extra-judicial executions 
carried out by the Nigerian government, 
which could implicate criminal charges 
against not only the Boko Haram but the 
Nigerian government as well before the 
ICC pending the unwillingness of the 
government to investigate into the situation 
in general (Addison, 2012).
EFFORTS BY THE NIGERIAN 
GOVERNMENT TO PROSECUTE 
THE TERRORISTS
According to the 2013 Report of the OTP 
Preliminary Examinations, the prosecutor 
to the International Criminal Court 
contended that the information available 
to the OTP indicated that the Nigerian 
government has been and are presently 
putting together proceedings against 
members of Boko Haram for crimes 
recognised under the Rome Statute. Also, 
the Nigerian authorities have provided a 
significant body of information on national 
proceedings, which the Office is analysing 
as part of its admissibility assessment 
(OTP 2013). It would have been that the 
OTP does not have the cooperation of the 
Nigerian Government but this is not the 
case as the OTP frequently visits the Office 
of the Attorney General of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria in order to get further 
assistance in getting more information 
about the situation regarding the insurgence 
of the Boko Haram. Non-governmental 
organisations, with offices around the 
country, are also on ground providing the 
OTP with the necessary information of 
all happenings regarding the Boko Haram 
and the evidences provided by the NGOs 
are corroborated by witnesses, victims are 
other stakeholders.
Also, a Federal High Court in Lagos 
headed by Justice Saliu Saidu on the 5th 
of November 2014, only a few days ago, 
sentenced a financier of the Boko Haram 
terrorist group to 10 years’ imprisonment 
with hard labour. The Boko Haram 
financier was among four suspects secretly 
tried before the judge by the Department 
of State Security (DSS). The suspects 
included Adamu Mohammed, Mohammed 
Mustapha, Bura Husseni and Mohammed 
Ibrahim (THISDAY 2014). Also in the 
same week, November 6, 2014, a Nigerian 
Senator by the name of Ali Ndume was 
linked to be a financer of the Boko Haram 
and was facing criminal charge before a 
Federal High Court in Abuja.
The major challenge faced by the OTP 
with regards to prosecuting members of the 
Boko Haram group is the determination 
of whether there is a genuine proceeding 
going on in Nigeria and also the OTP has 
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to give such a proceeding space to breathe 
before its genuineness can be determined 
(Hansen, 2012). The other challenge would 
be regarding the mechanisms for arrest, 
if it happens that the OTP has decided to 
prosecute certain members of the Boko 
Haram group. This problem of how to 
arrest perpetrators is a general obstacle that 
ICC faces in most of its cases and a very 
topical example is the inability of the ICC 
to arrest Al-Bashir, the President of Sudan.
CONCLUSION
The general situation in Nigeria came to the 
ICC in 2005; however, it is uncertain when 
exactly the particular situation relating 
to Boko Haram was brought into the 
preliminary examination process. The 2011 
Report on the Preliminary Examination 
Activities did not make any mention of 
Boko Haram situation though the terrorist 
group has been attacking since 2009.
The preliminary examinations started 
for the Boko Haram situation after 2011. 
Initially, the court was just considering the 
crimes against humanity in terms of murder 
and persecutions; in the 2013 report of the 
Office of the Prosecutor, it was stated that 
with the conflict between the Nigerian 
Armed Forces and the Boko Haram, the 
probability is that war crimes would have 
been committed. The abduction of over 240 
schoolgirls, crimes of enslavement, rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and 
forced pregnancy would have to be included 
in the preliminary examinations of the OTP.
The Office of the Prosecutor normally 
determines the jurisdiction and admissibility 
from the preliminary examination stage, 
notwithstanding the final say or upturn by 
the Pre-Trial Chambers who will decide 
whether the prosecutor should go ahead 
with full investigations or not, which will 
mean that the ICC has jurisdiction and 
admissibility over a particular situations 
once the Pre-Trial Chambers gives a go 
ahead for a full investigation.
At present, the Office of the Prosecutor 
is looking into the admissibility stage of 
the Boko Haram situation. It has already 
been determined that the International 
Criminal Court has temporal, territorial and 
material jurisdiction over the Boko Haram 
situation. Though the Pre-Trial Chambers 
can still overturn this assumption, it is 
unlikely that the report of the prosecutor 
will be overturned notwithstanding. The 
3rd stage of the preliminary examinations 
will require the fulfilment of the 
complementarity principle of whether 
the Nigerian government is conducting 
genuine proceedings in relation to those 
most responsible for such crimes, and 
whether the gravity of such crimes and the 
interest of the victims are being considered. 
The Nigerian government may pass 
the complementarity test of conducting 
national proceedings against members of 
Boko Haram but it seems nothing is being 
done to appease the victims of the crimes. 
The 2014 Report of the OTP’s activities, 
which is yet to be released, will determine 
whether the Boko Haram situation will be 
left to National prosecution or whether the 
Pre-Trial Chambers will order a full-blown 
investigation into the matter.
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The problem faced by the Office of the 
Prosecutor is not so much about who the 
perpetrators of crimes committed under 
the Rome Statute are in the case of Boko 
Haram and in most instances; it is that it 
is impossible for the ICC in general to 
arrest the perpetrators without the help of 
the government involved or other foreign 
security institutions.
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ABSTRACT
This article is a doctrinal legal research that employs comparative approach to analyse 
and explore employee whistleblower protection in Malaysia and Nigeria and under the 
common law as well. Employee whistleblowers who reported the misconduct of a fellow 
employee or superior within their organisation frequently face reprisal or retaliation, 
sometimes at the hands of the employer or the group which they have accused. While 
the article considered related instruments in the two countries under consideration in the 
analysis, the focus is on the Whistleblower Protection Act 2010 (WPA, 2010) and the 
Whistleblower Protection Bill 2011 (2011 Bill) in Malaysia and Nigeria, respectively. The 
article finds that the bulk of the present regime of whistleblower protection in Malaysia is 
contained in WPA 2010. The common law applies subject to the Act and other restrictions 
under the legal system of the country. In the case of Nigeria, on the other hand, as the 
2011 Bill is still pending, the common law applies generally in guiding whistleblower 
protection in the country. The article further finds that the concept of whistleblowing is 
wider in common law than under the WPA 2010 in Malaysia or the 2011 Bill in Nigeria. 
The conclusion of the article is that while legislation is desirable for the promotion of 
whistleblower protection in the countries under consideration to accord protection against 
the fluid position of common law, the 
legislation should not be unduly used to 
limit the scope of the protection such as in 
terms of defining the authorities to whom 
the disclosure is to be made as suggested 
by both the WPA 2010 and the 2011 Bill 
and classification of persons that can make 
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disclosure as in the 2011 Bill and which 
is not in line with the modern trends in 
whistleblowers protection.
Keywords: Whistleblower; disclosure of; protection; 
malpractices
INTRODUCTION
This article examines protection of 
employee whistleblower for disclosing 
wrongdoing as contained in the 
Whistleblower Protection Act 2010 
(WPA 2010) in Malaysia and the relevant 
instruments in Nigeria. It also surveys 
the position under the common law as 
applicable body of law in the two countries 
under consideration. The two countries, 
one African and the other Asian, were 
chosen for comparison due to a number of 
reasons bordering on their similarities and 
differences. In terms of the similarities, 
firstly, both countries belong to the 
common law world and are members of 
the commonwealth. Secondly, the legal 
system of both countries is pluralist, 
shaped by English law, Customary 
law and the Islamic law. However, the 
English law is the predominant law as 
far as the regulation of employment and 
industrial relations is concerned in the 
two countries. Thirdly, both countries are 
emerging economies that aspire to be one 
of the top players in the world economy in 
the near future. A country that seeks to be 
an important player in the world economy 
should of course ensure, among others, that 
her policies, laws and practices bearing on 
labour are robust, effective and efficient 
enough to attract both local and foreign 
investors. On the differences, Malaysia and 
Nigeria have different historical, cultural 
and socio-economic experiences. Though 
both countries are federal in structure with 
written constitutions, Malaysia operates 
the parliamentary system of government 
with constitutional monarchy, whereas 
Nigeria operates the presidential system of 
government. Unlike Nigeria, Malaysia has 
never experienced military rule and unitary 
system of government. Development of 
employment and industrial relations has been 
steady though slow in Malaysia compared 
to Nigeria due to a number of factors. The 
factors responsible for relatively more rapid 
development of employment and industrial 
relations in Nigeria than in Malaysia include 
ratification of all core International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) conventions by Nigeria, 
military intervention in Nigeria, drastic 
development in the area of employment 
and industrial relations in Nigeria ever since 
democracy was restored in the country 
in 1999. These developments include 
enactment of the National Industrial Court 
Act 2006, repeal and replacement of pension 
and workmen compensation legislations, 
amendment of Trade Unions legislation and 
amendment of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999 to constitutionally 
recognise National Industrial Court as a 
superior court of record. Despite these 
laudable developments in Nigeria, the 
country (unlike Malaysia), is yet to have 
a piece of legislation on the protection of 
whistleblowers. Such a legislation has a 
tremendous effect on modern employment 
and industrial relations.
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It is against this background that this 
article examines employee whistleblower 
protection in the two countries as part of 
their employment and industrial relations 
in a way. The article is concerned with 
an employee, about his or her legal and 
moral obligations to disclose or report 
wrongdoings perpetrated by co-employees 
or the employer. The wrongdoings may be 
in forms of non-observance of established 
rules, regulations, principles and standards 
in corporate affairs, which may result in 
fraud and other unlawful conducts and 
even crimes such as insider-trading, theft 
and maltreatment of corporate stakeholders 
including third party stakeholders. 
Emphasis however is placed on the 
protection of the employee from adverse 
treatment or victimisation as a result of the 
report or disclosure he or she makes.
The objectives of the article are 
three. The first objective is to explore 
employee whistleblower protection under 
the Malaysian and Nigerian laws, as well 
as the common law as a general law in 
the two countries. The second objective 
is to carry out comparative analysis on 
employee whistleblower protection in 
Malaysia and Nigeria to bring to light 
the similarities and differences in the two 
countries. The third objective is to proffer 
recommendations for the improvement of 
employee whistleblower protection in the 
two countries under consideration.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
The words ‘employee’, ‘whistleblower’, 
‘whistleblowing’, ‘disclosure’, ‘wrongdoing’ 
and ‘protection’ are essential to this 
discussion. It is imperative to explain these 
words and others related to them in the 
context of the discussion. This is to bring to 
light the ideas they convey to enable proper 
understanding of the analysis in the paper.
An employee is a counterparty in 
employer-employee relationship. Under 
the relationship, the employee provides 
dependent or subordinate labour for the 
employer as the other counterparty and 
receives wages in exchange. This unlike 
an independent labour provided by a self-
employed or an independent contractor 
under principal-independent contractor 
relationship for a consideration that bears 
nomenclatures such as fee or contract sum. 
The employer and employee relationship 
is distinguished from any other similar 
relationship including agency, bailment, 
trust, sale and partnership relationships based 
on the civil law distinction between contract 
of employment or contract of service, which 
is used to be known as ‘master and servant 
contract’ on one hand, and contract for 
services or contract of commission or trust 
on the other (Hanami, 1979, 31).
Section 2 of the Employment Act 1955 
(Act 265) of Malaysia and section 54(1) 
of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 
of Nigeria define the terms ‘employee’ 
and ‘employer’.  However, unlike the 
Whistleblower Protection Bill 2011 of 
Nigeria (2011 Bill), the Whistleblower 
Protection (Act 711) 2010 (WPA 2010) 
of Malaysia does not define the above 
two terms. Section 32 of the 2011 Bill 
defines employee to mean ‘a person who 
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works for another person, company or 
organisation or for the Federation and 
who is paid or entitled to be paid for 
organisation services rendered but does 
not include an independent contractor’. 
Definition of an employee in the bill is 
perhaps thought necessary because the bill 
expressly mentions employee as one of 
the persons qualified to make disclosure 
of impropriety. Definition of employee in 
the WPA 2010 is apparently unnecessary 
because the provisions dealing with 
persons entitled to make disclosure are not 
specified. As a corollary, the Bill defines 
an employer in the same section 32 to 
include ‘an individual, a body corporate or 
unincorporated of the Federation who or 
which engages the services of or provides 
work for any other person and pays for the 
services, and a person acting on behalf of 
or on the authority of the employer’.
Regarding whistleblowing, the term 
has been literally defined as ‘[exposing] 
something bad that someone is doing, 
especially by bringing it to the attention of 
other people’ (Cambridge, 2010, online). A 
whistleblower is thus ‘a person who informs 
people in authority or the public that the 
company they work for is doing [something] 
wrong or illegal’ (Oxford 2005, online). 
There may not be a universally acceptable 
definition of the terms ‘whistleblowing’ 
and ‘whistleblower’ from the legal point of 
view. This is because of the uncertainties 
surrounding them, especially when it 
comes to determination of circumstances 
protected by the whistleblowing law. 
While reference is made to some legally 
oriented attempts to define the terms to 
at least have working definitions, it is 
important to note that what is important 
is not the definitions of the terms but 
the definitions of the circumstances and 
conditions of whistleblowing which enable 
whistleblowers, particularly employee 
whistleblowers, the focus of this paper, 
to be entitled to legal protection as 
whistleblowers.
Whistleblowing seems to be legally 
and technically defined in the following 
statements: ‘the reporting of a wrongdoing 
that needs to be corrected or terminated 
in order to protect public interest’ (Asian 
Institute of Management, 2006, 15); ‘a 
colloquial term usually applied to the 
raising of concerns by one member of 
an organisation about the conduct or 
competence of another member of the 
organisation or about the activities of the 
organisation itself’ (Dehn, 2003); ‘passing 
on information from a conviction that it 
should be passed on despite (not because of) 
the embarrassment it could cause to those 
implicated’ (Gilan, 2003, 37). Whistleblowing 
has recently started to be viewed as a culture. 
It involves ‘a culture that encourages the 
challenge of inappropriate behaviour at all 
levels’ (Cm 6407, Tenth Report, 2005). It is 
a culture of raising concern by a member of 
staff about wrongdoing or misdeed taking 
place in his place of work (Shipman’s Inquiry, 
2005).
Regarding whistleblowers, they are 
described as persons (usually workers) who 
at their own risk, having been ‘motivated 
by a sense of personal, and/or public duty, 
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may expose what they perceive as specific 
instances of wrongdoing, which may be 
within the private and/or public sector’ (Gilan, 
2003). Broadly speaking, whistleblowers 
are those persons who speak out publicly 
or to prescribed authorities concerning 
wrongdoing detrimental to the public which 
manifests in any way. The wrongdoing 
may be in private or public sector. It may 
be perpetrated by a current or ex-employee 
of the organisation concerned or even by a 
member of the public who does not have 
any relationship with that organisation. The 
wrongdoing may cut across public wrongs 
(crimes) and civil wrongs ranging from 
financial scandal or cheat, corruption or 
mismanagement to health and safety issues 
that may bring about decline or total collapse 
of the organisation or an immeasurable 
danger to the public, if not checked.
It is instructive to note here from 
the definitions of ‘whistleblowing’ and 
‘whistleblower’ given that they tend to focus 
on employee whistleblower. Other possible 
whistleblowers are reflected only when the 
definitions are couched in broad terms. It is also 
important to note from the definitions that the 
wrongdoing contemplated may take various 
forms that are open ended. The wrongdoing 
is apparently perpetrated by insiders to the 
organisation. It can also involve outsiders 
where the insiders connive with them to 
perpetrate the wrongdoing. Wrongdoing may 
be harmful to the organisation concerned and/
or the general public. Serious wrongdoings 
or even minor wrongdoings perpetrated 
over time may result in loss of reputation, 
competitiveness, diminished productivity 
and even ultimate failure and collapse on 
the part of an organisation. The negative 
impact of wrongdoing on the public may 
manifest in many forms such as low quality 
or even harmful goods and services and 
unemployment with its accompanying social 
evils.
Indeed, the term ‘wrongdoing’ is so 
central to the issue of whistleblowing that 
it features in attempts to define the terms 
‘whistleblowing’ and ‘whistleblowers’ 
including those considered above. The 
concept of whistleblowing itself is 
basically about control of wrongdoing. 
The term ‘wrongdoing’ is therefore 
defined in both the WPA 2010 and the 
2011 Bill. The instruments however 
adopt other nomenclatures rather than the 
term ‘wrongdoing’. The term ‘improper 
conduct’ is used in section 2 of WPA 2010 
as equivalent to the term ‘wrongdoing’ 
and central term in the definition of 
whistleblower to mean ‘any conduct which 
if proved, constitutes a disciplinary offence 
or a criminal office’. Section 2 of the WPA 
2010 therefore defines a ‘whistleblower’ 
as ‘any person who makes a disclosure 
of improper conduct to the enforcement 
agency under section 6’. On the other 
hand, the equivalent of the term ‘improper 
conduct’ in the WPA 2010 is ‘impropriety’ 
in the 2011 Bill. Impropriety is defined in 
section 1(2) of the Bill as ‘a conduct which 
falls within any of the matters specified 
in subsection (1).’ A whistleblower is 
therefore defined in section 1(3) of the 2011 
Bill as ‘a person who makes a disclosure of 
impropriety.’
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It is instructive to note that in the 
definition of whistleblower in both the 
WPA 2010 and the 2011 Bill, the term 
‘disclosure’ appears. This shows that 
the term is central to the definition of 
whistleblower. It is equivalent to the term 
‘reporting’ that features in the non-statutory 
definitions of ‘whistleblowing’ and 
‘whistleblower’ as considered earlier. The 
disclosure or reporting by a whistleblower 
in the context of whistleblowing is therefore 
that of wrongdoing, ‘improper conduct’ 
or ‘impropriety’. As a corollary, the term 
‘law’ used in the title of this topic signifies 
the legal protection of whistleblowers 
for whistle-blowing in disclosing or 
reporting wrongdoing, improper conduct 
or impropriety as the case may be in the 
jurisdictions under consideration, namely, 
Malaysia and Nigeria.
THEORETICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
Whistleblowing policy or mechanism is 
used by modern organisations as part of 
their internal control system to prevent 
or mitigate wrongdoings arising from 
conflicts of interest so as to achieve good 
corporate governance practices (Meng 
& Fook, 2011). Agency theory foresees 
conflicts of interest in the running of affairs 
of corporate entities and thus advocates 
for mechanisms that will ensure that such 
conflicts are prevented or minimized. 
Therefore, whistleblowing mechanism, 
among other corporate mechanisms, is 
put in place to ensure that wrongdoings 
arising from conflicts of interest in the 
running of the affairs of corporate bodies 
are prevented or mitigated. The classical 
agency theory foresees conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders of 
companies. It presumes tension between 
shareholders and corporate managers 
and presupposes control mechanisms 
in the running of companies. The basic 
assumption of the classical agency theory 
is that managers will act opportunistically 
to further their own interest before that of 
the shareholders (Tsegba, 2011). By the 
modern approach to agency theory, conflicts 
of interest do not only arise between 
shareholders and managers of companies. 
They also exist among shareholders, 
particularly between majority and minority 
shareholders, and between the corporate 
entity and other stakeholders of the entity 
such as employees, creditors, customers 
and even the public at large (Kraakman et 
al., 2009, 2). Whistleblowing mechanism 
is designed not only to protect the interest 
of particular corporate stakeholders such as 
shareholders or employees but the public 
interest at large in both private sector and 
public sector organisations. Disclosure 
by an employee whistleblower may be 
about a wrongdoing that is injurious to the 
public at large as opposed to a wrongdoing 
against employees as a class of corporate 
stakeholders or any other particular class of 
the stakeholders. Employee whistleblowers 
serve public interest in drawing the attention 
of the authorities to corporate wrongdoing 
being perpetrated against public interest so 
that proper action can be taken to stop it and 
prevent future occurrence (Apinega, 2015).
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This article is a doctrinal legal research 
that employs comparative approach to 
examine protection of an employee against 
disclosure of the employer’s corrupt acts 
or any form of malpractices such as fraud, 
health and safety violations or any acts 
that are injurious to certain persons or 
the organisation in general. The analysis 
of primary and secondary sources of law 
from the jurisdictions under consideration, 
Malaysia and Nigeria; the primary sources 
are statutes and cases/common law whereas 
the secondary sources are the articles and 
text books  explaining the primary sources 
as used in the article.
WHISTLEBLOWING UNDER THE 
WPA 2010 AND THE 2011 BILL
As highlighted in the preamble to the Act, 
the WPA 2010 provides for whistleblower 
protection and for other incidental 
matters. The preamble describes the 
Act as “An Act to combat corruption 
and other wrongdoings by encouraging 
and facilitating disclosures of improper 
conduct in the public and private sector, to 
protect persons making those disclosures 
from detrimental action, to provide for 
the matters disclosed to be investigated 
and dealt with and to provide for other 
matters connected therewith”. The Act is 
divided into seven (7) parts: preliminary; 
administration; whistleblower protection; 
dealing with disclosure of improper 
conduct; complaints of detrimental action 
and remedies; enforcement, offences and 
penalties; and general.
On the other hand, the preamble to 
the 2011 Bill describes the bill as a bill 
for “An Act to provide for the manner 
in which individuals may in the public 
interest disclose information that relates to 
unlawful or other illegal conduct or corrupt 
practices of others; to provide for the 
protection against victimisation of persons 
who make these disclosures; to provide 
for a fund to reward individuals who make 
the disclosures and to provide for related 
matters”. The Bill is subdivided into six (6) 
parts: protected disclosure; procedures for 
disclosure; action by person who receives 
disclosure of impropriety; protection of 
whistleblowers; offences and penalties; 
and miscellaneous.
However, it should be noted at this 
juncture that direct and indirect provisions 
relating to whistleblowers have existed in 
the Malaysian and Nigerian body of law 
and practiced long before the enactment of 
the WPA 2010 and emergence of the 2011 
Bill, respectively.
In the case of Malaysia, provisions in 
the Companies Act 1965 (CA 1965) and 
Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 
(CMSA 2007) illustrate pre-WPA 2010 
whistleblower protection in the country. 
Section 368B(1) of CA 1965 provides 
that an officer of a company who has 
reasonable belief of any matter which may 
or will constitute a breach of CA 1965 
or its regulations may report the matter 
in writing to the Registrar of Companies 
(the Registrar). The company concerned 
is prohibited by section 368B(2) from 
removing, demoting, discriminating 
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or interfering with the officer’s lawful 
employment due to the report the officer 
made to the Registrar. Legal action or 
tribunal process cannot be taken against 
an officer who makes a report to the 
Registrar in good faith. The CMSA 2007 
contains similar provisions in section 321. 
However, the provisions in section 321 of 
the CMSA 2007 limits the protection to a 
chief executive, internal auditor, company 
secretary or any officer responsible for 
preparing or approving financial statements 
or information who makes the disclosure 
to the Securities Commission or the stock 
exchange of any information relating to the 
breach of any provision in the securities 
law or rules of the stock exchange or 
any matter which adversely affects the 
financial position of a listed corporation 
to a material extent and other provisions 
in other legislations on whistleblower 
protection are now complemented for 
example, sections 320 and 321 of the 
Capital Market and Services Act 2007 are 
now supplemented by the WPA 2010.
On the other hand, in the case of 
Nigeria, whistleblowing provisions have 
existed in one form or the other. The 
provisions of the Freedom of Information 
Act 2011 (FIA 2011) and that of some codes 
of corporate governance in the country bear 
on whistleblowing. Section 28 of the FIA 
2011 provides that: (1) Notwithstanding 
anything contained in the Criminal Code, 
Penal Code, the Official Secrets Act, or 
any other enactment, no civil or criminal 
proceedings shall lie against an officer of 
any public institution, or against any person 
acting on behalf of a public institution, and 
no proceedings shall lie against such persons 
thereof, for the disclosure in good faith of 
any information, or any part thereof pursuant 
to this Act, for any consequences that flow 
from that disclosure, or for the failure to 
give any notice required under this Act, if 
care is taken to give the required notice. (2) 
Nothing contained in the Criminal Code or 
the Official Secrets Act shall prejudicially 
affect any public officer who, without 
authorisation discloses to any person, any 
information which he reasonably believes 
to show: (a) a violation of any law, rule or 
regulation; (b) mismanagement, gross waste 
of funds, fraud, and abuse of authority; 
or (c) a substantial and specific danger to 
public health or safety notwithstanding that 
such information was not disclosed pursuant 
to the provision of this Act. (3) No civil or 
criminal proceedings shall lie against any 
person receiving the information or further 
disclosing it.
It is clear from the above section 
28 of the FIA 2011 that the protection 
provided is limited to public officers and 
to the disciplinary or judicial actions they 
may be otherwise liable under relevant 
instruments. Reprisal or retaliatory actions 
by employers or senior officers against the 
public officers are not envisaged by the 
section or the FIA 2011 as a whole. It is 
the retaliatory actions that place in forms 
of harassment, discrimination and other 
similar acts that are contemplated under 
whistleblower policy or mechanism.
While the FIA 2011 provides for some 
limited whistleblower protection and in an 
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indirect way, article 6.1.12 of Central Bank 
of Nigeria Code of Corporate Governance 
for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation 
2006 and article 32 of Code of Corporate 
Governance for Public Companies in 
Nigeria 2011 (SEC Code 2011) expressly 
provide for whistleblowing policy. For 
example, article 32.1 of the SEC Code 
2011 provides that “companies should 
have a whistleblowing policy which should 
be known to employees, stakeholders such 
as contractors, shareholders, job applicants 
and the general public. It is the responsibility 
of the Board to implement such a policy 
and to establish a whistleblowing 
mechanism for reporting any illegal or 
substantial unethical behaviour”. By article 
32.2, “the whistleblowing mechanism 
should be accorded priority and the Board 
should also reaffirm continually its support 
for and commitment to the company’s 
whistleblower protection mechanism”. 
Article 32.3 further requires that “the 
whistleblowing mechanism should include 
a dedicated “hot-line” or e-mail system 
which could be used anonymously to report 
unethical practices. A designated senior 
level officer should review the reported 
cases and initiate appropriate action, if 
necessary at the level of the Board or CEO/
MD to redress the situation. By article 
32.4, “the designated senior level officer 
assigned to review reported cases should 
provide the chairman of the audit committee 
with a summary of reported cases, cases 
investigated, the process of investigation 
and the result of the investigation”.
It is instructive to note that the above 
article 32 which provides for whistleblowing 
policy in the SEC Code 2011 merely makes 
recommendation for companies to have 
whistleblowing policies and establish and 
maintain whistleblowing mechanisms. The 
article is silent on whistleblower protection 
against reprisals or retaliatory actions 
by employers or senior officers of the 
companies let alone the agency to which 
the whistleblower may report to where he 
or she suffers victimisation.
It is pertinent to consider the following 
questions:
(i)  the person who can make 
disclosure of wrongdoing;
(ii)  the basis to make disclosure; and
(iii)  conditions for whistleblowing 
protection.
In relation to the above question (i), the 
WPA 2010 does not limit who can make 
disclosures. This suggests that any person 
can make a disclosure provided that he 
or she satisfies the conditions discussed 
under question (ii). The 2011 Bill however, 
does make classifications as to persons 
who can make the disclosure. Section 
2 of the Bill provides that “disclosure 
of impropriety may be made-(a) by an 
employee in respect of an employer,(b) 
by an employee in respect of another 
employee, or (c) by a person in respect of 
another person, or an institution”. It can be 
said that this classification by the 2011 Bill 
to single out employees in items (a) and 
(b) is not necessary since item (c) suggests 
that any person can make a disclosure. 
Perhaps the classification is deemed 
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necessary to emphasize the significant 
role of employees in whistleblowing as 
insiders are the ones presumed to be better 
informed about any wrongdoings that 
may be perpetrated in their organisations, 
either by co-employees or some other 
persons. The non-classification in the WPA 
2010 is in line with modern trends. Many 
definitions relating to whistleblowing 
and whistleblowers including some of 
those the authors considered in part two 
of this paper suggests that the person 
reporting or disclosing the wrongdoing 
to be employee or ex-employee of the 
organisation concerned and not a journalist 
or even ordinary member of the society. 
The modern approach as reflected in many 
whistleblowing protection statutes across 
jurisdictions is to consider any person a 
whistleblower by his or her actions, not 
necessarily identified by the organisation 
concerned in any way (Meng & Fook, 
2011).
Meanwhile, in answering the second 
question on the condition of making 
disclosure, section 6 of the WPA 2010 
provides that:
 “(1) A person may make a disclosure of 
improper conduct to any enforcement 
agency based on his reasonable 
belief that any person has engaged, is 
engaging or is preparing to engage in 
improper conduct: Provided that such 
disclosure is not specifically prohibited 
by any written law. (2) A disclosure of 
improper conduct under subsection (1) 
may also be made: (a) although the 
person making the disclosure is not able 
to identify a particular person to which 
the disclosure relates; (b) although the 
improper conduct has occurred before 
the commencement of this Act; (c) in 
respect of information acquired by him 
while he was an officer of a public body 
or an officer of a private body; or (d) 
of any improper conduct of a person 
while that person was an officer of a 
public body or an officer of a private 
body. (3) A disclosure of improper 
conduct under subsection (1) may be 
made orally or in writing provided that 
the authorized officer, upon receiving 
any disclosure made orally, shall as 
soon as it is practicable, reduce it 
into writing. (4) A disclosure made 
in relation to a member of Parliament 
or a State Legislative Assembly shall 
not amount to a breach of privilege. 
(5) Any provision in any contract of 
employment shall be void in so far as 
it purports to preclude the making of a 
disclosure of improper conduct.
It would be appropriate to set out 
herein the counterpart provisions in the 
2011 Bill and thereafter discuss the two 
sets of provisions together. Section 1(1) of 
the Bill provides that:
 “A person may make a disclosure of 
information where that person has 
reasonable cause to believe that the 
information tends to show- (a) an 
economic crime has been committed, is 
about to be committed or is likely to be 
committed; (b) another person has not 
complied with a law or is in the process 
of breaking a law or is likely to break 
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a law which imposes an obligation on 
that person; (c) a miscarriage of justice 
has occurred, is occurring or is likely 
to occur; (d) in a public institution 
there has been, there is or there is 
likely to be waste, misappropriation or 
mismanagement of public resources; 
(e) the environment has been degraded, 
is being degraded or is likely to be 
degraded; or (f) the health or safety 
of an individual or a community is 
endangered, has been endangered or is 
likely to be endangered.”
Both the provisions of the WPA 2010 
and the 2011 Bill are detailed and extensive. 
The basis for making disclosure in the 
WPA 2010 as stated above is “reasonable 
belief that any person has engaged, is 
engaging or is preparing to engage in 
improper conduct” and in the 2011 Bill 
as also stated above is “reasonable cause 
to belief”. The phrases “reasonable belief” 
and “reasonable cause to believe” mean 
the same thing. Whether or not disclosure 
can be made in a given circumstances has 
been made open to subjectivity. It is for the 
court to ultimately determine whether or 
not there is ground for making disclosure 
in a given case. Unfortunately, there are no 
direct judicial authorities explaining the 
phrases in the context of whistleblowing 
in the jurisdictions under consideration 
namely, Malaysia and Nigeria. However, 
cases decided in other contexts determining 
similar phrases would be useful. For 
example, cases decided in determining 
what constitutes “reasonable suspicion” to 
allow an arrest in the context of criminal 
law would be useful. Cases considered in 
the discussion below on the position of 
common law would also be relevant. In 
a nutshell, to justify disclosure in all the 
circumstances highlighted in the above 
two instruments, the basis is “reasonable 
belief” or “reasonable cause to believe”, 
respectively.
In relation to question (iii) above, 
it is a condition for the enjoyment of 
whistleblower protection under the WPA 
2010 and the 2011 Bill by virtue of section 
2 and section 3 respectively that the report 
of the wrongdoing must be made to the 
appropriate authorities.
Upon satisfaction of the requirements 
discussed above relating to corporate 
wrongdoing and its disclosure, the 
whistleblower of a corporate wrongdoing 
would be entitled to whistleblower 
protection under the WPA 2010 and the 
2011 Bill. By the provisions of section 
2 of the WPA 2010, it is a protection 
against detrimental action that includes: 
(a) action causing injury, loss or damage; 
(b) intimidation or harassment; (c) 
interference with the lawful employment 
or livelihood of any person, including 
discrimination, discharge, demotion, 
suspension, disadvantage, termination or 
adverse treatment in relation to a person’s 
employment, career, profession, trade 
or business or the taking of disciplinary 
action; and (d) a threat to take any of the 
actions referred to in paragraphs (a) to 
(c)”. On the other hand, sections 8, 9 and 
11 of the 2011 Bill provides for protection 
of whistleblowers to include protection 
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against victimization, court actions and 
application to court for assistance. The 
basic concern of most whistleblowers is 
how they can be protected against reprisals 
by their employers, reprisals in the form 
of unfair dismissal, job reassignment, pay 
cuts or loss of promotion. The WPA 2010 
envisages such reprisals and thus provides 
that a worker should not be subjected to 
any detriment by reason of his disclosure 
as highlighted above.
THE COMMON LAW POSITION
The common law perceives the employer 
and employee relationship as ‘fiduciary’ in 
nature. There is an implied duty of fidelity 
and loyalty and secrecy owed by every 
employee to his employer. It requires that 
the employee must have undivided or 
utmost loyalty to the employer. By reasons 
of the fiduciary relations, the employee 
is required to render good and faithful 
service to the employer or duty of fidelity 
- a term which was recognised by the 
English Court of Appeal (Lamb v Evans, 
1893). Since its inception, the duty of 
fidelity had been applied in many different 
circumstances. For example, the duty of 
the employee to render faithful and loyal 
service towards the employer; the duty to 
obey the lawful and legitimate instructions 
of the employer; duty to exert reasonable 
degree of competence and skill; duty to 
protect employer’s property and exercising 
trust placed on him by the employer; the 
duty not to dishonestly secure benefits at 
the employer’s expense; the duty not to 
accept commission, bribe and not to work 
in the spare time with a competitor of the 
original employer (Ashgar Ali, 2005, xxi). 
The employee is also under a duty not to 
disclose confidential information acquired 
during the course of employment (Agomo, 
2011, 122; Ahmad, 2012, 57-60).
Apart from the above, it is also a 
fundamental duty for the employee to obey 
all the lawful and reasonable orders and 
instructions of the employer. The employee 
is not entitled to disobey the order of his 
superior. Any refusal or disobedience of an 
order or instruction of a superior “will bring 
a chaotic situation to any organization in 
terms of discipline, performance as well 
as industrial peace (Ngeow Voon Yean’s 
v Sungei Wang Plaza Sdn Bhd & Anor, 
2004). “Wilful disobedience of a lawful 
and reasonable order shows a disregard 
– a complete disregard – of a condition 
essential to the contract of service, namely 
the condition that the servant must obey the 
proper orders of the master, and that unless 
he does so the relationship is, so to speak, 
struck at fundamentally” (Laws v London 
Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers) Ltd., 
1959).
However, a dismissal allegedly on 
grounds of the employee’s refusal or failure 
to obey an illegal order of the superior would 
be deemed unlawful. In JT International 
Trading Sdn. Bhd. v Mat Kamel Jusoh & 
Ors, it was stated: “Obedience to the orders 
of a supervisor is not without limits and 
hence it is not a defence for an employee to 
carry out any act instructed by a supervisor 
that is illegal or unlawful”. For example, in 
Morrish v Henlys (Folkestone) Ltd (1973), 
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the refusal to obey the superior order to 
falsify the account books at the garage 
where he worked was held not to be in 
breach of the contract. Again, in Gregory 
v Ford (1951), the refusal of the employee 
to take on the road a vehicle not covered 
by third party insurance was again held not 
to be in breach of the contract. It must be 
noted that in relation to an employee who 
was sick, he will only be excused from 
performing orders rendered impossible by 
the illness (Marshall v Alexander Sloan & 
Co Ltd., 1981).
Reverting back to the duty of 
fidelity, and in the context of confidential 
information, the duty of fidelity requires 
an employee not to disclose confidential 
information of the employer to a third 
party nor use the information obtained 
in the course of his or her employment 
to the detriment of the employer. The 
contract of employment would normally 
contain provision restraining the employee 
from misusing or disclosing confidential 
information of the company, its dealings, 
transactions and financial matters after 
the employment relationship has ended 
(Fong Kah Chan v Ibuzawa Corporation 
Sdn. Bhd., 2010).The above is also implied 
in the contract of employment (Schmidt 
Scientific Sdn Bhd v Ong Han Suan, 1997). 
In other words, it may be expressed or 
implied in the contract of employment 
that the employee shall not reveal any of 
the employer’s confidential information 
or trade secret to any third party without 
prior approval in writing from the company 
(Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fourler, 1987; 
Merry Weather v Moore, 1892; Universal 
Thermosensors Ltd v Hibben & Others, 
1992]). The employer has the right to 
restrain an employee (Patrick Chin Beng 
Chew v Time Dotcom Berhad, 2009) or 
its former employee from misusing the 
confidential information acquired while 
in employment for his own benefit or 
divulging the confidential information 
to others (Chuk Chin Leong v Milimewa 
Superstore Sdn Bhd [2009; Tiu Shi Kian 
& Anor v Red Rose Restaurant Sdn Bhd 
[1984] 1 CLJ 325; Tiu Shi Kian & Anor 
v Red Rose Restaurant SdnBhd [1984] 1 
CLJ 325 Hotel Jaya Puri Bhd v National 
Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers 
& Anor [1979] 1 LNS 32).
Any violation thereof would enable 
the employer to obtain legal redress and 
this includes an injunction to restrain the 
employee from disclosing or disseminating 
the employer’s confidential business 
information and trade secrets. It is worth 
mentioning that the information that the 
employer sought to be protected must be 
confidential in nature. “What makes it 
confidential is the fact that the maker 
of the document has used his brain and 
thus produced a result which can only be 
produced by somebody who goes through 
the same process” (Saltman Engineering 
Co. Ltd, and Others v Campbell 
Engineering Co. Ltd., 1963). In relation to 
the obligation of a recipient of information, 
Megarry J in Coco v Clark (1969) noted 
that “if the circumstances are such that 
any reasonable man standing in the shoes 
of the recipient of the information would 
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have realised that upon the information 
was being given to him in confidence, then 
this should suffice to impose upon him the 
equitable obligation of confidence”.
It must be added that the employees’ 
duty of fidelity or the contractual duty 
of confidentiality may be lifted in very 
exceptional circumstances for example 
where the disclosure is made in the interest 
of the public. Information concerning 
wrongdoings in the work place such as 
pilfering or misusing company’s funds and 
gross mismanagement, by the company’s 
senior executive, may be disclosed 
when the employee has reasonable 
grounds to believe that such wrong has 
been committed. This exception applies 
notwithstanding it is not expressly stated 
in the contract of employment (Initial 
Services Ltd v. Putterill and Anor, 1968). 
In Gartside v Outram (1856), Wood VC 
states that “there is no confidence as to the 
disclosure of inequity”. However, certain 
requirements has to be observed before the 
disclosure could be made, i.e. the disclosure 
is done in good faith, with a reasonable 
belief that the information to be disclosed 
is substantially true and that the disclosure 
must be done to the right person or body 
in the organisation for example, health 
and safety issues to the health and safety 
executive. The employees are encouraged 
to follow their organisation’s internal 
procedures for reporting of a wrongdoing.
It is worth noting that in Houlihan v 
Douglas College Students’ Society (2002), 
a Canadian case, it was held inter alia, that 
an employee owes a general duty to the 
employer to report the fellow employee’s 
wrongdoing. In that case, the manager 
was found to be in breach of her duty of 
faithfulness when she failed to disclose 
to the employer of a suspected theft by 
a subordinate employee. In particular, it 
was stated that “by keeping silent about 
acts that may amount to dishonesty so as 
to protect other employees, she misled her 
employer and breached the faith interest 
to the work relationship”. An employee 
who comes forward reporting a fellow 
employee’s wrongdoing must be treated 
fairly and protected from reprisals such as 
dismissal, lay-offs, suspension, demotion 
or transfer, discontinuation or elimination 
of a job, change of work location, reduction 
in wages, changes in hours of work or a 
reprimand, among others.
CONCLUSION
It is undeniable fact that whistleblowing 
plays a positive function in enhancing 
accountability, transparency and good 
governance in any organization and the 
elaborate legislative regimes is aimed 
at deterring reprisals. In Malaysia the 
WPA 2010 is the applicable law as far as 
whistleblowers protection is concerned. 
The applicable rules in common law will 
apply in the country subject to the WPA 
2010. Iin the case of Nigeria, however, 
the rules of applicable common law in the 
country apply in relation to the subject as 
the 2011 Bill is yet to be passed into law. 
The WPA 2010 and the 2011 Bill seek 
to concretize whistleblowers protection 
in the respective countries including in 
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relation to employees. However, defining 
the authorities to whom the disclosure is 
to be made as in both the WPA 2010 and 
the 2011 Bill and classification of persons 
that can make disclosure as in the 2011 Bill 
suggest restrictions on the protection. While 
legislations are desirable for the promotion 
of whistleblower protection and to address 
the fluid position of the common law on 
the issue, they should not be unduly used 
to limit the scope of the protection. We 
therefore recommend review of the WPA 
2010 to remove the unnecessary restrictions 
and the passage of revised 2011 Bill that is 
free from restrictions including unnecessary 
classification of persons that can make 
disclosures which is not in line with the 
modern trends in whistleblower protection.
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ABSTRACT 
The governing law on the administration of estate in Malaysia requires an appointment 
of a personal representative before a deceased’s estate can be dealt with. The personal 
representative acts as a fiduciary and is empowered to take possession and control over of 
the estate. However, in the hands of an unscrupulous personal representative, the estate 
might be dishonestly used or misappropriated. In such a case, the personal representative 
could be charged for criminal breach of trust, as provided by the Malaysian Penal Code 
and would therefore be punished with imprisonment, whipping and fine. This article 
aims to examine whether such punishment is adequate in regulating the conducts of the 
personal representative and remedying the estate beneficiaries against the misconducts 
of such personal representative. The study adopts a doctrinal analysis by examining the 
existing primary and secondary materials including statutory provisions as provided in 
the Probate and Administration Act 1959 (Act 97) and the Penal Code (Act 574), case 
law and other legal and non-legal literature relating to the adequacy of the relevant law. 
The article finds that once the estate has been misappropriated, charging the personal 
representative and punishing him for criminal breach of trust are inadequate and will 
not give much benefit to the estate beneficiaries. The punishment should be extended to 
depriving the personal representative of his own property so that the rights of the estate 
beneficiaries as the vulnerable party are 
better protected.
Keywords: Criminal breach of trust, estate 
beneficiaries, deceased’s estate, breach of fiduciary 
duty, personal representative, remedy
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INTRODUCTION
The administration of a deceased’s estate 
can be a trying process especially for 
those grieving. This is due to the fact that 
before the estate could be distributed to 
the beneficiaries, it has to be managed and 
administered for the purpose of paying 
all debts and liabilities of the deceased. 
Estate administration, as perceived by the 
Malaysian law, incorporates the need for the 
appointment of a personal representative. 
Once appointed, the personal representative 
is charged with great trust to ensure that the 
rights of the estate beneficiaries are well 
protected and preserved. In this context, 
the personal representative’s duties and 
estate beneficiaries’ rights can be said as 
to be akin to two sides of the same coin. 
The personal representative owes duties 
to uphold the beneficial interests of the 
beneficiaries. He is assigned with the tasks 
of gathering and taking possession and 
control of the assets of the estate, protecting 
and prudently investing those assets 
during administration and identifying 
the enforceable and payable debts and 
obligations of the deceased person. Sidhu 
(2005) stated that the main duties of a 
personal representative are to collect all 
debts due to the estate, pay all the debts 
and satisfy all the liabilities of the estate, 
and convert unauthorised investments into 
authorised ones.
The capacity to hold property is co-
extensive with the ability of the personal 
representative to become a trustee and 
a fiduciary to the deceased’s estate 
beneficiaries (Raman, 2012; Sidhu, 
2005; Sundrum, 2012), and is therefore 
duty bound to observe fiduciary duties 
in carrying out his duties. Acting as a 
trustee basically means that the personal 
representative must act in a fiduciary 
capacity by putting the interest of the 
estate beneficiaries beyond his own interest 
(Ahmad & Andrews, 2005; George, 2005; 
Haley &McMurtry, 2011; Hingun & 
Ahmad, 2013). Being arrayed with twofold 
character of trusteeship and fiduciary, the 
misconducts of unscrupulous personal 
representative would make him subject to 
potential liabilities and accountabilities. 
As a fiduciary serving as an executor or a 
trustee at that particular time, the notion of 
the beneficiaries’ vulnerability at the hands 
of the personal representative cum fiduciary 
is of an essence. Finn (1989) and Shepherd 
(1981) suggested that a person will be a 
fiduciary in his relationship with another 
when and insofar as that other is entitled 
to expect that he will act in  that other’s or 
in their joint interest to the exclusion of his 
own several interests.
In carrying out all those duties, the 
personal representative is vested with wide-
ranging power to deal with the deceased’s 
estate. Undeniably, in the hands of an 
unscrupulous personal representative, the 
estate might be misappropriated or misused. 
The estate beneficiaries, on the other hand, 
are powerless in assuming control or 
ensuring comprehensive monitoring over 
this matter due to their lack of authority to 
deal with such estate as they actually stand 
at the mercy of the personal representative 
(Nor Azlina & Akmal Hidayah, 2013). The 
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outcome of this disparity in power relations 
creates the likelihood that the personal 
representative may abuse his position 
for personal gain or gain of third parties. 
Hence, the adequacy of the governing 
law in remedying the estate beneficiaries 
against the acts of unscrupulous personal 
representative needs to be examined so that 
the rights of the estate beneficiaries would 
not be adversely affected.
METHODOLOGY
With enormous powers conferred by the 
law, the personal representative steps into 
the shoes of the deceased and takes over 
the deceased’s rights as the owner of the 
property. It is obvious that whenever one 
person has an effective control of property 
but is required to act for the benefit of another, 
there is a possibility that he will misuse the 
power that he holds (Pearce, Stevens, & Barr, 
2010). Thus, one of the most common areas 
of conflict in the administration of estate is 
the failure of the personal representative to 
properly administer the estate and discharge 
his office accordingly.
In this regard, it is often perceived 
that a breach of trust or misappropriation 
of property by the personal representative 
is a civil matter, which is actually an 
inaccurate perception. This is because the 
Malaysian Penal Code has illustrated that 
the misconducts of a personal representative 
may also amount to a criminal breach of trust. 
In such a case, the personal representative is 
not only liable under civil action but could 
also be charged for criminal breach of trust 
as provided by the Penal Code.
Hence, this article seeks to examine 
the offence of criminal breach of trust 
by the personal representative in the 
administration of the deceased’s estate. 
The discussion includes an analysis of 
the powers and duties of the personal 
representative, the personal representative 
as fiduciary, the offence of criminal breach 
of trust and the adequacy of its punishment 
in remedying the estate beneficiaries. The 
article excludes the discussion on the 
method of estate distribution either by will 
or Distribution Act 1958 and the rules of 
faraid for the non-Muslims and Muslims 
respectively as the offence of criminal 
breach of trust is normally committed 
before the deceased’s estate could actually 
be distributed.
For the purpose of the discussion, 
the article adopts the doctrinal analysis 
by examining the existing primary and 
secondary materials including statutory 
provisions as provided by the Probate and 
Administration Act 1959 (Act 97) and the 
Penal Code (Act 574), as well as case law 
and other legal and non-legal literatures 
relating to the case of criminal breach of 
trust by the personal representative to the 
deceased’s estate.
DISCUSSION
The area of administration of estate in 
West Malaysia is currently governed by 
various statutes of general application that 
are applicable to both Muslims and non-
Muslims, namely, the Rules of Court 2012, 
Probate and Administration Act 1959, 
Small Estates (Distribution) Act 1955 and 
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Public Trust Corporation Act 1995. The 
jurisdiction to deal with the administration 
of estate lies with three different 
backgrounds of administrative bodies, 
namely, the High Court, the Small Estate 
Distribution Section under the Department 
of Director General of Lands and Mines and 
the Public Trust Corporation, depending on 
the type of estate left by the deceased.
The administration of estate by 
the High Court involves the grants of 
representation to the two classes of 
representatives, namely, executor and 
administrator. Probate and Administration 
Act 1959, the principal statute affecting 
estate administration in Malaysia, provides 
that:
 “personal representatives means the 
executor, original or by representation, 
or administrator for the time being 
of a deceased person, and as regards 
any liability for the payment of death 
duties includes any person who takes 
possession of or intermeddles with 
the property of a deceased person 
without the authority of the personal 
representatives or the Court”.
The difference of the two classes, 
namely, executor and administrator, is 
based on the nature of their appointment. 
Executor is normally appointed by the 
testator in the latter’s last will to administer 
the estate. Administrator on the other hand 
is a person appointed by the court in the 
event of intestacy, or where the deceased 
dies without leaving any will. Nevertheless, 
the phrase ‘personal representatives’ 
essentially covers both executors and 
administrators (Hayton et al., 2005; Akmal 
Hidayah, 2012). In academic writing, 
executors and administrators in many 
occasions have been collectively described 
as the personal representatives of a 
deceased’s estate (United Asian Bank Bhd 
v Personal Representatives of Roshammah 
(decd) [1994] 3 MLJ 327). It is so as 
both parties play the same role in the 
administration of the deceased’s estate and 
owe duties to the estate beneficiaries.
In cases of administration of small 
estates, where the estate consists wholly 
or partly of immovable property and does 
not exceed two million ringgit in total 
value, section 13(4) of the Small Estates 
(Distribution) Act 1955 empowers the 
Land Administrator to grant letters of 
administration to such person or persons 
as he thinks fit, subject to such security as 
he may require and may in his discretion 
dispense with security. The grant of letters 
of administration may be made for the 
purpose of collecting and preserving the 
deceased’s assets or in cases of insolvent 
estates (section 13 (7), Small Estates 
Distribution Act 1955). The grant may also 
be made where the immovable properties 
of the deceased do not have titles, or where 
there are only documents evidencing title 
or beneficial interest or equitable interest 
in land.
As for the administration of estates by 
the Public Trust Corporation, it is governed 
by the Public Trust Corporation Act 
1995 where under this Act, the offices of 
Public Trustee and Official Administrator 
ceased to exist and the property, rights 
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and liabilities of the Public Trustee and 
Official Administrator are now vested in 
a Corporation known as Amanah Raya 
Berhad. The Corporation is empowered to 
administer the estates in its capacity as one 
of the administrative bodies. By virtue of 
section 17(1) of the Act, if a person dies 
testate or intestates, leaving only movable 
property and that the total value of the 
property does not exceed six hundred 
thousand ringgit, a summary administration 
in respect of the property may be made by 
the Corporation. On the other hand, the 
Corporation may also be appointed as a 
personal representative to the deceased’s 
estate and be granted probates of will or 
letters of administration by the Court.
The article predicates that although the 
term ‘personal representative’ normally 
refers to the personal representative as 
appointed by the High Court, the offence 
of criminal breach of trust, as provided by 
the Penal Code, should also be extended 
to the administration granted by the Land 
Administrator in cases of small estate and 
the appointment of Amanah Raya Berhad 
as the personal representative in any case 
the representative fails to discharge the 
office accordingly.
Powers and duties of the personal 
representative
The primary power of a personal 
representative is to dispose of property. 
Section 60(3) of Probate and Administration 
Act 1959 states that a personal representative 
may charge, mortgage or otherwise dispose 
of all or any property vested in him as he 
may think proper to do so. In Ong Thye 
Peng v. Loo Choo Teng&Ors [2008] 1 CLJ 
121, the court remarked that this provision 
concerned with the manner of disposal 
of the property of a deceased person by 
his personal representative. Furthermore, 
in Lau Yoke Hee& Anor V. Ting Liang 
Teng & Anor [2005] 3 CLJ 770, the court 
held that the personal representative can 
dispose of property vested in him without 
the beneficiaries’ consents. It can also be 
seen that the Probate and Administration 
Act 1959 confers vast powers upon the 
personal representative to administer 
the deceased’s estate. For instance, the 
personal representative is granted with 
powers to sue in respect of all causes 
of action that survive the deceased. The 
personal representative may also exercise 
the same power of recovering debts due to 
the deceased at the time of his death as the 
deceased had when living.
Other powers and duties incorporated 
in the Probate and Administration Act 
1959 also include the power to sell any 
immovable property, duty to keep an 
inventory of the deceased estate, duty to 
pay for debts, power to appropriate any part 
of the property, power to appoint trustees 
of minor’s estate and power to postpone 
distribution of the deceased estate before 
the expiration of one year from the death. 
In discharging the duties, the personal 
representative must necessarily act with 
due diligence to take possession of all 
property of the deceased and account for 
any property in respect of which possession 
has not been made possible. He must also 
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assume a responsibility which he must 
discharge with due diligence, by making the 
fullest inquiries and by taking all steps that 
are necessary and reasonable to ascertain 
the total values of the deceased’s estate.
In the course of managing the estate, 
the personal representative is also 
considered as a trustee to hold the estate 
on trust on behalf of the beneficiaries. By 
being a trustee, the personal representative 
holds a fiduciary duty which means that 
he is regarded by law to be a person who 
has undertaken an obligation of loyalty to 
another, namely, the beneficiaries, and is 
compelled to put that other person’s interest 
before his or her own which gives rise 
to a relationship of trust and confidence. 
When the deceased’s estate is under the 
personal representative control, he has the 
power of owner vis-a-vis third parties, but 
unlike a genuine owner he is not entitled 
to apply the estate for his own benefit. He 
has a duty to hold the deceased’s estate 
for the estate beneficiaries and distribute 
it to them accordingly. Oakley (1997) 
suggested four characteristics of fiduciary 
relationship, which in fact is the basis of 
the relationship between the fiduciary and 
the beneficiaries, namely, an undertaking 
by the alleged fiduciary; reliance placed 
on the alleged fiduciary by the other party, 
property which is put under the control of 
the alleged fiduciary; and vulnerability of 
the other party to the alleged fiduciary.
Personal representative as a fiduciary
A personal representative is held to the 
highest degree of good faith in performing 
his duties and owes fiduciary responsibility 
to the estate beneficiaries. The question on 
whether a personal representative receives 
and holds the deceased’s property in a 
fiduciary capacity has been considered by 
several Malaysian cases. In Guindarajoo 
Vegadason V. Satgunasingam Balasingam 
[2014] 1 LNS 866, for instance, the court 
held that an administrator is appointed 
by the court to be the guardian of the 
estate and he is in a fiduciary position 
with regards to the assets that come into 
his possession by virtue of his office. 
His duty is not only to preserve them 
and deal with them in accordance with 
the law but also to apply them in the due 
course of administration for the benefit 
of the creditors, legatees of various sorts 
and the residuary beneficiaries. The court 
referred to the decision in the case of State 
of Gujerat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal [1968] 
SCR 2 408 where the Supreme Court of 
India held that the person handing over 
the property must have confidence in the 
person taking the property so as to create 
a fiduciary relationship between them. It 
was further held that the administrator and 
trustee of the properties of the estate owed 
a fiduciary duty to the legal beneficiaries to 
the said estate, ie, the administrator/trustee 
and legal beneficiaries’ relationship (Loh 
Cheng Leong &Ors v. Tan BengKheng&Ors 
[2012] 1 LNS 582). Hence, executors and 
trustees of the estate of the deceased were 
in a fiduciary relationship vis-a-vis the 
beneficiaries.
In Koh Yook Tin (Suing as Executor 
to the Estate of Lim Chuak @ Lim Kwee 
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Kee, deceased) v. Koh Kim Leng @ Hoo 
Kim Leng & Anor [2013] 1 LNS 1088, the 
court upheld that personal representative 
acted as trustee owed a fiduciary duty to 
the estate of the deceased, the plaintiff and 
other shareholders. The court was guided 
interalia by the case of Malaysian Assurance 
Alliance Bhd v. Anthony Kulanthai Marie 
Joseph [2011] 1 CLJ 15, where the Court 
held that where a person is in possession 
of trust property which he knows does not 
belong to him, the law regards him as a 
constructive trustee. A constructive trust 
is simply a relationship created by equity 
in the interest of conscience. Therefore, 
it can be said that personal representative 
in discharging his duty is the only person 
authorised to deal with deceased’s estate 
for the benefit of beneficiaries. The element 
of entrustment exists after the extraction of 
the letters of representation by the personal 
representative from the appropriate 
administrative bodies as he is perceived by 
the law to step into the deceased’s shoes 
(Akmal Hidayah & Nor Azlina, 2014).
The beneficiaries’ vulnerability 
curtails completely from their dependency 
upon their fiduciary or utmost good faith 
towards the former’s best interest within 
the confines of fiduciary relationships 
(Rotman, 1996). Vulnerability is the major 
focus as this doctrine is premised upon 
the notion that beneficiaries are generally 
inferior in power vis-à-vis their fiduciary 
and that fiduciary law serves to displeasure 
this disparity by imposing strict duties 
upon fiduciary to act in the best interests of 
the beneficiaries. It is often impossible to 
stop those people who are dishonest from 
taking advantage of the opportunities for 
abuse that their positions bring (Noor & 
Halim, 2013). However, when a fiduciary 
fails to perform his duties, the beneficiaries 
are eligible to bring claims against him for 
breach of duty, and wherever appropriate, 
to obtain a remedy (Rotman, 2012).
The offence of criminal breach of trust 
under the Penal Code
Criminal breach of trust is clearly 
defined in section 405 of the Penal Code, 
which reads as follows:
 “Whoever, being in any manner 
entrusted with property, or with any 
dominion over property either solely 
or jointly with any other person 
dishonestly misappropriates, or 
converts to his own use, that property, 
or dishonestly uses or disposes of that 
property in violation of any direction 
of law prescribing the mode in which 
such trust is to be discharged, or of 
any legal contract, express or implied, 
which he has made touching the 
discharge of such trust, or willfully 
suffers any other person so to do, 
commits ‘criminal breach of trust”.
The provision describes the person who 
may be guilty as one being in any manner 
entrusted with property or dominion over it. 
If that person dishonestly misappropriates 
the property, he or she commits a criminal 
breach of trust. In other words, a criminal 
breach of trust may be well-defined as 
the dishonest appropriation of another’s 
property by a person to whom it has been 
entrusted, or into whose hands it has legally 
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come. The ownership or beneficial interest 
in the property in respect of which the so 
called criminal breach of trust has been 
committed, must be in some person other 
than the accused, and the latter must hold it 
on account of some person or in some way 
for his benefit.
The essential ingredients with regard 
to section 405 of the Penal Code have been 
stated by Wan Suleiman FJ in PP v Yeoh Teck 
Chye [1981] 2 MLJ 176 that for a person to 
be guilty of the offence of criminal breach 
of trust, there must be a proof that the 
accused has been entrusted with property or 
dominion over property and that he should 
dishonestly misappropriate or convert the 
property to his own use or dishonestly use 
or dispose of the property or wilfully suffer 
any other person to do so in violation of, 
any direction of law prescribing the manner 
in which such trust is to be discharged or 
of any legal contract made touching the 
discharge of such trust. A trust here may be 
defined as any arrangement by which one 
person is authorized to deal with property 
for the benefit of another. The person who is 
entrusted with certain property is entrusted 
directly with the said property, that is to 
say, delivered to him with specific purpose 
where the element of possession exists.
The terms ‘dishonestly’ and ‘wrongful 
gain and wrongful loss’ are explained 
in section 24 and section 23 of the Penal 
Code, respectively. Section 24 of the Penal 
Code provides that whoever does anything 
with the intention of causing wrongful gain 
to one person or wrongful loss to another 
person, irrespective of whether the act 
causes actual wrongful loss or gain is said 
to do that thing dishonestly. The section 
further explains that, in relation to the 
offence of criminal misappropriation or 
criminal breach of trust, it is immaterial 
whether there was an intention to defraud 
or to deceive any person. A wrongful gain 
simply means gain by unlawful means of 
property to which the person gaining is not 
legally entitled, whereas wrongful loss is 
the loss by unlawful means of property to 
which the person losing it is legally entitled 
(Section 23, Penal Code). Therefore, a 
person is said to gain wrongfully when 
such person retains wrongfully, as well 
as when such person acquires wrongfully. 
A person is said to lose wrongfully when 
such person is wrongfully kept out of any 
property, as well as when such person is 
wrongfully deprived of property.  A person 
is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does 
that thing with the intention to defraud, but 
not otherwise (Section 25, Penal Code).
It has been considered in Sathiadas 
v PP [1970] 2 MLJ 241, where the 
court in the case held that the gist of 
this crime is entrustment and dishonest 
misappropriation. Loss as a consequence 
of the act is not a factor; it is the act 
itself which amounts to this offence. In 
essence, the offence of criminal breach 
of trust is an offence relating to property 
and its commission is directed against the 
beneficial owner of that property. So, there 
can be no criminal breach of trust where the 
beneficial owner consents to the use of the 
property in a particular way. That consent 
of the beneficial owner is a complete 
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defence to the offence of criminal breach 
of trust and is to be found in the words “in 
violation of any legal contract, express or 
implied, which he has made touching the 
discharge of such trust”.
Criminal breach of trust by the personal 
representative
It is interesting to note that one of the 
illustrations to Section 405 of the Penal 
Code expressly illustrates the conduct 
of fraudulent personal representative as 
criminal breach of trust. The illustration of 
the section is as follows:
 A, being executor to the will of a 
deceased person, dishonestly disobeys 
the law which directs him to divide 
the effects according to the will, and 
appropriates them to his own use. A 
has committed criminal breach of trust. 
The law recognises illustration 
appended to a particular section as an aid 
to statutory interpretation as it may give 
examples to illustrate the working of its 
provisions (Wan Arfah, 2011). The Privy 
Council in Mohamed Syedol Ariffin v Yeoh 
Ooi Gark [1916] 1 MC 165, an appeal 
from Straits Settlement stated that it is 
the duty of a court to accept, if that can be 
done, illustration appended to a section as 
relevant in the interpretation of the text, 
and that it would require a very special case 
to justify their rejection on the ground of 
their assumed inconsistency to the section 
themselves.
The law requires that before criminal 
breach of trust is established it must be 
shown that the person charged has been 
entrusted with property or with dominion 
over property and that he has been guilty of 
breach of trust using the latter phrase loosely. 
There must be an element of entrustment 
and therefore the person accused must be 
shown to hold the property in a fiduciary 
capacity. In cases of estate administration, 
the element of entrustment is satisfied as a 
personal representative acting as a trustee 
is held to hold the deceased’s estate in a 
fiduciary capacity. A trust relationship is a 
classic example of a relationship, fiduciary 
in character. According to McGhee (2010), 
a constructive trust is a trust which is 
imposed by equity in order to satisfy the 
demands of justice and good conscience, 
without reference to any express or 
presumed intention of the parties. Riddall 
(1996) illustrated the constructive trust as a 
remedial device employed to correct unjust 
enrichment. It does not only implicate the 
act of taking title to property from one 
person whose title unjustly enriches him 
but also extends to the act of transferring 
the property to another who has been 
unjustly deprived of it.
Punishment for criminal breach of trust
The offence of criminal breach of trust is 
generally punishable under section 406 of 
the Penal Code. The section provides that:
 “Whoever commits criminal breach 
of trust shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which shall 
not be less than one year and not more 
than ten years and with whipping, and 
shall also be liable to fine”.
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However, the Penal Code also provides 
for stiffer punishment for persons who 
hold positions of higher degree of trust 
and confidence (Ariffin, 2013; Seng, 
1994) specifically person who works in 
his capacity as a public servant or in the 
way of his business as a banker, merchant, 
factor, broker, attorney or agent (Section 
409, Penal Code).
The “agent” was quite exhaustively 
defined in section 402A of the Penal Code. 
The section states that for the purposes of 
sections 405, 406, 407, 408. 409 of the Penal 
Code, unless the contrary appears from the 
context, an agent includes any corporation 
or other person acting or having been 
acting or desirous or intending to act for 
on behalf of any company or other person. 
There is a long list of other person which 
include partner, co-owner, clerk, servant, 
employee, banker, broker, auctioneer, 
architect, clerk of works, engineer, 
advocate and solicitor, accountant, auditor, 
surveyor, buyer, salesman, trustee executor, 
administrator, liquidator, trustee within the 
meaning of any Act relating to trusteeship 
or bankruptcy, receiver, director, manager 
or other officer of any company, club, 
partnership or association or in any other 
capacity either alone or jointly with any 
other person and whether in his own name 
or in the name of his principal or not (Aishah 
Mohamed Rose & Anor v PP [2014] 1 LNS 
957). The punishments specified for each 
group of persons are summarised in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Punishment for Criminal Breach of Trust under the Penal Code
Penal Code provision Who? Punishments
Section 406 Any person Imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 1 
year and not more than 10 years and with whipping, and 
shall also be liable to fine.
Section 407 Carrier
Section 408 clerk or servant
Section 409 public servant/ agent Imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 2 
years and not more than 20 years and with whipping, and 
shall also be liable to fine.
Adequacy of Punishment for Criminal 
Breach of Trust by the Personal 
Representative
It is undeniable that the principal objective 
of criminal law is to punish an offender. It 
is one of the functions of law under penal 
technique. This technique prohibits kinds of 
antisocial conduct, much of which are  also 
prohibited by moral rules as well as providing 
the machinery of law enforcement, from the 
police force, through the courts exercising 
criminal jurisdiction, to the prison service. It 
is one method to experiencing moral disgrace 
for being convicted of a crime and is one of 
the principal preventive mechanisms of the 
penal mode.
Unfortunately, this is not similarly 
significant for estate administration cases. 
This is because the existing punishment 
of imprisonment, whipping and fine as 
prescribed by the Penal Code is only 
sufficient to fulfil the preventive and 
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punitive penal function of the law. It is still 
far from achieving its grievance remedial 
function that provides for the enforcement 
of remedial award such as compensation. 
McLeod (2012) has earlier suggested 
that it is necessary for the policy-makers 
to look for the availability of punitive or 
exemplary damages in certain types of civil 
cases or the possibility of courts making 
compensation orders while exercising their 
criminal jurisdiction, both which clearly 
mix the grievance remedial function and 
punitive function. For this purpose, it is 
suggested that reference to section 66 of the 
Probate and Administration Act 1959 would 
be relevant. The section provides for the 
liability and accountability of the personal 
representative in cases where he wastes 
or converts to his own use any part of the 
estate. If he dies, such liability is extended 
to his personal representative who shall be 
liable and chargeable in respect of the waste 
or conversion, to the extent of the available 
assets of the defaulter, in the same manner 
as the defaulter would have been, if living.
CONCLUSION 
From the discussion, it could be established 
that whilst the offence of criminal breach 
of trust also includes the misappropriation 
of the deceased’s estate by the personal 
representative, its punishment is still 
inadequate and will not give much benefit 
to the estate beneficiaries. Hence, there is a 
need for another mechanism to compensate 
the estate beneficiaries for their loss 
resulting from the dishonest conducts 
of the personal representative from the 
criminal law perspective. The punishment 
under the current criminal breach of trust 
may successfully operate to regulate the 
conducts of the personal representative 
but is not sufficient to remedy the estate 
beneficiaries against the misconducts of 
such personal representative. It is therefore 
recommended that, a dishonest personal 
representative while being convicted for an 
offence of criminal breach of trust, there is a 
need to extend the punishment to deprive the 
personal representative of his own property 
through criminal forfeiture process equally 
been used in other criminal offences such 
as money laundering and drugs trafficking 
so that the rights of the estate beneficiaries 
as the vulnerable party are better protected. 
This is because, once the estate has been 
wasted or misappropriated, charging the 
personal representatives with criminal 
breach of trust under the current legal 
provision would not give much benefit to 
the estate beneficiaries as at this stage, the 
latter might have been left with nothing to 
be benefited from the deceased’s estate.
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ABSTRACT
Information Communication Technology (ICT) facilitates abuse and exploitation of 
children online, especially child pornography. A study conducted by the Internet Watch 
Foundation showed that ICT is responsible for the mushrooming of child pornography 
into a fast growing business and there is evidence to show that the victims of this abuse 
are getting much younger. Realising the severity of the threat, various conventions and 
conferences have been held to address the issue and discuss the methods in combating 
the problem. For example, the Cybercrime Convention criminalises all related acts of 
creating, producing, disseminating and possessing of any child abuse images. Similarly, 
various initiatives have been adopted to combat commercial and non-commercial sexual 
exploitation of children, particularly the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography (OPSC). At the national level, countries such as the 
UK, US and South Korea have enhanced their laws and legal mechanism to safeguard 
children against these ICT facilitated crimes in line with the international conventions. 
Based on a comparative analysis, this paper aims to highlight the threat and how the 
three countries are addressing the problem and analyses the legal position in Malaysia in 
addressing and combating the use of ICT to commit crimes against children.
Keywords: Child pornography, online risks, online violence, abuse and exploitation, ICT crimes against 
children
INTRODUCTION
Rapid technological advancement in ICT 
has created opportunities for criminals 
and individuals with mala fide intention to 
continuously misuse ICT to abuse, harm 
and exploit children. ICT provides access 
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for criminals to firstly contact, engage and 
‘be-friended’ children, secondly exploit 
the children’s innocence and ignorance 
of the threats or risks of ICT and thirdly 
collaborate to organise crimes that exploit 
and abuse children particularly in child 
pornography. Even though the Convention 
on the Rights of A Child (UNCRC) imposes 
responsibility on the member states to 
protect the rights of children, others 
especially parents, society, community and 
the children themselves also have a role 
to play in ensuring that the children are 
safe from harm, abuse and exploitation in 
the real and the virtual world. This paper 
analyses the approach of other countries 
or jurisdictions in addressing the issue and 
also looks at the adequacy of the Malaysian 
law in addressing and combating the use of 
ICT to commit crimes against children in 
Malaysia in this digital age. In particular, 
this paper focuses on a discussion relating 
to child pornography or child abuse 
materials only.
CHILD ABUSE MATERIALS OR 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
Child pornography is considered a heinous 
crime against children and ICT contributes 
towards the mushrooming of online child 
pornography. A report conducted by the 
Internet Watch Foundation in 2008 found 
there were 1,536 individual child abuse 
domains available on the internet and 58 
percent were hosted in the United States. 
It also reported that child pornography is 
a fast growing business due to the demand 
in commercial websites for child abuse 
materials (IWF Annual Report, 2008). In 
addition, a study conducted by the National 
Centre for Missing and Exploited Children 
indicated that 83 percent of the abuse 
materials in the possession of arrested child 
pornography perpetrator contained images 
involving children between the ages 6 and 
12, with 39 percent comprising of images 
of children between ages of 3 and 5, and 
19% had images of infants and toddlers 
under age of 3. This study indicated that 
the victims are getting younger and the 
abuses are getting severe and horrid.
Fear for the safety of child victims is 
alarming. As a result, child pornography is 
regarded as an international crime and has 
become an international concern in various 
international congresses, namely:
1.  World Congress on the Commercial 
and Exploitation of Children in 
Stockholm 1996;
2.  Vienna International Conference on 
Combating Child Pornography, 1999
3.  World Congress on the Commercial 
Exploitation of Children, Yokohama, 
2001
4.  World Congress on the Commercial 
Exploitation of Children, Rio de 
Janeiro, 2008
From these conferences, protection 
of children against this crime has been 
codified in various international human 
rights treaties governing child pornography, 
namely:
1.  Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, on the Sale 
of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography, 2000 (OPSC);
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2.  Convention on Cybercrime or 
Budapest Convention, 2001
3.  Council of Europe Convention on 
the Protection for Children against 
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse or Lanzarote Convention, 
2007
CRIMINALISING ONLINE CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY
Efforts have been made to criminalise child 
pornography at international, regional and 
national levels. Article 2 of the OPSC defines 
child pornography as any representation, 
by whatever means, of a child engaged in 
real or simulated explicit sexual activities 
or any representation of the sexual parts of 
a child for primarily sexual purposes. This 
definition covers both online and other 
forms of child pornography. Meanwhile, 
Article 3 of OPSC imposes obligations 
to State Parties to criminalise producing, 
distributing, disseminating, importing, 
exporting, offering, selling or possessing 
of child pornography as defined in Art 2. 
Art 3(1)(c) of the OPSC also obliges state 
parties to punish the possession of child 
pornography, especially for the purposes 
of producing, distributing, disseminating, 
importing, exporting, offering or selling. 
Being aware of the widespread distribution 
and accessibility of child pornography 
through the Internet, the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child has made specific 
recommendations regarding the adoption 
of legislation on the obligations of ISPs in 
relation to child pornography. Other concerns 
include ensuring convicted offenders to not 
continue exploiting children once they have 
served the sentence and the need to establish 
monitoring and surveillance mechanisms 
including a registry of the sex offenders.
The Budapest Convention makes online 
child pornography a crime. Article 9 (1) 
mandated State Party to adopt legislation that 
criminalises the conduct of producing child 
pornography for the purpose of distribution 
through a computer system, offering 
or making available child pornography 
through a computer system, procuring child 
pornography through a computer system and 
possessing child pornography in a computer 
system or on a computer data storage 
medium. For this purpose, the Convention 
defines child pornography to include a 
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, 
a person appearing to be a minor engaged 
in sexually explicit conduct and realistic 
images representing a minor engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct. The Convention 
categorises offences related to child 
pornography as content related offences. 
This makes both the activity involved in 
child pornography and the product of such 
activity a criminal offence. The Lanzarote 
Convention also criminalises all activities 
and conduct relating to child pornography 
but added ‘knowingly obtaining access, 
through information and communication 
technologies to child pornography’ as a 
crime. The Convention refers the term ‘child 
pornography’ as ‘any material that visually 
depicts a child engaged in real or simulated 
sexually explicit conduct or any depiction of 
a child’s sexual organs for primarily sexual 
purposes” [Art 20 (2)]
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At the regional level, the European 
Commission, for example, has issued 
a new directive 2011/92/EU to combat 
sexual exploitation and child pornography 
to replace Council framework Decision 
2004/68/JHA. The new directive follows 
the Council of Europe Convention on 
the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse 2007 or 
Lanzarote Convention. The EU regard 
enforcement as one of the important 
mechanisms to combat child pornography 
measure and adopt several measures 
including creating a special unit to 
combat child pornography within the law 
enforcement service of the Member States. 
The Unit uses different channels of police 
cooperation, in particular Interpol, Europol 
and sets up the contact point in the Member 
States to combat cybercrime, which are 
operational 24 hours a day and to venture 
into the possibility of obliging internet 
service providers to retain traffic-related 
data and to set up their own control system 
(Europol, 2010).
Apart of the legislative approach, EU 
also adopts a resolution to prevent the 
dissemination of illegal contents on the 
internet especially child pornography. On 
this matter, the EU has issued a directive on 
the Communication on Illegal and Harmful 
Content (Content Directive) on the Internet 
and a Green Paper on the Protection of 
minors and human. The Content Directive 
provides a policy to fight against harmful 
and illegal contents on the Internet that also 
include child abuse materials.
Efforts to combat and criminalise 
online child pornography have also taken 
place at the national level where countries 
such as the UK, US and South Korea have 
improved and extended the scope of their 
existing law to address this particular issue. 
In these three jurisdictions, all activities 
and conduct involved in producing, 
disseminating and possessing child abused 
materials are criminalised and definition 
of child pornography has been extended 
to include computer graphic images of a 
child.
Criminalising the activities involved in 
online child pornography in line with 
the requirement of the OPSC and the 
Cybercrime Conventions
a. The UK Approach
The UK has amended the existing 
laws governing child pornography to 
address the challenges of technology and 
incorporated the international standard 
laid down by the Cybercrime Convention 
into their laws. As a result, the Protection 
of Children Act 1978 has been amended 
to effect the criminalisation of taking, 
making, distributing and possession 
of child pornography. With the above 
development, UK legislated against the 
production, possession and distribution 
of child pornography in whatever form. 
The application of the laws can be seen in 
various cases. In R v Bowden [2000] 1 Cr 
App R (S) 26 and R v Jayson CA [2002] 
EWCA Crim. 683, the court held that 
downloading an image of a child from the 
internet amounts to ‘making’ a photograph, 
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which is an offence contrary to Section 
1 of the Protection of Child Act. The act 
of downloading causes the image to exist 
on the screen, which therefore becomes 
a photograph. In R v Fellows and Arnold 
[1977] 1 CR App R 244, the 1st Appellant 
had uploaded and stored child sexual abuse 
images on his employer’s computer that 
enabled users to both display and print 
the images. Those who have the password 
could access those images. The password 
also allowed them to access the archive and 
assisted in the growth of the archives in which 
the 2nd defendant was one of them. Both were 
charged under the Protection of Child Act 
1978, the Obscene Publications Act 1959 
and the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1988. The Court in this case held that 
a file on a database, which can be displayed 
on screen and printed out, constitutes a copy 
of a photograph and uploading such images 
constitutes possession with a view to their 
being distributed or shown. However, in 
relation to possession of an indecent image 
of a child, some knowledge of its existence 
was held to be necessary as illustrated in 
the case of Atkins v Director of Public 
Prosecution and Goodland v Director of 
Public Prosecutions [2000] 2 Cr App R 
248 (QB). Nevertheless, in the case of R 
v Harrison [2008], viewing a child abuse 
image on a pop-up advertisement amounts 
to criminal offence if the defendant knew 
that the images would pop up and once 
viewed was automatically saved. This is 
because the pop up left automatic traces on 
users’ computers. Accordingly, the law in 
the UK criminalises all activities involved in 
the production, distribution and possession 
of child pornography in whatever form and 
the court plays an important role in applying 
the laws to cover online and offline child 
pornographic materials.
b. The US Approach
In the US, child pornography is regarded as 
an obscene expression of speech that is not 
protected under the First Amendment. It is 
a crime under the 18th United States Code, 
a federal law that prohibits the production, 
distribution, reception and possession 
of an image of child pornography under 
Section 2252 of the Code. Production of 
child pornography is made illegal under 
Section 2251 and this includes the act “to 
persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor 
to engage in sexually explicit conduct for 
purposes of producing visual depictions 
of that conduct.” Further, the federal law 
prosecutes any individual who attempts or 
conspires to commit a child pornography 
offense and those who knowingly produce, 
receive, transport, ship or distribute child 
pornography with the intent to import 
or transmit the visual depiction into the 
United States. The law also provides 
severe statutory penalties to any violation 
of the above law by fines or imprisonment 
between 5 years to 30 years, respectively. It 
also imposes life imprisonment for offense 
occurring in the following situations: (i) the 
images are violent, sadistic, or masochistic 
in nature, (ii) the minor was sexually 
abused, or (iii) the offender has prior 
convictions for child sexual exploitation.
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Apart from the above, the US Congress 
has passed several laws specifically 
criminalising sexual exploitation of 
children:
1.  Protection of Children Against 
Sexual Exploitation Act 1978 that 
criminalises live performance and 
visual depictions of children engaged 
or engaging in whatever form;
2.  Child Protection Act 1984 that 
criminalises production or 
trafficking of non-commercial child 
pornography in whatever form;
3.  Child Pornography and Obscenity 
Enforcement Act 1988 criminalise 
distribution and advertisement of 
child pornography through the use 
of computer;
In the case of Osborne v Ohio 495 
U.S 103 (1990), the court criminalised the 
possession including private possession 
and private use of child pornography. The 
court held that private possession of child 
pornography was not protected under the 
First Amendment and that mere possession 
of child pornography should be illegal 
because paedophiles may use it to seduce 
new victims or convince children to submit 
to sexual violation and sexual solicitation 
or grooming of children.
Concerned with the availability and 
accessibility of the content online, the US 
has enacted the Children Internet Protection 
Act (CIPA) that imposes mandatory 
filtering and blocking of such pornographic, 
obscene and indecent materials in schools, 
libraries and educational establishment that 
receive federal funding for internet access.
Similar to the UK, the US also 
criminalises the processes involved in the 
production distribution and possession 
of child pornography in whatever form. 
The US law severely punishes those who 
seduce children to get involved in child 
pornography and any attempt to import into 
the country of any such visual depiction. 
As in the UK, there exist several laws that 
specifically address the criminalisation of 
child pornography in any manner and forms.
c. The Korean approach
In South Korea, the Act on Protection 
of Children and Juvenile from Sexual 
abuse criminalises production, import and 
export of obscene materials, sale, rental 
or distribution, as well as possession of 
child pornographic materials under Article 
8. The provision criminalises distribution 
including possession of child and juvenile 
pornography and any violation shall be 
punished by imprisonment with prison 
labour for a specific period stated under the 
respective sub-provisions. For possession 
of child and juvenile pornography, the 
punishment is imprisonment with prison 
labour for not more than seven years.
Pornography and child pornography 
is considered as harmful materials and 
the Juvenile Protection Act protects 
children from harmful act, abuse and 
violence by regulating the distribution 
of harmful materials in print, broadcast 
and online media. Article 53(3) of the 
Telecommunication Business Act (TBA) 
regards child pornography as harmful 
and illegal online content; in order to 
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monitor this issue, the Act established 
the Information Communication Ethics 
Committee (ICEC) to operate a centre for 
reporting harmful online communication 
and make recommendation to the ISPs to 
remove the content. The Act gave power 
to ICEC to monitor Internet discussion 
and contacted system operators to get the 
information deleted. In 2001, the ICEC 
introduced the Internet Content Filtering 
Ordinance to filter Internet content which 
requires ISPS to filter access to a list of 
websites determined by the ICEC and 
requires Internet access facilities like 
libraries and PC Bangor Internet café to 
install filtering software to protect youth. 
ICEC also introduced Internet Content 
Media Rating system that provides criteria 
for indecent, as well as violence sites as 
measures, to prevent child pornography and 
cyber sexual violence. In 2008, the Korean 
Communication Standard Commission 
(KCSC) took over the role of ICEC and 
carried out further tasks of issuing warning 
to Internet users who attempted to access 
to any of such materials or content on the 
Internet. In addition to filtering and rating, 
the Act on Promotion of Communication 
Network Utilization and Data Protection 
(CNA) under Article 42 requires labelling 
of media materials harmful to juveniles 
as measure to protect children online. 
The Act imposed a duty on the Ministry 
of Information and Communication to 
develop appropriate measures to ensure 
development and dissemination of contents 
screening software, the development 
and dissemination of juvenile protection 
technology and develop education and 
publicity for juvenile protection. Pursuant 
to this, ‘Nuri Cops’ has been appointed 
among the public to clean up and patrol 
the Internet by deleting child pornographic 
images as one of the mechanism to protect 
children online.
As seen above, the UK, the US and 
the South Korea have adopted legal 
mechanism to combat child pornography 
online and offline. Each country has 
domestic laws that criminalise all activities 
relating to the production, distribution 
and possession of child pornography in 
whatever form. The courts also play an 
important role in interpreting the laws and 
extending the application to criminalise 
possession of child pornography from 
offline to online. Apart from using criminal 
laws and laws protecting children to 
make child pornography a crime, content 
regulation is also used to protect children 
from this crime. Child pornography 
materials are considered illegal and thus 
filtering is required by the laws to protect 
children, as seen in the US and in the South 
Korea. In South Korea, rating and media 
labelling are introduced by the law as 
important protective measures that require 
the government and the industries to work 
in tandem to ensure children and juvenile 
are protected from any harm, abuse and 
violence both online and offline. In the 
UK, however, there is no specific statute 
imposing filtering, rating and labelling; 
the country nevertheless employs self-
regulation and parental control as 
mechanism to protect children online.
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d. Malaysia
In comparison with the above jurisdictions, 
Malaysia regards all pornography as 
illegal and thus does not have any 
specific law criminalising child 
pornography. The laws are scattered and 
govern all types of pornography under 
the category of obscene, indecent and 
offensive materials. The Printing Presses 
and Publications Act 1998 (PPPA), the 
Film Censorship Act 2002 (FCA) and 
Penal Code clearly prohibit obscene and 
offensive materials in relation to print 
medium and film, whereas indecent, 
obscene and offensive online contents 
are governed by the Communication 
and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA) and 
Consumer Content Code (CCC). However, 
it is unfortunate that the Computer Crimes 
Act 1997 (CCA) does not address this 
particular issue since child pornography 
is considered as a computer crime against 
children online.
In relation to criminalising the activities 
involved in producing obscene films, 
Section 4 of the PPPA prohibits production 
or printing of obscene publication or 
documents from any printing press or 
machine. Sec 2 of the PPPA defines 
“publication” to include:
i.  A document, newspaper, book and 
periodical;
ii.  All written or printed matter and 
everything whether of a nature 
familiar to written or printed 
matter or not containing any visible 
representation;
iii.  Anything which by its form, shape 
or in any manner is capable of 
suggesting words or ideas; and
iv. An audio recording.
The term “publication” only refers 
to what can be published rather than 
the process and activities involved in 
publication in contrast to the definition of 
“publication” under section 1(3) of UK 
Obscene Publication Act 1959 and the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994 (UK), where the term ‘publication’ 
includes distributing, circulating, selling, 
transmission of a document and electronic 
file, image or data.” As a result, the offence 
under PPPA focuses merely on production 
of obscene printed materials and does not 
include Internet publication.
Section 5 of the Film Censorship 
Act makes it an offence to possess, 
have in custody, control or ownership 
or circulate, exhibit, distribute, display, 
manufacture, produce, sell or hire any 
film or film publicity material which 
is obscene or otherwise against public 
decency. The provision imposes a fine 
between RM10,000 – RM50,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five 
years or both to those who are found guilty 
to commit such offence. The Act, however, 
limits its application to a film which is 
defined to “include original or duplicate of 
the whole or any part of a cinematograph 
film; and a video, diskette, laser disc, 
compact disc, hard disc and other record 
of a sequence of visual images, being a 
record capable of being used as a means 
of showing that sequence as a moving 
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picture, whether or not accompanied by 
sound.” The focus is more on a film in its 
physical medium for censorship purposes 
rather than digital film on the Internet. 
The application of this Act to obscene 
materials on the Internet is further limited 
by the non-application provision under sub 
section 3 which states, “This Act shall not 
be construed as permitting the censorship 
of any film or film publicity material 
published, displayed, circulated, exhibited, 
distributed or transmitted over the Internet 
or over the intranet.” Therefore, the Act 
has its limitation and does not specifically 
criminalise the activities relating to online 
child pornography and obscene materials 
online.
Apart from the PPPA and the Film 
Censorship Act, the Penal Code also 
makes it an offence to sell, distribute 
and circulate obscene books. Section 
292 provides “whoever sells, lets to hire, 
distribute, publicly exhibit, circulate in 
whatever manner or for the purpose of 
sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition or 
circulation, makes, produces or has in his 
possession any obscene book, pamphlet, 
paper, drawing, painting, representation 
or figure or any other obscene object 
whatsoever”, etc. shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend 
to three years or with fine or with both.” 
The words used in this provision refer to 
physical obscene materials rather than 
to online materials. Thus, in contrast to 
the law in the UK, the US and the South 
Korean, the Malaysian statutes, as seen 
above, do not specifically criminalise 
the production, offering, distributing and 
possessing of online child pornography.
In relation to online pornography, 
Sections 211 and 233 of the Communication 
and Multimedia Act 1998 make it an 
offence to provide, makes, create and 
initiate transmission of contents which 
are obscene, indecent, false, menacing or 
offensive in character with intent to annoy, 
abuse, threaten or harass any person. These 
provisions are of general application and 
do not specifically regulate child abused 
content as required under the OPSC.
Nevertheless, section 31 of the Child 
Act 2001 clearly prohibits sexual abuse 
of children, while section 43 makes it an 
offence to sell, buy, let for hire, obtain 
possession, detain, advertise of a child 
for the purposes of prostitution. These 
provisions, however, merely focus on 
physical abuse and exploitation that may 
require judicial activism from the court 
and prosecutor creativity to extend the 
application to an online environment.
Recent developments, however, have 
seen a new approach in addressing and 
combating the issue of online pornography 
or indecent images. Several of the above 
Acts that were used to govern print and 
film pornography have been applied to 
address online crimes in relation to posting, 
distributing and possessing of indecent 
photographs online and on website. In the 
case of Tan Jye Yee & Anor v Pendakwa 
Raya [2014] 6 MLJ 609, the appellant has 
been charged inter alia under section 5(1) of 
the Film Censorship Act 2002 for obscene 
publication in their Tumblr. The charge is 
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yet to be materialised since he has escaped 
to another jurisdiction. The provision also 
prohibits possession of obscene materials. 
In 2010, Shahrom Mahdi a security guard 
was charged under section 292 of the 
Penal Code for uploading pornographic 
pictures and disseminating them on six 
websites. He pleaded guilty to the charges 
and was convicted (Bernama, 2010). In 
2013, Fila Syahida Zulkipli was charged 
under section 292 of the Penal Code by 
the Mukah Magistrates Court. She pleaded 
guilty to recording an obscene video of a 
15-year-old girl using her mobile phone 
and was fined for producing the obscene 
video (The Borneopost.com, 2013).
The issue on adequacy of the Malaysian 
law to address child pornography has 
become a hot topic recently when a 
Malaysian student, Nur Fitri Azmeer 
Nordin, was charged and convicted in 
the UK court for possessing, making 
and distributing pornographic images 
of children. Observation indicated that 
what is lacking in our law is criminalising 
possession of indecent or obscene images. 
Even though Section 292 of the Penal Code 
and Section 5 of the Film Censorship Act 
do mention about possession of obscene 
materials, the provision may not be 
adequate to address the issue unless the law 
is specifically extended to include online 
child pornography materials and images. 
On this aspect, the case of Shahrom Mahdi 
and Fila Syahida should be used as a 
stepping stone to criminalise possession 
and production of online child pornography 
in Malaysia, as required by the OPSC.
Challenges in Defining Image to Suit 
Digital Environment
Another issue challenging the law on 
online pornography is the definition of 
child pornography ‘image’, particularly 
computer-generated image and manipulated 
photograph. A clear definition is important 
since it involves criminal prosecution. 
The position in the UK, the US and South 
Korea is further discussed below.
In the UK, the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009 define ‘image’ to include pseudo 
photograph as solution to solve the issue 
involving ‘publication’ of the child abuse 
in that format. To this effect, the Protection 
of Children Act 1978 (which was amended 
by the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1996) defines pseudo-photograph as an 
image, whether made by computer graphics 
or otherwise howsoever, which appears to be 
a photograph. Section 7 of Act 1978 further 
explains that “if the impression conveyed 
by a pseudo-photograph is that the person 
shown is a child, the pseudo-photograph 
shall be treated for all purposes of this Act 
as showing a child…notwithstanding that 
some of the physical characteristics shown 
are those of an adult”. The provision also 
indicates that “references to an indecent 
pseudo-photograph include – a copy of 
an indecent pseudo-photograph and a 
data stored on a computer disc or by other 
electronic means which is capable of 
conversion into a pseudo-photograph.” In 
general, the Act criminalises any images 
showing sexual abuse of children on the 
basis that photograph of that nature is 
a record of the abuse of an actual child. 
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With such definition, any act of producing, 
publishing or publication, disseminating 
and possessing of such indecent pseudo-
photograph of a child or child abused 
materials is a crime under the Act.
In relation to the term ‘publication’, the 
Obscene Publication Act 1959 defines the 
term ‘publication’ to include distributing, 
circulating, selling, letting, giving, lending, 
showing, playing, projecting or broadcasting 
of such image. Thus, publication of an 
indecent or obscene image involving a child 
in whatever form is an offence under this 
Act. The definition of publication is further 
defined under the Criminal Justice Act and 
Public Order 1996 to include data stored 
electronically and transmission of that data. 
Thus, any such acts and processes involving 
child abused images including computer 
generated child pornography or pseudo-
photographs are criminalised.
In the US, images of child pornography 
are not protected under the First Amendment 
rights. Section 2256 of Title 18, United 
States Code, defines child pornography as 
any visual depiction of sexually explicit 
conduct involving a minor (someone 
under 18 years of age). The term “visual 
depictions” include photographs, videos, 
digital or computer generated images 
indistinguishable from an actual minor 
and images created, adapted, or modified, 
but appear to depict an identifiable, actual 
minor. In addition, undeveloped film, 
undeveloped videotape and electronically 
stored data that can be converted into 
visual images of child pornography are 
also deemed illegal visual depictions under 
the federal law. As a result, the US Child 
Pornography Protection Act 1996 was 
amended to further extend the definition 
of child pornography to include ‘virtual 
image’ i.e. image of a minor that was 
created through the use of technology, 
pseudo photograph or depiction of image 
‘appeared’ to be a minor. The Act also 
defines ‘sexually explicit’ to include 
‘actual or simulated visual depictions 
which convey the impression that they 
contain sexually explicit depictions of 
minors’. These two amendments facilitate 
and expedite the prosecution of such cases 
in court and ease the burden of proving 
whether the pornographic image in question 
depicted an actual act or real victim.
In South Korea, Article 2 of the Act on 
Protection of Children and Juvenile from 
Sexual Abuse defines the term “child or 
juvenile pornography” as the depiction of 
children or juveniles doing an act specified 
in subparagraph 4 or engaging in any other 
sexual act in the form of film, video, game 
software, or picture or image displayed 
on computers and other communication 
media. In 2011, the National Assembly 
revised the above Act to cover ‘creations of 
persons who can be perceived as minors in 
sexual situations’. The law was revised after 
the occurrence of a series of high profile 
cases of child rape and murder. Nevertheless, 
the law was criticised as it has the effect of 
treating imaginary acts of sexual contact 
with a child as the same as authentic sexual 
abuse where the actor may face a minimum 
of five years sentence and be registered as 
sex offender.
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 There is no specific definition 
of child pornography by any Act in 
Malaysia but the Content Code regards 
child pornography as obscene contents 
that include “depiction of any part of 
the body of a minor in what might be 
reasonably considered a sexual context 
and any written material or visual and/
or audio representation that reflects 
sexual activity, whether explicit or not 
with a minor is strictly prohibited.” The 
Content Code prohibits any form of child 
pornography. The Child Act 2001 regarded 
child pornography as sexual abuse, an 
offence under Section 17 of the Child 
Act. The Act recognises that a child who 
is sexually abused if he has taken part, 
whether as a participant or an observer, 
in any activity which is sexual in nature 
for the purposes of (i) any pornographic, 
obscene or indecent material, photograph, 
recording, film, videotape or performance, 
or (ii) sexual exploitation by any person 
for that person’s or another person’s 
sexual gratification is a child in need of 
care and protection. A child who is being 
induced to perform any sexual act, or is 
in any physical or social environment, 
which may lead to the performance of such 
act should be protected and be out into 
rehabilitation. Section 31 of the same Act 
makes it an offence to those who, being a 
person having the care of a child sexually 
abuses the child or causes or permits him 
or her to be so, abused and could be liable 
to a fine not exceeding RM20,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
years or both. Apart from the Child Act, 
the Penal Code particularly section 292 
also criminalised child pornography within 
the ambits of obscenity laws. The law thus 
needs to be stretched out to cover online 
child pornography. In contrast, the law in 
the UK, the US and South Korea provide 
reasonably clear definitions of child 
pornography and extend the definitions 
to cover online pornography and make 
prosecution of this heinous crime more 
effective.
FINDINGS
From the above discussions, this article 
highlights the following findings on the 
adequacy of Malaysian laws to combat 
online child pornography. Firstly, the 
processes and activities involving making, 
producing, disseminating, selling of 
pornographic materials in the offline 
world are criminalised, as seen in Section 
292 of the Penal Code and Section 5 
(1) of the Films Censorship Act but the 
CMA, particularly section 211, limits the 
processes and activities only to the term 
‘provide’. Therefore, it does not criminalise 
the processes and activities of creating, 
uploading, downloading, transmitting, 
posting, transferring, receiving, viewing 
and possessing of the prohibited materials, 
as it is clearly provided in the laws in the 
UK, the US and South Korea. This could 
be due to the focus of the Act which is 
‘content of the communication’ and ‘use 
of multimedia’. Nevertheless, it is argued 
that pornography constitutes illegal online 
contents and producing and posting of such 
contents may constitute abuse particularly 
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when peer-to-peer communication is 
involved. Peer-to-peer communication 
has been identified as one of the modus 
operandi for the mushrooming of child 
pornography. Thus, even though the CMA 
defines ‘communication’ as any means, 
whether between persons and persons, 
things and things, or persons and things, 
in the form of sound, data, text, visual 
images, signals or any other form of any 
combination of those forms, it alone does 
not make each process or activity as stated 
above a crime.
Secondly, there is no clear legal 
definition on the terms pornography, child 
pornography, obscenity and indecency 
provided by the statutes. This may lead to 
difficulty to synchronise the application of 
the laws to cover all forms of pornography. 
Although the Content Code provides 
definition of the above terms, it is only 
used as a reference or a guideline for self-
regulatory mechanism by online content 
providers. It does not have the binding effect 
and does not cover individuals involved 
in creating, producing, disseminating, 
viewing and possession of the materials. 
The Content Code limits its application to 
IASP that has agreed to be bound by it and 
does not apply to all Internet users.
Third, the non-censorship policy 
over Internet under the CMA, the Bill of 
Guarantee and the Film Censorship Act 
2001 has the effect of allowing access 
to pornographic materials and websites. 
Such offensive materials and website 
are accessible to youth, especially in the 
absence of mechanism to filter access to 
online contents, parental guidance and 
control mechanism, as well as lack of 
self-resilience among the youth. This non-
censorship policy could be seen as the root 
to all evils that could endanger the well-
being and positive development of children 
in Malaysia. In this regard, filtering 
mechanism at school should be imposed as 
practiced in the three jurisdictions.
In relation to online contents, the CMA 
makes it an offence to provide indecent, 
obscene and offensive contents with the 
‘intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass 
any person’. The provision seems to 
indicate that in the absence of the above 
elements, providing such contents may not 
be illegal. This is not consistent with the 
requirement for physical content under the 
Film Censorship Act and the Penal Code. 
Finally, prosecuting cases under the CMA 
for online pornography will strengthen the 
applicability of the law through judicial 
interpretation and through this manner, 
the law could adapt to the advance in 
technology and the technical process. Most 
of the cases brought at the lower court 
were unreported even though the courts 
have relied and extended the application 
of the Penal Code and Film Censorship 
Act to cover online matters. In the UK, for 
example, the courts have, in several cases, 
extended the interpretation of ‘photograph’ 
to include computerised images and pseudo/
virtual photographs. Thus, any database 
consisting of such images is caught under 
the UK Protection of Children Act 1978, 
UK Obscene Publication Act 1959 and UK 
Criminal Justice and Public Act 1988.
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CONCLUSION
ICT crimes against children are on the 
rise; thus, appropriate laws are needed to 
protect children from being the victims. 
In Malaysia, the existing laws are still far 
reaching to meet the challenges of ICT 
facilitated crimes against children. In 
particular, the laws governing pornography 
should be clear and adequately 
comprehensive to cover both online and 
offline pornography and the laws should 
form an integrated system that criminalises 
child pornography. In this regards, the Penal 
Code, CMA and CCA should specifically 
criminalise online child pornography 
in line with the requirement of OPSC. 
Further, the Child Act 2001, being the main 
Act to protect children, needs to integrate 
physical and online abuse offences together 
to give full protection for children in this 
digital era. In order to curb distribution of 
child abused materials through file sharing, 
prohibition should cover peer to peer 
sharing, emailing and social networking. 
In addition, collaboration with the Banks 
is also important to eliminate the demands 
towards pornography, especially child 
pornography. The courts, particularly 
the higher courts, should be given the 
opportunity to further interpret the 
application, terminology and forms under 
the various statutes governing pornography, 
obscene, indecent and offensive materials. 
Lastly, the Malaysian Content Code should 
be made mandatory or alternatively be 
made as mandatory reference in relation 
to issues involving pornography, obscene, 
indecent and offensive materials.
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ABSTRACT
Electronic evidence is one of the many forms of documentary evidence. It is stored and 
retrievable from electronic devices such as computers and smartphones, particularly in 
the their hard disks or memory banks. However, due to the fragile nature of electronic 
evidences, it is prone or susceptible to damage or alteration, as well as destruction due to 
improper handling or safe keeping. Since it can easily be tampered with or self-deteriorate, 
establishing the authenticity and reliability of electronic evidence is a technical task. 
Meanwhile, states of affairs would cause such electronic evidence to be inadmissible or 
carries low or no weightage whatsoever by the court, thus undermining the prosecution’s 
or the plaintiff’s case, as the case may be. In order to ensure such evidence is admissible 
and carry the expected weightage, relevant parties must first prove the authenticity of such 
evidence and subsequently on its reliability and relevancy. Nevertheless, in cybercrime 
cases, proving the crime is actually a technical challenge, where the responsible personnel 
are required to understand what is electronic evidence, how to extract and preserve the 
originality of such evidence and the laws governing electronic evidence, as well as 
cybercrimes. This article attempts to explain the scope of electronic evidence in relation 
to criminal cases such as in cybercrimes, as far as its admissibility and weightage are 
concerned. The discussion will be based on Malaysian and common laws.
Keywords: Authenticity, cybercrime and electronic 
evidence 
INTRODUCTION
Electronic evidence is not a recent thing. 
It has been around for quite sometime in 
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the form of black box in aircraft, closed-
circuit television (CCTV) in buildings 
and premises, at traffic junctions, desktop 
computers, laptops and smartphones. The 
contents stored in the hard disk and memory 
card (internal storage), whether they are in 
smartphones, televisions or computers, are 
generally known as electronic evidence. 
The same may be extractable and readable 
through their appropriate devices or in 
intricate situations, expert opinion is 
allowed to be given. Nowadays, with 
their portability and efficiency, and further 
advancement that electronic gadgets bring, 
whereby anyone is able to communicate 
with ease and speed, our dependency in 
the day-to-day affairs to electronic gadgets 
cannot be denied. It could improve and 
enhance the quality of life. However, with 
the advantages that the gadgets bring where 
anyone is able to communicate across 
geographical boundaries in real time, 
conduct business and transaction without 
physical presence, it also brings along with 
it disadvantages. It has also given criminals 
the opportunity to perpetrate their crimes 
through the internet (O’Donnell & 
Milner, 2009). These crimes are known as 
cybercrimes. All cybercriminal activities 
can be traced and trailed if one knows the 
technical nature of electronic evidence 
and how gadgets such as computers 
and smartphones operate. However, the 
downside of electronic evidence is that 
it can be easily altered and manipulated 
(Kuntze & Rudolph, 2011).
THE BRIEF LAW ON 
ADMISSIBILITY OF 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Sections 45 to 51 of the Malaysian 
Evidence Act 1950 (MEA) are provisions 
whereby expert opinion as to the contents 
of those electronic evidence are legally 
relevant in cases where the court could not 
form an opinion in matters of art, science 
or foreign laws. Electronic evidence is 
also documentary evidence whereby prove 
must be by primary evidence as required 
by Sections 61 and 64 of MEA, unless 
exceptions apply under Section 65 of MEA. 
Under Section 65 of MEA, secondary 
evidence may be adduced, provided the 
person adducing it lays down the legal 
foundation as to why primary evidence is not 
available after having made a diligent search 
to procure the same. Electronic evidence, 
being also documentary evidence, must 
also be proven in terms of its authenticity 
in a manner provided under Sections 67 to 
73 of MEA. Furthermore, for a document 
generated by computer, under Section 90A 
MEA (subject to its relevancy, best evidence 
rule and authentication), certification by the 
person in charge or managing the computer 
in its ordinary use and that the computer is in 
good working order, renders the document 
admissible. Section 90A considers computer 
generated documents (CGD) as primary 
evidence and also as an exception to the rule 
against hearsay.
CYBERCRIMES
To date, there is no standard definition 
of cybercrime. The terms “cybercrime,” 
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“computer crime”, “Information 
Technology crime,”, “high-tech crime”, 
“internet crime” and “information Age 
Crime” are often used interchangeably 
(Clancy, 2011) to refer to the two major 
offences either computer as a target and 
traditional offences by means of computer 
or computer as a tool (Goodman, 1997). 
There are also computers that function 
as a container or storage of  a valuable 
data on the crimes (Clancy, 2011). For 
example, when a blackmailer uses a 
computer to generate blackmail letters or 
email exchanges (Brenner & Goodman, 
2002), the computer will keep and store 
the data. Cybercrimes could be understood 
as crimes that involve computer, computer 
system and other electronic devices either 
as a medium in w h ich  computers and 
electronic devices that are connected to 
the Internet or computer networks are used 
as the instrument to commit crime or as a 
target in which the computer or electronic 
devices are used to access data stored in 
the electronic devices (Kam Wai, 2006). 
Cybercrime activities also include those of 
‘traditional crimes’, where criminals have 
found new ways in executing their criminal 
activities through the Internet by means 
of computer and other electronic devices 
(Stefan, 2011) and true cybercrimes which 
done using the technology (Brenner, 2007). 
Therefore, cybercrimes could be defined 
as “any activities that can bring harm by 
network technology for the purpose of 
manipulation of information or gain either 
by using computers or electronic devices as 
a tool, target or container” (Clancy, 2011).
Cybercrime differs from traditional 
crime by means of how the crimes are 
orchestrated. The main criterion that 
differentiates cybercrime and traditional 
crime is that the cybercrime is committed 
through an electronic device (Kam Wai, 
2006), be it a desktop computer or a 
notebook, a cellular phone, tablet, etc. 
Another criterion is that criminal activities 
are committed remotely (Internet) compared 
to traditional crimes that require criminal’s 
physical presence. Since cybercrime could 
be committed remotely, and there are no 
geographical and political boundaries in 
the cyber world, a cybercrime could also 
be transnational, since it affects not only 
one nation but several nations, making 
identification of crime scene location 
a difficult task. Meanwhile, Garfinkel 
(2009) states that cybercrime is a crime 
where the crime scene is `invisible’. It 
can be a heaven to cybercriminals because 
the percentage being caught of their 
cybercrimes is relatively small. Gabrys 
(2002) mentioned that there is less than a 
1:20,000 chance of cybercriminals being 
caught and there is less than a 1:22,000 
chance that the cybercriminals will go to 
prison. The reason being cybercriminals 
committed cybercrimes remotely without 
their physical present. However, there 
are electronic trails known as electronic 
evidence. Getting this electronic evidence 
is a technical challenge which investigators, 
defence counsel judges and lawyer must 
be familiar with, or they would face 
the problem in making decisions on it 
(Rockwood, 2005).
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NATURE OF ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE 
Electronic evidence is any data associated 
with electronic devices, whether created, 
stored, manipulated or transmitted in 
digital format. Electronic evidence is 
also known as digital evidence, computer 
evidence, computer generated document 
or computer-related document. The 
prime element of an electronic evidence 
which is an evidence is creating, storing, 
manipulating or transmitting in digital 
format with the advancement of technology 
tool (Mason, 2011).
There is no specific definition on 
electronic evidence under the Malaysian 
law, but it could be figured out in three 
different statutes, namely, the Electronic 
Commerce (ECA) 2006, Computer Crimes 
Act 1997 (CCA) and Malaysian Evidence 
Act 1950 (MEA). ECA in Section 5 defines 
electronic as any technology that can be 
used by various functions which is related 
to the technology. It could be computer 
and other devices such as a smart phone, 
tablet, iPad, etc., while ‘computer output’ 
is described in Section 2(1) of the CCA, 
which covers all types of statements or 
representations including translations that 
are produced by a computer and displayed 
on its screen. Section 3 of MEA provides 
the meaning of evidence and document. 
An illustration in that Section gives further 
understanding what a document is, which 
includes any writing or words printed, 
lithographed or photographed, a map, 
plan, graph or sketch, an inscription on 
wood, metal, stone or any other substance, 
material or thing, a drawing, painting, 
picture or caricature, a photograph or a 
negative, a tape recording of a telephonic 
communication including a recording of 
such communication transmitted over 
distance, a photographic or other visual 
recording including a recording of a 
photographic or other visual transmission 
over a distance, a matter recorded, stored, 
processed, retrieved or produced by a 
computer. Hence, electronic evidence is a 
form of documentary evidence.
Characteristics of Electronic Evidence
Electronic evidence is unique in its 
character compared to traditional evidence. 
Electronic evidence is easily manipulated 
(Kuntze & Rudolph, 2011), altered, 
damaged or destroyed (Pollitt, 2007). It can 
be modified without leaving any trace of 
the original message and it needs an expert 
to clarify it compared to record written 
with pen and paper (Garfinkel, 2009). The 
data in electronic format are also difficult 
to eliminate but easy to create. When a file 
or data on the computer was deleted, it does 
not mean that it is really gone as it will be 
stored away or merely moved to another 
location in the hard drive or digital storage 
device or archive system (Rockwood, 
2005). It is because the computer contains 
metadata to enable the computer to retrieve 
the data which are supposedly deleted 
(Rockwood, 2005). Metadata means data 
which is invisible or hidden behind a 
screen or display monitor (Harris, 2009). It 
could be created by a user or automatically 
created by a programme and stored on the 
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computer and the user is probably unaware 
of its existence (Wong, 2013). Volume and 
speed of electronic data can be increased 
exponentially compared in paper format 
(Chung & Byer, 1998; Ahmad, 2008). The 
great volume of electronic evidence or too 
much quantity makes timely investigation 
an insurmountable task (Maurushat, 
2010). To date, it has been a challenge for 
investigators to extract useful information 
from a large volume of data because the era 
of Big Data has arrived (Wu, Zhu, Wu, & 
Ding, 2014). Big Data refers to a buzzword 
or catch-phrase that is used to describe 
a massive volume of both structured 
and unstructured data that are large and 
difficult to process using traditional data 
base and software techniques. An example 
of Big Data is petabytes (1,024 terrabytes) 
or exabytes (1,024 petabytes) of data 
consisting of billions to trillions of records 
of millions of people - all from different 
sources (e.g., web, sales, customer 
contract, centre, social media, mobile 
data and so on). The data are typically 
and loosely structured data that are often 
incomplete and inaccessible (Beal, n.d.). 
Hence, finding data in a Big Data could be 
like finding a needle in a haystack, which 
is tedious for the investigator. In order to 
solve this problem, the investigator may 
need to use effective tools to investigate 
the crime such as the Big Data analytics 
(Armending, 2013).
It can be concluded that electronic 
evidence is very technical and complex for 
the user to understand as it has a unique 
nature compared to the paper format. It is 
also volatile and easy to manipulate either 
accidentally, unwittingly or wittingly 
and has an enormous volume with higher 
cost and time (Adams, 2011). Proving the 
authenticity of evidence is a crucial aspect 
when it comes to electronic evidence. 
It contains the combination between 
technical aspect rather than litigation 
aspect. However, in order to ensure the 
authenticity of electronic evidence, the 
expert must be able to show the chain of 
evidence which will prove the integrity of 
the evidence itself before it can be used to 
support a legal process (Rowlingson, 2004).
AUTHENTICATION OF 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE FROM 
THE MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE
“Authentic” in Merriam Webster 
Dictionary means original, real or genuine, 
true or just like the original (http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
authentic). The authentic characteristic of 
electronic evidences is difficult to achieve 
because data in electronic format are prone 
to alteration, modification and could be 
corrupted through extraneous factor such 
as virus or malware. The data, which are 
in an electronic format, will need to be 
interpreted because they exist in the binary 
form. Authentication in digital format 
can be understood as ‘matches the claims 
made about it’ (Pattenden, 2009) and not 
a fabricated data (Radhakrishna, 2009) or 
spoliation (Adams, 2011). Adam (2011) 
defines spoliation as the destruction or 
significant alteration of evidence based on 
case West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
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167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). To date, 
there has been no authentication term in 
Malaysia concerning electronic evidence 
but there are modes of authenticating 
it. Authentication is different from 
encryption. The word encrypt is defined 
as ‘to change (information) from one form 
to another especially to hide its meaning’ 
((http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/authentic). Both authentication 
and encyrption are considered as two 
intertwined technologies that help to ensure 
the data to remain secured (Brenton, n.d.).
In Malaysia, there are two legal issues 
concerning electronic evidence. Firstly, 
whether particular electronic devices 
come under the definition of computer in 
Section 3 of the MEA. Secondly, whether 
a certificate needs to be tendered when 
a maker of a document is not called to 
testify in court. In Hanafi Mat Hassan v 
PP [2006] 4 MLJ 134, an automated bus 
ticketing machine, a termalcycler and a 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analyser 
were found to be computer generated 
documents. Those documents were 
admitted in the court although no certificate 
was produced to prove the authenticity of 
the ticket and the DNA report. The court 
dismissed the appeal of the accused  who 
was charged with rape and murder and 
confirmed the conviction and sentences 
of the High Court. In Gnanasegaran a/l 
Pararajasingam v PP, [1997] 3 MLJ 1 
at p.14, the Court of Appeal gave a clear 
clarification on whether a certificate had 
to be tendered under Section 90(A) of 
MEA. Mahadeve Shankar JCA held that 
Section 90A was enacted to bring “the best 
evidence rule” up to date with the realities 
of the electronic age. The effect of Section 
90A(1) means that the computer generated 
document (CGD) is admissible and it is no 
longer necessary to call the actual teller or 
bank clerk who keyed in the data to come 
to court, provided he issued a certificate 
stating to the best of his knowledge and 
belief that it was made in the course of its 
ordinary use. The court also held that as the 
maker was in court to testify, the certificate 
is not necessary to be adduced. Apart from 
being primary evidence, the best evidence 
rule is somehow relaxed when it comes to 
electronic evidence. It too is an exception 
to the rule against documentary hearsay. 
Section 90B requires the court to give the 
admissible evidence the requisite weightage.
Electronic evidence or computer 
generated document can be divided into 
two, namely, produced by a computer 
in the course of its ordinary use and not 
produced by the computer in the course 
of its ordinary use. Shaikh Daud Ismail 
JCA clarifies that there are two ways to 
proving ‘in the course of the ordinary 
use’ of the computer in Gnanasegaran a/l 
Pararajasingam v PP [1997] 3 MLJ 1 at 
p.11. In the course of the ordinary use, it 
may be proven by the production of the 
certificate as required by sub-section (2). 
Thus, sub-section (2) is permissive and not 
mandatory. This can also be seen in sub-
section (4) which begins with the phrase, 
“Where a certificate is given under sub-
section (2)”, or by calling the responsible 
person or the maker of the document.
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However, tendering a certificate was 
not mandatory in all cases, as explained 
in Gnanasegaran case which used the 
words ‘may be proved’ in Section 90A(2) 
indicating that the tendering of a certificate 
is not a mandatory requirement in all cases. 
In Petroliam Nasional Bhd & Ors v Khoo 
Nee Kiong [2004] 2 LRC 202, Su Geok 
Yiam JC stated that it is not compulsory for 
the plaintiffs to exhibit a certificate pursuant 
to Section 90A in his affidavit in support 
of the plaintiffs’ application in respect 
of the computer printouts containing the 
impugned statements. The requirement to 
tender a Section 90A certificate will only 
arise if the plaintiffs did not wish to call 
the officer who had personal knowledge of 
the production of the computer printouts by 
the computer to testify to that effect in the 
trial proper.
From the above cases, it could be 
surmised that authenticating of electronic 
evidence in Malaysia can be done in two 
ways; either by the production of the 
certificate as required in Section 90A(2) 
or by calling the maker or the responsible 
person. In PP v Goh Hoe Cheong & Anor 
[2006] MLJU 468, the accused were charged 
under Section 39B(1) (a), Dangerous 
Drugs Act 1952. The electronic evidence, 
which were the baggage tag and a baggage 
claim tag were inadmissible in evidence 
in the absence of both oral evidence from 
Malaysia Airlines (MAS) or the authority 
managing Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport (KLIA) to prove the aspect of 
physical checking and any certificate under 
Section 90(1). The failure to authenticate 
CGD by adducing the certificate that the 
computer is in good working order and 
was produced in the course of its ordinary 
use would make an electronic evidence 
inadmissible in evidence under Section 
67 of MEA. As a result, the accused were 
acquitted and discharged because the 
prosecution had failed to prove the charge 
against them.
Similarly, in PP v Mohd Abdul Azizi 
bin Ibrahim [2014] 10 MLJ 824 at para 
62, when the court held that the closed-
circuit television (CCTV) recording was 
inadmissible in the absence of both the 
certificate as well as the oral evidence for 
non-compliance with Section 90A of the 
MEA 1950. In this case, the electronic 
evidence was the hard disk in the CCTV. 
Even though it was not damaged and was 
able to vividly broadcast recording of the 
crime and was in safe custody, without 
adducing a certificate or oral evidence, it 
is inadmissible. Without the evidence of 
the CCTV recording, the prosecution had 
failed to establish that it was the accused 
who had caused the death of the deceased. 
Consequently, the accused was acquitted 
and discharged without calling the accused 
to enter his defence.
It is clear that there are methods in 
authenticating electronic evidence in 
Malaysia. Under Section 90A, electronic 
evidence can be admitted through one of 
two ways; either by tendering a certificate 
as stated in Section 90A(2) and (3) or an 
oral testimony to prove the document was 
produced by the computer “in the course 
of its ordinary use”. It is followed by the 
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presumption in Section 90A(4) that the 
computer is in good working order and 
operating properly at the material time. 
The question is who will ensure that 
the computer or particular devices were 
properly functioning at the material time? 
Even though the computer was in the cause 
of its ordinary use, it is not impossible that 
at the material time, it was not in good 
working order or failed to operate properly 
(Mason, 2011). Even though in DPP v 
McKeown; DPP v Jones, Lord Hoffmann, 
[1997] 1 All ER 737 at 742, said that “it 
is notorious that one needs no expertise 
in electronics to be able to know whether 
a computer is working properly”, it is an 
extreme view because it is not impossible 
to know that a computer is working 
properly even for an expert. Moreover, 
with the ability of cybercriminals to hack 
the computer system would depend on 
the expert to ensure that the computer is 
working properly. It shows the dependency 
to the expert in clarifying the electronic 
devices are in good working order.
Unfortunately, there is no specific 
provision in MEA on the authentication 
of electronic data or evidence compared 
to the United States (US) Federal Rules 
of Evidence in Rule 901 and Singapore 
Evidence Act (Amendment) 2012 in 
Section 116A, which repealed Sections 
35 and 36. Other laws such as the United 
Kingdom (UK) Civil Evidence Act 1968 
(CEA), the UK current civil evidence 
legislation, i.e. the Civil Evidence Act 
1995 (CEA) and the UK Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) also 
recognise the admissibility of electronic 
data and the importance of authenticating 
the data. Although there are provisions in 
MEA on authenticating a document under 
Sections 67 to 73A, the absence of specific 
provisions on electronic evidence has 
given rise to misunderstandings as to its 
admissibility or weightage (Radhakrishna, 
Zan, & Khong, 2013). Although the 
certificate or oral testimony is one of 
the means of authenticating electronic 
evidence, particularly computer generated 
document, it is not sufficient to ensure the 
originality and genuineness of electronic 
evidence. In the Supreme Court of India, 
Kurian J., in Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer 
and others Civil Appeal No. 4226 of 2012, 
observed that “electronic records being 
more susceptible to tampering, alteration, 
transposition, excision, etc., without such 
safeguards, the whole trial based on proof 
of electronic records can lead to travesty of 
justice”. In this case, electronic evidence 
by way of secondary evidence such as 
printouts, compact discs (CDs), pen drives, 
micro-chips, etc., shall not be given and 
used as evidence unless the requirement 
of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence 
Act (IEA) is satisfied, which requires the 
person in-charge of the duplication of 
data to give the court a certificate that the 
data are authentic to the best of his or her 
knowledge. It is to be noted that Section 
65B of IEA is pari materia with Section 
90A of MEA 1950.
The issues of collection, preservation 
and discovery are also important to 
ensure the authenticity of the contents of 
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the electronic evidence. The court must 
look into the importance of preserving 
electronic evidence to ensure that the 
contents of the electronic evidence are 
also authentic (Haneef, 2006). It seems 
that people who are associated with the 
justice system must equip themselves on 
the reality of electronic evidence, i.e. the 
unique characteristic which is prone to 
damage and alteration (Garrie & Gelb, 
2010). This is because they can properly 
address the issues that come with it.
Modes of authenticating electronic 
evidence 
In order to ensure electronic evidence is 
admissible, the parties involved must not 
only prove that the electronic evidence 
is both relevant and authentic. There are 
several ways of proving authentication in 
the MEA, which include calling the maker 
or the witness (Section 67) and expert 
opinion (Section 45), and comparing 
signatures (Section 73) and admission 
(Section 70). However, the unique nature 
of electronic evidence poses a special way 
in investigation, preservation as well as 
authentication of its contents (Borisevich 
et al., 2012). Electronic evidence can be 
authenticated by the following modes:
1. Testimony of the witness
The witness can testify the data or evidence 
from the photo. For example in Datuk Seri 
Anwar bin Ibrahim v Wan Muhammad 
Azri bin Wan Deris [2014] MLJU 177, 9 
MLJ 605 at 618, the defendant denied that 
he is the author of all the articles in any 
blog available at the following URL, www.
papagomo.com, and that he is not the owner 
of that blog. The defendant was accused 
for publishing the defamatory statement 
of the plaintiff through the website www.
papagomo.com. However, there was a 
credible witness testimony [Mohd Fauzi 
bin Mohd Azmi (SP1)], which recognised 
the defendant as papagomo when he and 
the defendant met at the Bloggers United 
Malaysia Conference on 16 May 2009 at 
Lake View Garden in Subang Jaya, where 
he took the defendant’s photograph. At 
that time, the defendant admitted to the 
witness that he was indeed the blogger 
named ‘Papagomo’. Although the 
defendant denied that he is the person in 
the photograph, the court has a base to 
believe that the person in the photograph 
and the defendant are the same person 
based on the observation of the court. As 
a result, the defendant was ordered to pay 
RM800,000.00 to the plaintiff because the 
defamatory statement could be attributed 
to the defendant.
It is clear that without any credible 
witness (i.e., Mohd Fauzi bin Mohd Azmi), 
it is difficult to prove the responsible person 
or defendant being the author and owner 
of the blog. Even with the photograph 
of the defendant, without the testimony 
from the witness, the defendant could 
have easily denied that he was the writer 
named papagomo who had published 
the defamatory statement of the plaintiff 
through the website www.papagomo.
com due to the anonymity of the virtual 
activity by internet user (Keene, 2012). 
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The user only can be identified through the 
Internet Protocol (IP) address and not by 
the person. Thus, there is a great challenge 
for investigator to identify the user of the 
electronic device. Even though the IP address 
is unique, it can be easily duplicated (Chen et. 
al., n.d). In other words, cybercriminals can 
hide behind the IP address as an anonymous 
user. Cybercriminals do not use their real 
identification when committing any offence. 
Therefore, the testimony of the witness can 
corroborate the electronic evidence.
It is clear that in order to establish an 
authentic electronic evidence (photograph), 
expert opinion or a specialist in that subject 
is required to verify whether or not the 
photograph has been modified (Low, 
2012). There are various types of software 
used in editing electronic pictures. 
However, identifying the authenticity 
of such pictures is a challenging task. 
This shows that electronic data including 
electronic photograph can be easily altered 
by using other technology. Apart from 
the testimony of witnesses, the testimony 
from the victim can authenticate electronic 
evidence. In Kevin Michael Shea v The 
State of Texas167 S.W.3d 98; 2005 Tex. 
App. LEXIS 3091, the accused (Shea) 
was convicted for indecency with a child. 
The victim’s testimony authenticates the 
emails sent to her by the accused. The 
victim is familiar with the defendant’s 
e-mail address and the contents of the 
e-mails match the conversation between 
them. In specific, the victim testified that 
the defendant had called her to confirm that 
she had received his e-mail. As a result, 
the court accepted the electronic evidence 
(emails) with the corroboration with other 
evidence. This overruled the objection 
raised by the defendant who had argued 
that the emails lacked of authenticity. On 
the other hand, the High Court of Kuala 
Lumpur in Re Ng Liang Shing: ex-parte 
Sirim Bhd. [2013] 8 MLJ 916 dismissed 
an appeal made by the Judgment debtor 
(JD) who relied on computer evidence and 
emails. The learned judge said, “Although 
the judgment creditor (JC) had not objected 
to the authenticity and the admissibility of 
JD’s electronic evidence, nevertheless, for 
such evidence to be admitted, it would also 
require the evidence to be tested against 
the normal rules of evidence on burden 
and standard of proof and the weight to be 
attached to the evidence. The court found the 
relevance and weight to be given to the e mail 
trail and the electronic attendance record to 
fall far short of proof that the JD was actually 
in his department when the bankruptcy notice 
was purportedly served on him”.
2. Expert Opinion
Section 45 of the MEA defines an expert as a 
person who has a special skill or knowledge 
or experience in science or art or foreign law 
which is acquired through special study or 
practice in that particular area. This means 
expert witnesses are able to give opinion(s) 
based on their skills for the questions 
asked. In Chou Kooi Pang & Anor v Public 
Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR 593, Yong Pung 
How CJ opined that the expert opinion was 
only admissible to furnish the court with 
scientific information which was likely to 
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be outside the experience and knowledge 
of a judge. An expert must be skilled in his 
field whether through special study or from 
experience in order to assist the court.
Electronic evidence is a combination of 
law and technology, and the authentication 
of its contents has to be done by expert 
witness, i.e. a computer forensic investigator. 
Some countries have added a new section 
concerning expert opinion on authentication 
of electronic evidence to their existing laws. 
India, for example, inserted a new section, i.e. 
Section 79A of the Information Technology 
(Amendment) Act 2008, which involves 
or includes expert opinion as an examiner 
of electronic evidence. Computer forensic 
experts have a difficult task to prove the 
authenticity of electronic evidence, which is 
to ensure no doubt of any possible alteration 
during the process of searching, collecting, 
analysing and presenting the data to the court 
(Juan, 2011). In Kennedy v Baker [2004] 
FCA 562, Branson said that, “Computer data 
can be easily altered and merely turning a 
computer on causes data stored within the 
computer to change. One of the principal 
objectives in forensic examination of a 
computer system is to ensure that data on 
the computer system is not altered by the 
examiner during the examination process.” 
In this case, Mr Kennedy sought an order 
that would prevent the respondents from 
examining or otherwise dealing with the 
imaged hard drive and required the delivery 
up of the imaged hard drive to him. The issue 
in this case concerns with the extent of the 
power given to an officer executing a search 
warrant. The application was dismissed with 
cost.
A computer forensic investigator is the 
person most suitable to help establish the 
authenticity of electronic data. The expert 
can preserve and ensure from the first step 
i.e. collection of electronic evidence up to the 
time when the evidence is produced in court. 
It means that a computer forensic expert can 
assist the judicial system in implementing 
justice relating to the techniques of 
investigation, i.e. to authenticate electronic 
evidence (Haneef, 2006).
3. Chain of custody
At the same time, the chain of custody of 
such evidence is important to ensure that 
the electronic evidence is authentic and 
accepted by the court from the time the 
data were created up to the time they are 
required (Giova, 2011; Mason, 2010). In 
Mohd Ali Jaafar v Public Prosecutor [1998] 
4 MLJ 210 at 229, the appellant was found 
guilty by the Session court judge. In this 
case, the learned counsel for the appellant 
contended that the chain of custody of the 
tape recordings had not been established 
by the prosecution. He further said that it 
must be affirmatively proven and referred 
to Ghazali bin Salleh & Anor v PP [1993] 
3 CLJ 638, where Abdul Malik Ishak JC 
(as he then was) said in p. 644, “since the 
tape-recorded conversation is susceptible 
to interference, and can be easily altered, 
there must be evidence to show that it is 
well guarded. The essence of any safeguard 
which is at once real and understandable 
seems to lie in physically guarding the 
disc or tape as soon as a recording has 
been made on it; and making sure that it is 
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under guard until it is needed for a lawful 
occasion or until it is brought to the court”. 
Augustine Paul J. said that the authenticity 
of the recordings had not been proven 
beyond reasonable doubt as there was a 
break in the chain of custody. Therefore, 
the tape recordings were wrongly admitted 
in evidence by the judge. As the conviction 
of the appellant on the first charge was 
anchored on the recorded evidence, it 
could not be sustained. Accordingly, the 
conviction and sentence on the first charge 
were quashed.
In order to ensure the authenticity of 
electronic evidence, the expert must be 
able to show the chain of evidence which 
will prove the integrity of the evidence 
before it can be used to support a legal 
process (Rowlingson, 2004). Furthermore, 
the investigators need to recognise that the 
chain of evidence is just as important as 
electronic evidence as it is with physical 
types to ensure the integrity of the evidence 
(Cameron, 2011). Apart from that, the 
unbroken chain of evidence is also the most 
effective method to preserving electronic 
evidence (Group 3, 2014). It can reveal any 
tampering and error in data entry, which 
is an evidentiary problem concerning 
electronic evidence.
It is clear that there are many modes of 
authenticating electronic evidence such as 
through testimony of witness, admission, 
expert opinion and also through the break in 
the chain of evidence. Electronic evidence 
is one of the forms of documentary 
evidence. Documentary evidence is one of 
the modes of proof other than oral evidence, 
circumstantial evidence and physical 
evidence. In PP v Mohd Abdul Aziz bin 
Ibrahim [2013] MLJU 530, although the 
court admits electronic evidence, they 
would still fail to prove a prima facie case 
unless the accused pleaded guilty. This is 
a murder case under  Section 302 of the 
Penal Code. In PP v Muhammad Nuzaihan 
bin Kamal Luddin [2000] 1 SLR 34, the 
accused pleaded guilty to unauthorised 
access to computer materials, unauthorised 
modification of the contents of a computer 
and unauthorised access to a computer 
service under Sections 3(1), 5(1) and 6(1)
(a) of the Computer Misuse Act (Cap 50A, 
1993 Ed) (‘CMA’). In PP v Law Aik Meng 
[2007] SGHC 33, the accused pleaded 
guilty for working in syndicate which 
involved in perpetrating an automated 
teller machine (ATM) card fraud and was 
charged under the CMA and the Penal 
Code. However, if the case is primarily 
based on the electronic evidence, the court 
might not be able to convict the accused 
without any other evidence if there was no 
weightage or the weightage attached to the 
electronic evidence is trivial.
CONCLUSION
It  can be said that electronic evidence is 
not synonymous to cybercrime as one 
might have thought. Electronic evidence 
also relates to other cases other than 
cybercrimes; in fact, proof or conviction 
of the accused is much easier compared 
to other evidence as electronic evidence is 
automatically available in hard disks such 
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as those in speed cameras and in computers. 
For electronic evidence, however, being 
a documentary evidence, apart from its 
clean provenance (i.e., authenticity), legal 
relevancy and the best evidence rules must 
be complied in order for it to be admissible. 
The certificate used for authenticating 
electronic evidence is not sufficient enough 
to ensure the originality and genuineness of 
the electronic evidence or the content. Thus, 
to ensure that the electronic evidence is 
authentic, the discovery and preservation of 
electronic evidence must also be addressed 
using other evidence. At the same time, the 
prosecution, through their witnesses, must 
be able to show that the chain of evidence 
is unbroken because this will prove the 
integrity of the evidence before it can be 
used to support a legal claim. Apart from 
the modes for authenticating electronic 
evidence, Malaysia does not have a specific 
section concerning the authenticity of 
electronic evidence in respect of the weight 
to be attached to it compared to Singapore 
Evidence Act and the US Federal Rules 
of Evidence. It is proposed that laws on 
authenticity, reliability, accuracy and their 
weightage should be made available in the 
Malaysian Evidence Act 1950 by adopting 
the Singapore Evidence (Amendment) Act 
2012 as a model legislation.
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ABSTRACT
Identity theft is one of the crimes that threaten both society and individuals. Millions 
of people have been badly affected by identity theft following misuse of their identities 
by criminals. The term ‘identity theft’ is used to include all illicit activities (gathering, 
utilising, buying selling, etc.) that target personal information (including natural and 
legal persons). Identity theft is not a new crime, and it has grown and become a major 
concern in the era of information. Around the globe, laws and regulations have been 
enacted and revised to accommodate the phenomenon. Based on the divine rules of Islam, 
the Shari’ah has its own formula and perspectives on matter such as identity theft. This 
paper attempts to define the term ‘identity theft’ and then recollect and examine some of 
the Shari’ah rules related to the crime in general and discuss their applicability to this 
insurmountable matter of identity theft so as to demonstrate solutions that can be offered 
to Muslim-populated jurisdiction. It is a doctrinal rather than empirical study, therefore, 
it attempts to explore the Shari’ah rules based on the primary sources of Islam, i.e. the 
Qur’an and the prophetic traditions (hadith), as well as the juristic opinions of prominent 
Muslim scholars. The study finds that the Shari’ah law is very resourceful with principles 
and theories on which laws on identity theft can be established. This paper demonstrates 
another area where the Shari’ah should be further explored to answer to the challenges 
of contemporary society. It is argued that a study such as this will positively contribute to 
the field of justice as it looks at identity crime from another approach and also suggests 
further research to help alleviate identity theft especially in the Muslim communities.
Keywords: Identity theft, fraud, Islamic criminal law
INTRODUCTION
Identity theft is one of the crimes that 
threaten both society and individuals and 
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“unlike other crimes, victims of identity 
theft may not know they are victims 
until weeks or months after the theft has 
occurred” (An Australian Government 
Initiative, 2014). In the digital age, 
interests of people, especially in regard 
to property, are in serious danger. In 
traditional theft, thieves usually exercise 
their physical strength to commit the act of 
crimes. However, cybercriminals can steal 
millions of dollars while sitting in their 
divans and even without their innocent 
victims knowing about it. Consumer 
Sentinel Network Data Book highlighted 
an increase in the number of identity theft 
victims in the USA during the last 12 
years (from 2001 to 2012). In 2001, for 
instance, the number of victims was about 
137 hundred while in 2012, it was over 
one million (Consumer Sentinel Network 
Data Book, 2012). It was also indicated 
that about 15 million of the United States 
residents have had their identities used 
fraudulently each year resulting in an 
estimated loss amounting to $50 million 
(www.identitytheft.info, 2014). In 2012, 
around 7% of those aged 16 years or older 
became victims of identity theft (Erika 
Harrell, 2013). Identity theft can result 
in an experience of nightmare as in case 
of Adrian Richards, a UK citizen who is 
currently liable for a £130,000 unpaid tax 
bill in Germany and has to hire solicitors to 
fight a £34,000 court order (The Telegraph, 
19 Oct 2013). Mr. Richards’s passport was 
stolen and identity thieves used his passport 
to conduct unlawful activities that resulted 
in this debt.
As many cybercrimes are out of the 
scope of the traditional laws, lawmakers 
around the globe have responded by 
creating special rules that can be applied 
to digital crimes such as identity theft. 
Fortunately, the Shari’ah has come to 
guide mankind and solve their problems. 
The Holy Qur’an (Al-Hadid: 57) says, “We 
sent afore time Our Messengers with Clear 
Signs and sent down with them the Book 
and the Balance (of Right and Wrong), that 
men may stand forth in justice” (Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali, 2007, p. 686). The Shari’ah has 
its own rules (ahkam) that can be applied 
to all crimes regardless of the time and 
location. Generally, the Shari’ah is aimed at 
benefiting the society and individuals and 
its laws are designed to protect their benefits 
and to facilitate their lives (Kamali, 2007, 
p. 395). This article attempts to positively 
contribute to the ongoing discussion by 
looking at identity theft from an Islamic 
perspective. It starts with a clarification 
of the term ‘identity theft’ in its academic 
usage. Then, it collects and analyses some 
relevant Shari’ah laws and discuss their 
applicability to identity theft. This is 
followed by conclusions for the paper by 
giving relevant recommendations.
DEFINITION OF IDENTITY THEFT
Nabeth (2009) mentioned that the concept 
of identity can be approached from two 
perspectives: the structural and the process 
perspectives. In the structural perspective, 
identity as a representation is used as a 
reference to “a set of attributes (permanent 
or temporary) describing the characteristics 
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of the person in context of practical activities” 
such as positions. In the process perspective, 
identity is viewed as “a set of process relating 
to disclosure of information about the person 
and usage of this information.”  Here, 
identity consists of elements that identify 
persons and link them to some authorisation 
such as identity cards. It is worthy to note 
that ‘identity’ is a term that is shared by many 
specialists in various fields of knowledge 
and thus we hear legal, social, technological 
and commercial identities and so forth (Sidi 
Mohamed, 2014).
Broadly speaking, identity theft is a 
term used to describe misusing identities 
and it is considered as one of the most 
known identity crimes. Therefore, various 
terms (e.g., identity crime, identity theft 
and identity fraud) have been used to 
describe the act of misusing identities and 
related information. James Blindell (2006) 
observes that in the USA, the term ‘identity 
theft’ is used to cover all types of identity 
crimes while in the UK and Australia, 
terms such as ‘identity fraud’ and ‘identity 
crime’ are used respectively to cover such 
crimes. Historically, as mentioned by 
Shun-Yung and Huang (2011), the term 
‘identity theft’ was used to describe crimes 
committed against individual victims while 
‘identity fraud’ is the term used to describe 
crimes against collective bodies such as 
the government and financial institutions. 
More recently, according to the authors, the 
term ‘identity theft’ is used to distinguish 
the act of obtaining personal identifying 
information and ‘identity fraud’ applied to 
the act of utilising such information.
The Canadian Criminal Code (R.S.C., 
1985, c. C-46, s.402.2) defines identity 
theft by stating that, “Everyone commits an 
offence who knowingly obtains or possesses 
another person’s identity information in 
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable 
inference that the information is intended 
to be used to commit an indictable offence 
that includes fraud, deceit or falsehood as 
an element of the offence”. In the United 
States, an identity theft offender has been 
defined to include anyone who “knowingly 
transfers or uses, without lawful authority, 
a means of identification of another person 
with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, 
any unlawful activity that constitutes a 
violation of Federal law, or that constitutes 
a felony under any applicable State or local 
law” (Newman, Megan, & McNally, 2005, 
p. 1).
Academically, Mohamed Chawki 
and Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab (2006, 
p. 2) define the ‘term identity’ by stating 
that “Identity theft occurs when someone 
uses or exploits the personal identifying 
information of another person such as: 
name, social security number, mother’s 
maiden name, ID number, etc…to commit 
fraud or engage in other unlawful activities. 
The OECD Ministerial Meeting on the 
Future of the Internet Economy in Seoul 
(2008, p. 12) described how identity theft 
is committed by the criminals: “ID theft 
occurs when a party acquires, transfers, 
possesses, or uses personal information of 
a natural or legal person in an unauthorised 
manner, with the intent to commit, or in 
connection with, fraud or other crimes.”
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In general, the above definitions include 
common key elements such as the object 
of identity theft (data or information), the 
acts (acquiring data, using or manipulating 
it, etc.), mental elements (obtaining and 
using information, etc.) and missing 
authorisation from the victim. The four 
mentioned elements “are required for the 
development of a criminal law provision 
in defining the structure” (Gercke, 2011). 
Thus, identity theft is an umbrella term 
used to place together many offences 
pertaining to identity (Zulhuda, 2012).  
For the purpose of this paper, ‘identity 
theft’ is used to include collecting personal 
information in illegal ways, misusing 
identities (manipulation, forgery, etc.) and 
using them in various unlawful ways.
 
Identity Theft Toolkits
Lawson mentioned that identifying 
information can be obtained through 
victim’s negligence and deception, third 
party public disclosure and third party 
negligence or deception (Lawson, 2011). 
These tactics range from very simple 
ways such as theft of wallets, documents, 
dumpster diving, shoulder surfing, listening 
to oral disclosures of personal identity, 
to more sophisticated methods such as 
phishing, pharming, and using hacking 
and malicious software in which the 
perpetrators utilise high technology devices 
to commit their offences (Almerdas, 2007). 
Some of these tools seem to be unlawful 
(haram) in the Shari’ah perspective 
because they either contravene specific 
laws such as theft, spy and privacy (secret) 
laws or general laws such as prohibition of 
oppression and harming or causing damage 
to others’ property, as will be discussed in 
the later section of this paper.
Purposes of Identity Theft   
Identity crime is committed for different 
purposes. For example, criminals can 
engage in illegal activities such as selling 
personal information to other criminals, 
accessing and using their victims’ credit or 
debit cards and taking over their existing 
accounts or opening new bank accounts, 
obtaining a passport or other identity 
documents in someone else’s name, 
obtaining government benefits and services 
using the victim’s name, concealing 
their identities while travelling illegally, 
smuggling drugs, engaging in money-
laundering, terrorism or other crimes, 
misleading law enforcement or court 
officials by directing them to the wrong 
persons, etc. (ICCLR, 2011).
IDENTITY THEFT FROM THE 
SHARI’AH PERSPECTIVE
Protecting individuals’ interests and 
benefits is the main objectives of the 
Shari’ah, as evidenced from Islamic 
resources including the holy Qur’an 
(Kamali, 1991, p. 395). The Shari’ah rules 
can be applied to all matters including 
identity theft in the digital age as the rules 
provide general and specific guidelines 
for all offences regardless of time and 
place (Ahmed Vathi, n.d., p. 36).  Laws of 
Shari’ah (ahkam sharciah) can be divided 
into two categories; defining law (al-Hukm 
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al-Taklifi) and declaratory law (al-Hukm 
al-Wadci) and each has different types. 
The former can be defined as “a locution 
or communication from the Lawgiver 
addressed to the mukallaf which consists of 
a demand or of an option” whilst the latter 
is “communication from the Lawgiver 
which enacts something into a cause 
(sabab), condition (shart) or a hiderence 
(manic) to something else” (Kamali, 1991, 
pp. 323-325).
Prohibition of theft by the Shari’ah 
can be taken as an example of defining 
laws and theft punishment can be given as 
an example of declaratory laws (Khallaf, 
n.d., pp. 100-103).  In this regard, it 
can be argued that the Shari’ah protects 
identities not only through general rules, 
but also by relying on specific rules 
(ahkam) and regulations. Laws on theft, 
forgery, fraud, spying and disclosure of 
secrets, in addition to sanctity of property 
are applicable to at least some forms of 
identity theft. In addition, other Shari’ah 
laws such as the sanctity of houses, sanctity 
of man’s honour, prohibition of spying and 
prohibition of disclosure of secrecy could 
also be employed to curb identity theft in 
the digital age. The following are some 
examples of the Shari’ah laws that can 
arguably be applied to identify them.
 
Information Theft
Interestingly, under the Shari’ah, theft is 
one of the most serious crimes in Islam as 
it falls under the hudud crimes. In Islam, 
theft consists of infringement of property 
and privacy of others.  Normally, property 
is protected by imposing a heavy penalty 
on the thieves. The Qur’an (al-Maeda: 38) 
reads, “As to thief, male or female, cut off 
his or her hands: a punishment by way of 
example, from Allah, for their crime: and 
Allah is Exalted in Power, Full of Wisdom.” 
Likewise in one authentic narration, the 
Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said, “May 
Allah curse the thief who steals an egg for 
which his hand is cut off, or steals a rope 
for which his hand is to be cut off” (Ibn 
Hajar al-Asqalany, 2003, p. 461).
The term ‘theft’ is known as ‘sariqah’ 
in Arabic, which means the act of taking 
or appropriating something in a secret way 
or without the permission of the owner. It 
includes taking objects and other things 
such as hearing speech, as the Qur’an 
(Al-Hijr: 18) says, “But any that gains a 
hearing by stealth, is pursued by a flaming 
fire, bright (to see).” Meanwhile, Ibn 
Rushd (1981) defines theft as “...taking the 
property of others in a secret way without 
being in his trusteeship.” Likewise, cAbd 
Allah Ibn Mahmud (n.d.) mentions the 
following definition; “Theft is the act 
of taking a sound-minded adult secretly 
a certain storing amount of money or 
its value, belonging to others, without a 
valuable reason” (in other words, without 
having a reason to believe that such 
property is lawful for him).
It can be learned from these definitions 
that theft under the Shari’ah consists of 
taking the property or possession of others 
without their permission in a specific 
manner. Additionally, these definitions 
contain some conditions related to criminals 
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and conditions related to property.  These 
conditions are important as they distinguish 
thefts from other financial crimes such as 
usurpation (Ghasb), embezzlement, (Al-
Ikhtilas), breach of trust (Al-Khiyanah) and 
so forth.
Once these strict requirements are met, 
as well as all strict evidentiary conditions 
are fulfilled and the accused is found guilty 
by the court for committing theft, the 
punishment for the thief is the amputation 
of the right hand.
Does Identity Theft Qualify for Theft 
Liable for Hudud punishment? 
In order to apply theft laws to identity theft, 
however, one needs to examine whether all 
the required conditions for theft are present 
on the occurrence of these crimes. As 
mentioned above, identity theft includes 
stealing personal information and utilising 
this information and each one will be 
examined in the light of the Shari’ah law.
a. Stealing Personal Information
Cybercriminals can gain information on 
someone’s identity in many ways. Here, 
the focus is on stealing personal data under 
the perspective of the Shari’ah. According 
to Ibn Rushd, the majority of scholars are 
unanimous that stealing valuable property 
which can be bought and sold, subjects the 
thief to the hadd punishment. Thus, the 
question here is the personal information 
valuable property in the eyes of the 
Shari’ah. Can personal information be 
bought and sold?
Without any doubt, in this digital 
age, information becomes essential and 
valuable because “the data…has a very 
real, commercial value - possession of data 
itself is every bit as important as possession 
of physical real estate or capital good” 
(Barrett, 1997, p. 16) and people use the 
information in their daily lives. Having said 
that information is a valuable possession 
does not necessarily mean that stealing it 
is a theft under the Shari’ah because wine 
and pigs are valuable but stealing them 
is not considered a theft, which is liable 
for hadd punishment. In other words, the 
commercial value of information is only 
one of the conditions required in the stolen 
thing. Can personal information be bought 
and sold? Under the Shari’ah perspective, 
for instance, the object (goods) that can 
be bought or sold has to be a pure and 
beneficial thing that can be handed to the 
new owner (Shaikh Khalil, 1981).
Additionally, dealing with information 
as an asset is only a new occurrence 
in this digital age and for that reason, 
it is missing from traditional Islamic 
discussions. Nevertheless, another issue 
related to stealing information has been 
cited by Islamic jurists. It is the issue of 
stealing books including Qura’nic and fiqh 
books. In this regard, the Hanafi school, for 
instance, says that stealing Qur’anic and 
fiqh books does not subject the thief to theft 
punishment because the books are usually 
kept for reading and the letters do not have 
financial values (cAbdallah Ibn Mahmud, 
n.d.). However, other scholars are of the 
opposite view. For example, the Maliki 
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school viewed stealing Qur’anic or fiqh 
books as a theft. This opinion was justified 
by arguing that stealing things which can 
be sold is a punishable theft (Abd Al-
Wahhab, 1997).
It is noteworthy to mention here the 
opinion of a contemporary Islamic jurist, 
Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, about stealing 
information. Al-Qaradawi (2011), when 
asked about stealing protected information, 
is of the opinion that information is 
not a property even though it may have 
great value and thus, stealing it is not 
a conventional theft or in other words, 
stealing information is not a theft in the 
terminology of Islamic jurists. It seems 
that Al-Qaradawi has been influenced by 
the Hanafi school of thought. It is arguable 
that the opinion of al-Qaradawi is a 
justifiable opinion because the general rule 
of Shari’ah, as explained before, provides 
that hudud must be abandoned in the event 
of doubt or uncertainty. Thus, bearing in 
mind that the term ‘personal information’ 
includes different types and in the light of 
the above, one can come to the conclusion 
that stealing personal information may not 
be a punishable with the hadd punishment 
because the nature of the stolen subject 
matter is not clear.
b.  Using Stolen Information to Commit 
Theft  
Stolen information can include financial 
information such as credit card information, 
passwords and physical ATM cards, and 
such information may enable criminals to 
access victims’ existing accounts, transfer 
money from victims’ accounts to another, 
buy goods online, etc. These activities 
are absolutely forbidden by the Shari’ah 
because they infringe the sanctity of the 
property of others.
By analogy, Islam has announced that 
it is illegal to enter the houses of others 
without permission even though the houses 
are empty (The Quran, An-Nur: 27). The 
point being highlighted here is that the 
financial accounts of others are important 
personal information that must be protected. 
In the light of the rules relating to theft, 
accessing accounts without transferring 
money cannot be considered as a theft. It 
is like accessing the physical store or place 
of property and it is known that one of the 
conditions of theft is to bring the property 
out of its store or safe place. The jurists 
state that if the thief enters the place and 
takes the property but it is taken from his 
hands before he exits, it will not amount to 
the crime of theft which is liable for hadd 
punishment. It is submitted that the same 
rules can be applied to cybercriminals 
who misuse personal data to access 
others’ accounts without permission or 
authority; though there may be no theft, 
such unauthorised access of information 
itself is wrong and can amount to a ta’zir 
punishment.
In another scenario, cybercriminals can 
commit further crimes such as transferring 
money from the victims’ accounts to another 
account. In this case, the criminals can be 
considered thieves and can be punished 
by the prescribed punishment if all other 
conditions are fulfilled. To illustrate this, 
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theft rules can apply to anyone who takes 
respected property secretly from its proper 
place which he enters without permission 
if all other conditions are fulfilled. Careful 
examination of these crimes can lead one 
to conclude that the definitions of theft 
in Shari’ah can apply to them if all other 
conditions are fulfilled. On this particular 
issue, Al-Qaradawi (2011) commented 
that stealing money from banks by using 
information such as number on cards and 
password is a complete theft because all 
conditions of theft are fulfilled.
FRAUD AND FORGERY IN THE 
SHARI’AH PERSPECTIVE
Fraud is another part of the Shari’ah criminal 
law that can be applied to identity theft. 
According to Ibn al-Arabi (1998), fraud 
(al-ghish) is derived from the Arabic word 
‘al-ghashash’ which means muddy water 
as a fraudster usually mixes good and bad 
quality and hides the reality. He added that 
all Islamic jurists unanimously agreed that 
fraud is forbidden by the Shari’ah because 
it contradicts the obligation of giving 
advice. It is narrated by Imam Muslim 
that the Prophet (P.B.U.H) said, “A person 
who takes up arms against us in not one of 
us and likewise the one who cheats us is 
not one of us” (Imam An-Nawawi, 1984, 
p.770). Undoubtedly, identity theft includes 
fraud because the criminals fraudulently 
use victims’ identities to obtain goods or 
services. Phishing is also another manifest 
of fraudulent act that criminals employ to 
collect information, as explained before.
Other than fraud, forgery law is 
also relevant to the crime as identity 
criminals do expand their illegal actions 
to manipulate documents or create forged 
documents. Forgery is “the crime of 
copying a document, signature, painting, 
etc. in order to deceive people” (Oxford 
Wordpower, 2006, p. 309). Similarly in 
Arabic, the term tazwir (forgery) means to 
falsely create or say something in order to 
deceive others (Butrus Al-bustani, 1987). 
From the Shari’ah point of view, forgery 
is one of the major sins that are forbidden 
by the Shariah. The Holy Qur’an (Al-Hajj: 
30) states, “…and shun the word that is 
false.” Closely connected to the above, the 
Shari’ah forbids perjury or false testimony 
and counts it among the major sins. False 
testimony is derived from ‘al-zur’ which 
according to Imam al-Nawawi (1323H) 
is disguising falsehood and making it 
like truth. In fact, “identity thieves can 
use personally identifiable information 
to create fake or counterfeit documents 
such as birth certificates, licenses, and 
Social Security cards” (Finklea, 2014) and 
thus, the Shari’ah law of forgery can be 
employed to combat identity theft.
LAWS OF SPYING AND 
DISCLOSURE OF SECRECY
Identity thieves employ highly sophisticated 
methods such as phishing, pharming, and 
using hacking and malicious software to 
unlawfully collect personal information 
(Suhail Almerdas, 2007). Cyber trespass 
and hacking seem to be illegal (haram) 
in the eye of the Shari’ah because they 
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infringe the well-known Shari’ah rules such 
as infringement of the sanctity of others’ 
property and prohibition to encroach and 
spy on others.
Spying
Regarding spying rules, the Shari’ah 
forbids spying and infringement of the 
sanctity of other people as the Holy 
Qur’an (Al-Hujuraat: 12) says, “O you 
who believe! Avoid much suspicions, 
indeed some suspicions are sins. And 
spy not, neither backbite one another...” 
Similarly, the Prophet s.a.w said, “Beware 
of suspicion, for suspicion is the worst of 
false tales. Do not look for other’s faults. 
Do not spy one another” (An-Nawawi, a. 
P. 1185-6). According to Muslim jurists, 
spying (al-tajassus) is looking for private 
and secret matters. This includes private 
information and everything that is kept in 
secret. Furthermore, spying is an unlawful 
activity regardless of the means that are 
taken in doing it. It includes spying on 
people through doors, as well as using 
new technology (Hasan Al-Ghafiri & 
Muhammad Al-Alfi, 2007).
By analogy, cyber trespassing and 
hacking are akin to spying; hence, one 
can say that doing so is breaking the rules 
because cyber-intruders and hackers usually 
rummage into the victims’ computers 
or computer systems to find secrets and 
private matters such as financial or personal 
information and this is exactly what a spy 
does. For instance, gathering information 
in a secret way such as installing software 
programme in the victims’ computer to 
intercept communication and listening to 
oral disclosure of personal information 
could be considered as spying from the 
Shari’ah point of view.
Rule of Secrecy
In the Shari’ah point of view, keeping 
secrets is a vital matter. As an illustration, it 
is narrated that Anas (one of the Prophet’s 
companions) said, “The Prophet (PBUH) 
came to me while I was playing with the 
boys. He greeted us and sent me on an 
errand. This delayed my return to my 
mother, when I came to her, she asked, 
“What detained you?” I said; “Allah’s 
Messenger sent me on errand.” She asked, 
“What was it?” I said it’s a secret. My 
mother said; “Do not disclose to anyone the 
secret of Allah’s Messenger.” Anas said to 
Thabit: “By Allah, were I to tell it to anyone 
I would have told you” (An-Nawawi, p. 
596-7). This authentic hadith indicates that 
keeping a secret was an essential matter in 
the early Muslim society. The jurists say 
that keeping secrets includes all things 
such as secret information, private matters, 
conversation, correspondence and so forth 
(Ahmad Ibn Ghunim, 1997). Since identity 
thieves are working under the table, it 
is arguable that the rule of secrecy could 
apply to their activities, at least in some 
instances.
SANCTITY OF PROPERTY AND 
IDENTITY THEFT
Regarding the sanctity of property, the 
Messenger of Allah said this when He was 
delivering the final sermon on the day of 
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An-Nahr (the sacrifice) in Makkah, “Your 
blood, your property, and your honour are 
sacred to you all like the sacredness of this 
day of yours, in this city of yours and in this 
month of yours” (Al-Imam An-Nawawi, 
1998). This authentic hadith shows how 
the Shari’ah respects and protects property 
from any interference.
Additionally, identity theft is considered 
an act of aggression and mischief against 
the property of others which is forbidden 
by the Shari’ah as stated om the Qur’an 
(Al-Baqarah: 188), “And do not eat up your 
property among yourselves for vanities, nor 
use it as bait for the judges, with intent that 
you may eat up wrongfully and knowingly 
a little of (other) people’s property.”  As 
Ibn Juzay (1430H) mentioned, aggression 
against property encompasses four kinds 
of unlawful actions: (1) taking property 
away without the owner’s permission, 
(2) taking advantage of property, (3) 
destroying property, and (4) spoiling 
property completely or partially or making 
it less beneficial. It is argued that identity 
theft can be considered an aggressive 
activity against property as it includes the 
four elements of aggression. For instance, 
identity criminal can take over existing 
accounts, documents, services, etc., and 
use them without permission or even with 
the victims’ knowledge.
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The discussion reveals that identity theft 
has become a major challenge in the 
information age as it is a menace to all 
societies regardless of age, position or 
location. Different preventive measures 
have been employed to tackle the crime. 
In some countries, identity theft is a 
stand-alone crime, while in others, it is 
“covered by a multitude of rules including 
unlawful access to data, fraud, forgery, and 
intellectual property rights, etc” (OECD, 
2008). From the Islamic perspective, 
identity theft is a crime that can be treated 
by various Shari’ah principles and rules, as 
explained above.
The Shari’ah principles relating to 
the law of theft is applicable to identity 
theft in different scenarios as in cases of 
account takeovers which “occur when an 
unauthorized party gains online access to 
an existing bank account by stealing the 
access credentials to the account and then 
conducts illegal transactions” (Castell, 
2013). Where all the strict conditions of 
theft are fulfilled, the prescribed hadd 
penalty (Haddu al-sariqah) can then be 
imposed. On the contrary, if any of the 
requirements of hadd is not fulfilled, 
the discretionary penalty (Ta’zir) is then 
applicable.
It was also pointed out that fraud and 
forgery laws can be cited as evidence 
of criminalising identity thefts from the 
Shari’ah perspective. Forgery and fraud are 
usually part of the identity thieves and are 
also unlawful (haram) under the Shari’ah 
law and for that reason they can be used to 
combat identity theft. Interestingly, forgery 
and fraud are discretionary crimes which 
have no specific punishment and falls under 
ta’zir crimes. It means that the Shari’ah 
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gives courts or lawmakers the freedom to 
impose a suitable penalty for the crime.
Other Shari’ah laws such as rules on 
spying, disclosure of secrecy and protecting 
of property are relevant to identity theft, as 
explained above. Therefore, the Shari’ah 
approach can be adopted to combat identity 
theft in the digital age as the conventional 
approach seems to be ineffective in dealing 
with the phenomenon.
However, it is not the scope of this 
article to look at how these Shari’ah rules are 
being implemented in the courts of various 
jurisdictions, which is a natural follow-
up that deserves another research of more 
empirical nature. Nevertheless, this article 
recommends that countries with a Muslim 
community adopt the Shari’ah approach in 
dealing with identity thefts as the Shari’ah 
establishes general and flexible rules that 
can be applied to various crimes related to 
information-related offences. For instance, 
the Shari’ah punishment is characterised by 
the ease of implementation and the power 
of deterrence (Ahmad al-Raisoni, 1999). 
With the correct understanding of Islam 
and the Shari’ah, it is strongly believed that 
adopting the Shari’ah approach to identity 
theft will help protect individuals in the 
society from becoming victims and deter 
potential criminals from committing the 
crime of identity theft.
Apart from that, steps can be taken 
to enact and create special laws (based 
on the Shari’ah) that deal with identity 
thefts and digital crimes in general. This 
recommendation was initially suggested by 
some researchers who urged for creation 
of comprehensive identity crime offenses 
that cover identity theft and identity fraud 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2008). It 
is believed that such specific laws are 
necessary particularly in countries that do 
not have computer crime acts. This special 
law can be a multipurpose tool. On one 
hand, it would enable law-enforcement 
bodies to prosecute identity criminals and 
on the other hand, it would help to create 
public awareness of identity crimes.
In addition, raising awareness among 
the legal fraternities and public about this 
type of crimes is also essential because 
there is a real need to sensitise the public 
to the problem of identity crime and 
its grave consequences. In the digital 
environment, people are willing to share 
everything including personal information 
and the criminals, as said, wait in ambush. 
Therefore, educating people about the 
consequences of identity crime and 
warning them that their personal interests 
could be in danger would lead them to be 
extra careful with their identity information 
and consequently protect themselves from 
identity theft.
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ABSTRACT
An act can only be regarded as a crime if its exercise can cause harm to others. On that basis, 
many activities that usurp copyright and can possibly pose harm to the society have been 
criminalised. In relation to traditional cultural expression, model laws such as the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Draft Articles on the Protection of Traditional 
Cultural Expressions (2011), WIPO-UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organisation) Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of 
Expression of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Action (1982) and 
the South Pacific Model Law for National Laws (2002), as well as some national laws of 
the United States of America and the Philippines have criminalised certain acts constituting 
the misappropriation of traditional cultural expressions (TCEs). TCEs or expressions of 
‘folklore’ are considered by many developing countries as part and parcel of their cultural 
fabrics and their misappropriation as ‘harmful’ not only to the right holder’s interest but also 
to the country. To that extent, the misappropriation of TCEs must be criminalised. This paper 
commences with an examination of copyright protection over TCEs in Malaysia with a view 
to assessing the adequacy, relevancy and efficacy of criminal sanction and ensuring effective 
enforcement against misappropriation of indigenous TCEs. The article also examines 
national initiatives on TCEs, particularly countries that have criminal provisions on certain 
activities involving TCEs. To lend support for criminalisation, the article further revisits 
the initiatives of WIPO and UNESCO. The article concludes that introducing some form 
of criminal offences within the context of 
copyright law is possible either through the 
extension of the existing criminal provisions 
or by having a special part dealing only with 
misappropriation of TCEs.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional cultural expression (hereinafter 
referred as to “TCE”) includes “any 
tangible or intangible form of creativity 
including phonetic or verbal expressions, 
musical or sound expressions, expressions 
by actions and tangible expressions 
(WIPO)”1. Internationally, WIPO and 
UNESCO have for decades tried to 
come up with model laws on TCEs, with 
differing objectives and purposes. One 
of the components of TCE is indigenous 
TCEs and international treatises dedicated 
to the rights of the indigenous peoples 
include some form of control over their 
TCEs. The main international instrument 
here is the Declaration on the Rights of the 
Indigenous Peoples.
At the General Assembly of the United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, Malaysia, together with another 143 
states, voted in favour of the Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The 
event, which took place on 13th September 
2007, saw four countries voting against 
it. These four countries were Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United 
States. The enormous support received 
by the Declaration is a testimony to the 
recognition of the indigenous people’s 
1 WIPO: The Protection of Traditional Cultural 
Expressions: Draft Articles, Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/18/4Rev, available 
online at www.wipo.int
value and diversity of their cultures to 
the world (Kuruk, 2004). In relation to 
cultural heritage, Article 31 declares 
the dominion and intellectual property 
of the Indigenous Peoples over their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge 
and traditional cultural expressions. The 
broad term of traditional knowledge and 
TCE encompasses their manifestation 
of cultures, as well as their sciences and 
technologies. It also includes inter alia, 
oral traditions, literatures, human and 
genetic resources, knowledge of flora and 
fauna, and the like. As Malaysia has voted 
in favour of the Declaration, the country is 
duty-bound “to take effective  measures  to 
recognise and  protect the exercise of these 
rights”.
This paper considers only the 
punishment meted in the event of 
misappropriation of TCEs. As far as the 
current legislation is concerned, there is 
neither specific law addressing the issue 
of misappropriation of TCE in Malaysia, 
nor specific provisions under intellectual 
property laws, particularly the Copyright 
Act 1987 (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Act”). It considers whether criminal 
punishment can be proposed especially 
in cases where the moral interests of 
the practitioners of the TCEs have been 
impaired. In order to do this, the paper 
starts by discussing the position of TCE 
under the Copyright Act 1987, then the 
normal criminal provisions in the Act 
before venturing further into national and 
international initiatives on criminalising 
offences relating to TCEs.
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INDIGENOUS TCE IN MALAYSIA
Malaysia is a country of multi-racial 
population, blessed with diverse and unique 
cultural heritage. A small percentage of 
the population is the Indigenous people; 
though they are small in number, they 
greatly contribute to the cultural richness 
of the country. The Indigenous population 
of Malaysia includes the Orang Asli or 
“original people” in Peninsular Malaysia 
and the Indigenous people in Sabah and 
Sarawak. The Negritos, the Proto-Malay 
and the Senoi are among the major tribes 
of Orang Asli who live in Peninsular 
Malaysia. As compared to Peninsular 
Malaysia, Sabah has more diverse ethnic 
groups of the Indigenous people such as the 
Bajau, Murut and Dusun. In Sarawak, the 
Indigenous people include ethnics groups 
like the Iban, Melanau, Bidayuh and Orang 
Ulu. As a matter of fact, these Indigenous 
people have been practising and preserving 
their rich and unique cultural expressions 
which include inter alia, traditional dances, 
music instruments and various handicrafts. 
For example, a popular handicraft which 
belongs to the Iban of Sarawak is Pua 
Kumbu (hand-woven textile), while unique 
wood sculptures depicting forest spirits 
belong to the Mah Meri tribe who live on 
Carey Island in the state of Selangor.
TCE is undoubtedly a significant part, 
in fact an integral component, of the cultural 
heritage of a nation. This means that TCE is 
closely linked with the social identity of a 
nation, regardless of whether the country is 
categorised as a developed, developing or 
least developed. The notion is particularly 
relevant and proves to demonstrate the real 
challenge to some developing countries 
as they have encountered unjustifiable 
commercial exploitation of TCE by 
tradesmen who are not legally connected 
with the true owner of the TCEs. This in 
turn leads to unfortunate consequences as 
the Indigenous people, who were the real 
owners of the TCEs, would not be enjoying 
neither the economic reap nor reasonable 
profit from such unauthorised exploitation. 
It is disheartening to note that in some 
cases, very little or no respect at all was 
shown to the preservers of the TCEs in 
such dealings to the extent that the TCEs 
were exploited in ways that were culturally 
offensive, spiritually degrading and even 
insulting to the real custodians of the TCEs 
(Kuek, 2005).
Developing countries including 
Malaysia consider TCE as a valuable 
component of their cultural heritage and 
view their misappropriation as a serious 
threat to the integrity of the heritage. The 
serious efforts of developing countries 
on the need for an effective and feasible 
legal framework for the protection of TCE 
culminated in the proper legislation when 
many countries in the African continent 
incorporated specific provisions within their 
national copyright laws. Undoubtedly, there 
is a real need to find out an effective solution 
through a legal mechanism for protection and 
preservation of TCE (Farley, 1997-1998). 
As far as legal protection is concerned, 
copyright law is one of the mechanisms to 
protect the TCEs. Apparently, copyright 
law is thought as the possible option that 
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can afford adequate protection for the 
TCEs on the basis that it aims to prevent, 
inter alia unauthorised reproduction of the 
copyright works (where such TCEs satisfy 
the essential qualifications, or fall in the 
category of copyright works).
As far as copyright is concerned, it is 
a statutory, exclusive and assignable legal 
right given to the originator or creator in 
certain creative works such as literary, 
dramatic, musical, artistic and other 
intellectual works for a specific period. The 
main governing legislation in Malaysia 
pertaining to copyright is the Copyright 
Act 1987 (hereinafter “the Act”). Section 
7(10) of the Act expressly states that:
 “...the following works shall be eligible 
for copyright:
(a) literary works;
(b) musical works;
(c) artistic works;
(d)	 films;
(e) sound recordings; and
(f) broadcasts.
Section 10(1) further explains the 
eligibility of work to be protected under 
the Act: 
 Copyright shall also subsist in every 
work which is eligible for copyright 
and which—
(a)  being a literary, musical or artistic 
work	or	film	or	sound	recording	is	
first	published	in	Malaysia…”
 In Malaysia, it is not a requirement 
to register a copyright as the right 
automatically subsists once the work is 
completed. Therefore, the author has to be 
vigilant in keeping evidence of production 
of his/her work as that might be used in 
the future, for example, to pursue a case 
if the work is infringed, though it is not 
compulsory to do so. One of the most 
important rights out of bundle of rights 
conferred to the copyright owner is the 
right to control reproduction. This is 
provided under section 13 (1) of the Act 
which states:
 “Copyright in a literary, musical 
or	 artistic	 work,	 a	 film,	 or	 a	 sound	
recording or a  derivative work 
shall be the exclusive right to control in 
Malaysia: (a) the  reproduction in 
any	material	form…”
In this regard, those TCEs which 
comprise of tribal arts, tales and musical 
compositions would potentially be 
considered as literary, artistic and musical 
works under the domain of copyright. 
Nevertheless, section 7(3) of the Act 
expressly spells out the requirement for 
such works to be qualified for protection, 
that is, such works must be original in 
character. Having said that, the ensuing 
problem arises, as most of the TCEs 
belonging to the Indigenous people in 
Malaysia have been practised for so many 
generations and they have been passed 
down from the forefathers.
A careful scrutiny of the provisions 
of the Act reveals that there is no specific 
or direct provision relating to protection 
of TCEs in Malaysia. Nevertheless, it is 
still possible for certain forms of TCEs 
to be protected by the Act as long as they 
fulfil the requirements of copyright under 
the Act. In other words, the Act does not 
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foreclose new renditions of TCEs in the 
country from being subject matters under 
the purview of copyright. For instance, the 
handcrafts, wood carving and sculptures 
produced by the contemporary Indigenous 
people in the country may qualify for the 
scope of “artistic works” if “sufficient 
effort has been expended to make the 
works original in character” under section 
7(3) of the Act.
As far as TCEs vis-a-vis the Act 
is concerned, the only provision that 
mentions the phrase “expressions of 
folklore” is found in section 2 of the Act, 
under the definition of “live performance” 
in paragraph (a)(vi) which includes within 
the ambit of recognised performance as 
“performance in relation to expressions 
of folklore which is given live by one or 
more persons in Malaysia, whether in 
the presence of an audience or otherwise 
…”. Meanwhile, a “performer” is defined 
under the same section as “a person who 
performs a live performance under the 
Act”. In theory, it seems that expressions 
of folklore in Malaysia may possibly 
qualify for protection though through an 
indirect manner. In practice, however, in the 
absence of the definition of “expressions of 
folklore” in the Act, it is somehow not an 
easy task to ascertain the specific nature of 
expressions that falls within the scope of 
the provision. Apparently, the interpretation 
of the provision is left for judges to decide. 
The extent of the indirect protection of TCE 
provided by the Act is yet to be ascertained 
as at to date, there have been no reported 
cases on live performance of expressions of 
folklore.
Apart from the performer’s rights, 
another relevant provision is section 26(4)
(c) of the Act. This provision stipulates that 
“in the case of unpublished work where 
the identity of the author is unknown, but 
where there is every reason to presume 
that he is a Malaysian citizen, copyright 
in the work shall be deemed to vest in the 
Minister charged with the responsibility for 
culture”. From this provision, it is observed 
that if TCE meets the requirement of a 
literary, musical or artistic work within 
the meaning of the Act, copyright in such 
work shall be conferred to the Minister and 
the Minister is legally responsible to give 
proper protection as well as to enforce the 
rights of the unknown Malaysian author 
of such work in Malaysia. Such rights are 
equally afforded to authors from the Berne 
Union countries.
This article focuses on the criminal 
remedies for the infringement of TCEs 
since it is possible for TCE to be recognised 
under copyright law in Malaysia [in 
particular under Section 2 and section 26(4)
(c), as mentioned above] and fulfils the 
copyright requirements under Section 7(3) 
of the Act. In relation to criminal remedies, 
various attempts have been made over 
the years to furnish better legal remedies 
and solutions for the protection of TCEs, 
and these include discussion and proposal 
of imposing criminal penalties for wilful 
infringement involving TCEs.
Thus, in principle, many of the TCEs 
are protectable subject matters under the 
copyright law. In terms of fulfilling the 
conditions for subsistence of protection and 
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duration, however, there would be problems 
satisfying the requirement of the copyright 
law (Moran, 2008). The “originality” 
requirement under section 7(3)(a) of the 
Act, which is of paramount importance, 
means that copyright protection is only 
conferred to the “original” works, and many 
traditional literary and artistic productions 
are not “original” in this sense. In addition, 
certain ‘fixed’ expressions under section 
7(3)(b) of the Act may not fulfil the 
requirement of an artistic work such as 
sand carvings, body painting, face painting 
and the like. Looking from another angle, 
adaptations of TCEs can still qualify for the 
copyright protection and hence be legally 
protected as the ‘original’ copyright work 
and designs (Lim, 2012). In fact, there are 
quite a number of limitations of copyright 
law vis-a-vis protection of TCEs as have 
been suggested by many legal jurists and 
authors, but the originality requirement 
and the fixation requirement are some of 
the oft-cited ones (Vanguardia, 2011-2012; 
Farley, 1997-1998; Kuruk, 1998-1999).
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT & 
CRIMINAL REMEDIES
Infringement has always been one of 
the issues revolving around intellectual 
property rights, and this includes copyright. 
Infringement occurs when a person does or 
causes other persons to do an act controlled 
by copyright without the consent of the 
owner. Those acts are listed under Section 
36 of the Act which include sale, distribution 
and exhibition of the product in the public for 
purpose of sale. Misappropriation of TCEs 
may amount to copyright infringement 
(on the assumption that TCE is protected 
under copyright) in various ways, such 
as by way of unauthorised reproduction 
or commercialisation of  handicrafts or 
products made by Indigenous people 
with no sharing of economic benefits, neither 
monetary profit nor acknowledgment of 
the original creator [which falls under the 
purview of moral rights of copyright law, 
i.e. section 25(2) of the Act].
When an infringement of copyright has 
occurred, civil actions may be initiated by 
the copyright owner. Remedies available 
to the copyright owner include inter alia, 
damages and injunction. Section 37(1) of 
the Act clearly provides that “Subject to 
this Act, infringements of copyright shall 
be actionable at the suit of the owner of 
the copyright and in any action for such 
an infringement, all such relief by way of 
damages, injunction, accounts or otherwise, 
shall be available to the plaintiff as are 
available in any corresponding proceedings 
in respect of infringement of other proprietary 
rights”. A defendant who has infringed an 
IPR may also face criminal action for his 
infringing activities. The criminalisation of 
these activities, instead of simply making 
them the subject of civil suit, is justified 
because of the mischief these activities 
have caused on the society. The criminal 
offences include making for selling or hire, 
or exhibiting for the purpose of sale and 
importing infringed goods into Malaysia. 
The punishment meted upon conviction 
can be quite dire, i.e. a combination of 
both monetary fine and imprisonment. The 
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enforcement of copyright criminal offence 
is done by the Enforcement Division of the 
Ministry of Domestic Trade, Cooperatives 
and Consumerism.
It is to be noted that provisions on 
enforcement are provided under Part 
VII Copyright Act 1987, from section 44 
to section 57. The seized goods can be 
subjected to forfeiture regardless whether 
the perpetrator is convicted guilty or not 
for the offence. The criminalisation of 
certain copyright offences can be a useful 
mechanism to deter the public from 
committing certain offences.
In relation to TCEs, criminal 
offences can be a strong weapon 
against misappropriation of these 
expressions outside the cultural domain 
of such practices. In addition, where the 
misappropriation leads to offensive use 
of revered images of the TCEs, stronger 
punishment should entail. This requires 
a careful revision of the current criminal 
provisions to reflect the sanctity of certain 
images of TCEs which should be meted 
with heavier punishment.
In order to understand which context 
criminal offences can be introduced, this 
article further examines the practices 
in some national legislations, as well 
as recommendations in international 
framework such as WIPO and UNESCO.
NATIONAL COUNTRIES 
EXPERIENCE WITH CRIMINAL 
OFFENCES DEALING WITH TCEs
Legal mechanisms in several countries 
tend to show a trend of tightening their 
copyright laws and enforcement in 
addressing misappropriation of TCEs. 
Some countries have taken serious efforts by 
treating copyright infringement as offences 
under criminal law, and these include 
misappropriation of TCEs (Tellez & Waitara, 
2007). In comparison to other regions, 
African countries have been observed to 
be very vocal in protecting their TCEs. 
For instance, a paramount significance 
is attached to the legal definitions of the 
term ‘folklore’ and interestingly, this has 
underscored the importance of communal 
rights (Blavin, 2003). A cursory look at 
various copyright laws of African countries 
reveals that the legislation affords a 
comprehensive definition to ‘folklore’. 
For example, S.31(5) Copyright Act 1999 
(Nigeria) defines folklore as:
 “a group-oriented and tradition-based 
creation of groups or individuals 
reflecting the expectation of the 
community as an adequate expression 
of its cultural and social identity, its 
standards and values as transmitted 
orally, by imitation or by other means.”
Likewise, a similar definition is 
incorporated in the legislation of other 
African countries. Art. 15, Law on 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Congo) 
1982 for instance, defines folklore as:
 “all literary and artistic productions 
created on the national territory by 
authors presumed to be Congolese 
nationals or by Congolese ethnic 
communities, passed from generation 
to generation and constituting one 
of the basic elements of the national 
traditional cultural heritage.”
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A similar provision can also be found 
in Art. 4 of Decree-Law Regulating the 
Rights of Authors and Intellectual Property 
(Burundi, 1978), which defines folklore as:
 “all literary, artistic and scientific 
works created on the national territory 
by authors  presumed to be nationals 
of Burundi, passed from generation to 
generation and  constituting one 
of the basic elements of the traditional 
cultural heritage.”
From the above-mentioned legislations, 
statutory examples of folklore would 
include poetry, riddles, songs, instrumental 
music, dances, and plays, productions 
of art in drawings, paintings, carvings, 
sculptures, pottery, handicrafts, costumes, 
as well as indigenous textiles and the like, 
though these examples are not exhaustive. 
Other than the national laws, regional 
efforts of the African Intellectual Property 
Organization have also come up with a 
broader definition of folklore. Annex VII 
of the Revised Bangui Agreement of 1999 
folklore denotes:
 “…literary, artistic, religious, scientific, 
technological and other traditions and 
productions as a whole created by 
communities and handed down from 
generation to generation.”
Interestingly, African legislatures have 
developed some other alternative legal 
mechanisms in order to enhance the current 
protection over folklore rights. A relevant 
example is a number of African copyright 
laws which enunciate that such copyright 
may be vested in the government instead 
of individual or communal rights. This 
mechanism is possible as the government 
is treated as if it were the creator of 
the original work. Another round of 
observation on Nigerian laws (which has 
express provisions on this point) reveals 
that legal protection of IPRs is specifically 
expounded under the Nigerian Copyright 
Act, with amendments in 1992 and 1999. 
S. 28(1) of the 1999 Act, states:
  “Expressions of folklore are protected 
against:
(a) reproduction;
(b)  communication to the public 
by performance, broadcasting, 
distribution by cable or other 
means;
(c)  adaptation, translation and other 
transformations, when such 
expressions are made either for 
commercial purposes or outside 
their traditional or customary 
context.”
Thus, it is apparent from the above 
provision that the Nigerian laws have 
managed to include the aspect of protection 
of the cultural rights and traditional cultural 
expressions which many developing 
countries are still hesitant to follow suit, 
the reasons inter alia, for fear that such 
provision may be exploited (Ezeani, 2011). 
It is also worth noting that S. 29A of the 
1999 Copyright Laws specifically provides 
for criminal liability for the infringement 
of any expression of folklore. It states that:
 “Criminal liability in respect of 
infringement of folklore.
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29A. (1) A person who -
(a)  does any of the acts set 
out in section 28 of this 
Decree without the consent 
or authorisation of the 
Commission; or
(b)  does not comply with the 
requirement in subsection (4) 
of section 28 of this Decree; 
or
(c)  wilfully misrepresents the 
source of an expression of 
folklore; or
(d)  wilfully distorts an 
expression of folklore in a 
manner prejudicial to the 
honour, dignity or cultural 
interests of the community in 
which it originates, commits 
an offence under this Decree.
(2)  A person convicted of an 
offence under subsection (1) 
of this section is liable on 
conviction; 
(a)  in the case of an individual, 
to a fine not exceeding N 
100,000 or to imprisonment 
for a term of 12 months 
or to both such fine and 
imprisonment; 
                  and
(b)  in the case of a body 
corporate, to a fine of 
N500,000.”
Criminalisation of illegal misappropriation 
of TCEs would run parallel to the notion 
that the illegal taking should be considered 
as a crime; in fact, it is not a concept that 
is foreign to intellectual property law. 
Proposal and suggestions for criminal 
sanctions and remedies are made with 
the primary goal of deterring the criminal 
conduct, while also providing a realistic, 
achievable remedy for indigenous people 
(Vincent, 2010) who are often a vulnerable 
party in misappropriation cases involving 
TCEs. Criminalisation of infringement 
of TCEs owned by indigenous people 
would to some extent address the problem 
of misappropriation of TCEs and hence 
facilitate better protection of their rights.
Since intellectual property is 
recognised and generally considered as 
a form of property, the proposition to 
criminalise primary infringements of 
copyright could be justified on the same 
reasoning as offences pertaining to the 
violation of general property interests. A 
relevant example would include the law of 
theft (Cheng, 2010).
Other than African countries, several 
other countries have also legislated on 
TCEs at the national level by criminalising 
several activities constituting the 
misappropriation of TCEs with particular 
emphasis on indigenous TCEs (Kuruk, 
1998-1999). Of notable mention is the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act (2000) of the 
United States of America. The Act was 
passed with the objective of preventing 
commercial interests from falsely 
representing their services with indigenous 
peoples. Section 104(a), for instance, 
“prohibits misrepresentation in marketing 
of Indian arts and crafts products in the 
US” comes with “criminal penalties 
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punishable with fines up to $250,000 of five 
years imprisonment”. The Implementing 
Regulations (Section 309.2(d)(1) further 
clarifies that, “an  Indian product covers 
only any art or craft product made by 
an Indian both in traditional and non-
traditional Indian style or medium.”
It is clear that the Act makes it illegal, 
and hence it is a criminal offence to sell or 
to be involved in trade activities in respect 
of an art or craft when a person claims 
them to be created by an Indian, but the 
truth is that they are not really the products 
of Indian. It is thus a crime to sell products 
claiming to be Indian Jewellery in US if it 
is not true. The only constraint in the Act 
is that it only applies to the arts and crafts 
produced after 1935 and the producer of 
the concerned Indian products must be a 
US resident.
In the ASEAN region, the Philippines 
has successfully legislated a broad range 
of indigenous rights. Under the Philippines 
national laws, among the rights conferred 
to the indigenous people are the right to 
control and govern ancestral domains, as 
well as the right to self-governance and 
empowerment, to be given social justice 
and equal treatment as part of human rights 
and more fundamentally cultural integrity 
over their cultural heritage. As the Act 
serves to recognise and promote all rights 
of the indigenous cultural communities, it 
provides for criminal punishment for certain 
rights and obligations laid down in Section 
72 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act 
of 1997. This includes unauthorised and/
or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands 
(as spelt out in Section 21). The Act also 
covers the unlawful acts pertaining to 
employment (section 24), as well as rights 
to religious, cultural sites and ceremonies 
(Section 33). The provision clearly states 
that the commission of violation of any 
of the provisions of the Act will entail 
criminal punishment and is not confined to 
only the situations mentioned.
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES
The Western copyright system is not 
designed to give full recognition of the 
interests of the right holders of TCEs 
(Torsen, 2008). It is for this very reason 
that WIPO’s Intergovernmental Committee 
on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore (WIPO IGC) recommends for 
a mixture of proprietary, non-proprietary 
and non-Intellectual Property measures 
(Girsberger, 2008). This will ensure a 
more comprehensive treatment of TCEs by 
considering both the monetary and moral 
interests of the right holders.
The Model Provisions for the National 
Laws on the Protection of expressions of 
folklore against illicit exploitations and 
other prejudicial actions (1985) prepared 
by UNESCO and WIPO are among the 
earliest model laws on TCEs. The Model 
Provisions recommend penal provisions in 
four instances, as follows:
i)  Wilful non-compliance with 
section 5. Section 5 deals with 
acknowledgement of source  
of TCEs. Thus, by deliberately 
not mentioning the source of 
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the TCEs, i.e. the community or 
geographic place where the TCEs 
are derived would entail criminal 
sanction.
ii)  Wilful utilisation of TCE without 
the authorization or consent of 
the holder of the TCEs. In this 
context, utilisation includes 
publication, reproduction and any 
distribution of  copies  of TCEs 
or public recitation, performance 
transmission and communication 
of such TCEs.
iii)  Deceiving the origin of artefacts 
or subject matters of performances 
or recitations made available to the 
public to be derived from a certain 
traditional community when they 
are not.
iv)  When a person publicly uses, in 
any direct or indirect manner, 
expressions of  folklore wilfully 
distorting the same that would 
prejudice the cultural integrity of 
the TCEs.
On that score, the WIPO IGC during 
its seventh session in Geneva (2004) 
recommends that any type of legislative 
solution must address the interests of the 
traditional communities themselves. Any 
legislative solution must address certain 
key objectives such as raising deference 
over traditional cultures and folklore, with 
the aims of paying reverence to the dignity, 
cultural integrity, as well as intellectual 
and spiritual values of the right holders of 
the TCE. One way of achieving these is by 
empowering them to assert authority over 
their own TCEs including taking action 
against perpetrators, should they wish to 
do so.
The WIPO IGC recognises the need 
to look at the interests of the traditional 
community in a broader perspective. The 
Report stresses the need to explore a wide 
range of legal mechanisms to achieve 
the intended objectives of the protection 
and not just within the narrow confines 
of copyright. This includes a mixture of 
non-proprietary and non IP measures. 
Among the non-IP measures highlighted 
in the Report is the law in relation to the 
promotion of arts and handicrafts.
The WIPO IGC recommends member 
countries to restrain the offensive use of 
TCEs that might prejudice the honour of 
the beneficiaries or the integrity of the 
TCEs. In particular, Article 8 recommends 
member countries to adopt measures that 
are necessary to prevent wilful or negligent 
infringement against the economic or moral 
interests of the TCE holders sufficient to 
deter them from repeating the conduct in 
the future.
Among the conducts that may justify 
effective sanctions in the WIPO IGC 
Report (2004) include:
“ (a)  unauthorized reproduction, 
adaptation and subsequent 
commercialisation of TCEs, with 
no sharing of economic benefits;
 (b)  use of TCEs in ways that 
are insulting, degrading and/
or culturally and spiritually 
offensive;
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 (c)  unauthorised access to, and 
disclosure and use of sacred/
secret materials;
 (d)  appropriation of traditional 
languages;
 (e)  unauthorised fixation of live 
performances of TCEs and 
subsequent acts in relation to 
those fixations;
 (f)  appropriation of the reputation 
or distinctive character of TCEs 
in ways that evoke an authentic 
traditional product, by use of 
misleading or false indications 
as to authenticity or origin, or 
adoption of their methods of 
manufacture and ‘style’;
 (g)  failure to acknowledge the 
traditional source of a tradition-
based creation or innovation;
 (h)  granting of erroneous industrial 
property rights over TCEs and 
derivatives thereof.”
From the WIPO IGC Report, several 
observations can be drawn. A broad range 
of offences can be created in relation to the 
misappropriation of TCEs. Among them are 
those considered as ‘harming’ the cultural 
identity of the TCEs. These include the use 
of the TCEs in culturally degrading manner 
and failure to acknowledge the source of 
the TCEs. However, some offences that 
impaired the material needs of the rights 
holder can also be penalised. These include 
unauthorised access to secret/sacred TCE, 
the sale of fake indigenous arts and crafts 
and the granting of IPRs over the TCEs. 
Both the impairment of the materials 
and moral interest of the TCEs can cause 
considerable harm to the society and 
should be penalised. If the widespread 
sales of fake indigenous arts and crafts are 
left unchecked, there is little respect left 
for creativity and on the basis of just theory 
should be curbed.
Another important model law is the 
South Pacific Model Law for National Laws 
(2002) lends support to the proposition 
that certain misappropriation of TCEs can 
be criminalised. Section 26 of the Model 
Law provides the criminal punishment for 
a person who makes use of TCE outside its 
traditional usage or uses it for commercial 
purpose without prior consent from the 
right holders. Other instances of criminal 
offences are acts inconsistent with the 
moral rights of their traditional holders are 
inter alia, Section 27 of the South Pacific 
Model Law for National Laws (2002), 
where TCEs which are kept sacred and 
secret are used outside their customary 
use (as provided under Section 28 of the 
Model Laws) and also Section 29, which 
provides for importation or exportation of 
TCEs without the prior informed consent 
of the TCEs.
From these international documents, 
we can propose that certain usage of TCEs 
must, as a matter of policy, be criminalised. 
Only then can we take effective measures 
against misappropriation of TCEs, which 
will not only harm the right holders but 
also the society.
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CONCLUSION & 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The extension of copyright over TCEs 
is the most logical argument raised by 
many scholars. Similarly in Malaysia, 
certain renditions of TCEs qualify for 
copyright protection. Once recognised as a 
subject matter of copyright, the extension 
of the criminal provisions to cover the 
misappropriation of TCEs is the next 
logical move.
Both UNESCO and WIPO have 
developed model laws that can be used 
against misappropriation of TCEs. These 
two model laws recommend criminalising 
of activities that impair both the moral 
and material interests of the TCE right 
holders. These recommendations support 
the practices in some countries that have 
legislated to this effect such as Nigeria and 
the Philippines. Meanwhile, the US targets 
only the sale of fake indigenous arts and 
crafts.
All these international and national 
initiatives attest to the fact that more 
should be done to arrest the widespread 
misappropriation of TCEs. Criminalising 
certain offences that harm the interest of 
the right holders of the TCEs serves not 
only the right holder’s interest but also the 
society. In Malaysia, this can be done by 
extending the criminal provisions to cover 
the situations mentioned in the WIPO 
IGC reports. Another way to do this is by 
having a special part dedicated solely to 
the criminalisation of misappropriation 
of TCEs. The newly introduced part for 
criminal offences relating to camcording 
could be a good example. If camcording 
can be criminalised, so can offences that 
impair the materials and moral interests 
of the TCEs. In addition, further support 
can also be obtained from Article 61 of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that 
allows the criminalisation of copyright 
offences “particularly when they are 
committed willfully and on a commercial 
scale.” Most of the sales of fake indigenous 
arts and crafts are done with blatant 
disregard of the rights of the TCE holders 
and with the intent of making commercial 
profit. To that extent, the criminalisation of 
misappropriation of TCEs falls squarely 
within Article 61 TRIPS Agreement and 
thus, is justifiable.
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